





























in	 times	 of	 international	 disputes	 and	 a	 state’s	 dispute	 behaviour	 have	 traditionally	
focused	on	hostile	statements	used	by	political	 leaders	to	deter	or	compel	adversaries.	
This	 ignores	 the	 reality	 that	 political	 leaders	 often	 use	 both	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements	 in	 the	 context	 of	 disputes	 and	 limits	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 these	
different	 types	 of	 statements	 may	 have	 differing	 effects	 on	 the	 policies	 that	 a	 state	
employs	in	engaging	its	adversaries.	It	also	obscures	the	possibility	that	theory	linking	
the	hostile	 statements	 of	 political	 leaders	 to	 their	 states’	 dispute	 behaviour	 is	 equally	
applicable	 to	conciliatory	statements;	 the	prevailing	 focus	on	hostile	statements	stems	
from	scholarly	convention	rather	than	theoretical	principle.	
This	 thesis	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 first	 attempts	 to	 systematically	 collect	 data	 on	 the	
conciliatory	 statements	 used	 by	 US	 presidents	 during	 international	 disputes.	 In	 early	
chapters	 I	highlight	 the	omission	of	 conciliatory	statements	 from	 foregoing	analyses.	 I	
demonstrate	 that	 the	 logical	 extension	 of	much	 of	 the	 theory	 and	 empirical	 evidence	
present	in	the	relevant	literature	is	to	hypothesise	that	conciliatory	statements	made	by	
political	 leaders	 in	 the	 context	 of	 disputes	 will	 be	 negatively	 associated	 with	 that	
leader’s	state	using	armed	force	against	its	dispute	adversaries.	I	also	hypothesise	that	
the	more	 the	balance	of	 conciliatory	 and	hostile	 statements	used	by	 a	political	 leader	
favours	conciliatory	statements,	 the	 lesser	 the	odds	 that	 the	state	 in	question	will	use	
armed	force	against	its	adversaries.	
Later	chapters	are	dedicated	to	explaining	my	methodological	approach	and	empirical	
findings.	Using	McManus’	 (2014)	dataset	 of	 272	dyadic	militarised	 interstate	disputes	
involving	 the	 US	 between	 1950-2010,	 I	 employ	 inferential	 statistics	 to	 test	 the	
relationships	 between	 the	 frequency	 of	 hostile	 presidential	 statements,	 conciliatory	
presidential	 statements	and	 the	use	of	armed	 force	by	 the	US.	The	 first	 finding	of	 this	
analysis	is	that	conciliatory	statements	made	by	US	presidents	do	not	have	a	statistically	
significant	 relationship	 with	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 force	 against	 its	 adversaries.	 This	 is	 an	
interesting	 finding,	 given	 that	 existing	 theory	 would	 suggest	 that	 conciliatory	
statements	should	be	negatively	correlated	with	the	US	using	armed	force.	The	second	
finding	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 shares	 a	
statistically	significant	relationship	with	the	use	of	armed	force	by	the	US.	The	greater	




In	 concluding	 I	 discuss	 the	 above	 findings,	 highlighting	 how	 they	 relate	 to	 existing	
theory.	I	also	consider	potential	avenues	for	future	research.	Finally,	I	reiterate	the	main	
contributions	that	this	thesis	makes	to	existing	literature.	The	data	collected	herein	are	
the	 first	 systematically	 collected	 on	 US	 presidents’	 use	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 in	
dispute	 settings.	This	data	enables	 the	 first	 statistical	 analysis	of	whether	variation	 in	
the	 frequency	of	conciliatory	and	hostile	statements	made	by	US	presidents	 in	dispute	
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1.1 A Pressing Matter 
The	 election	 of	 Donald	 Trump	 in	 the	 2016	 US	 presidential	 election,	 and,	 indeed,	 the	
preceding	campaign	run	by	Trump,	raised	many	questions	about	US	and	global	politics.	
One	 of	 these	 questions	 is	what	 impact	 the	words	 uttered	 by	 political	 leaders,	 and	US	
presidents	in	particular,	might	have	on	the	course	of	international	disputes.	Indeed,	the	
inflammatory	remarks	Trump	made	toward	foreign	states	and	their	leaders	throughout	
his	 campaigning	 were	 one	 of	 the	 major	 concerns	 voiced	 regarding	 his	 candidacy.	
Commentators	 and	members	 of	 the	 American	 public	 expressed	 concern	 that	 such	 an	
approach	 to	 international	 relations	 could	 have	material	 consequences	 for	 the	 foreign	
policy	 of	 the	 United	 States,	 antagonising	 allies	 and	 adversaries	 alike	 (Hosenball,	
Mohammed	&	Spetalnick,	2016;	Sargent,	2016).	
Yet,	 doubt	 remained	 regarding	 the	 motivations	 and	 consequentiality	 of	 Trump’s	
statements.	Public	trust	in	politicians	is	low	and	declining	(Pew	Research	Centre,	2017).	
This	distrust	or	scepticism	was	detectable	in	the	2016	election.	Trump’s	own	aides	and	
supporters	 promoted	 the	 idea	 that	 Trump	 was	 putting	 on	 a	 show	 during	 his	
campaigning	and	that	his	rhetoric	would	be	moderated	as	he	got	closer	and	closer	to	the	
White	House	(see	Holland	&	Becker,	2016;	Leibovich,	2016).	
Ultimately,	 the	 period	 surrounding	 the	 2016	 US	 presidential	 election	 was	 a	 time	 of	
concern	or,	at	least,	confusion	regarding	the	potential	consequences	of	statements	made	
by	 political	 leaders.	 This	 confusion	 has	 continued	 over	 into	 the	 first	 year	 of	 Trump’s	
presidency,	 as	 analysts	 and	 other	 policy-makers	 have	 attempted	 to	 understand	 the	
intentions	 behind	 and	 consequences	 of	 Trump’s	 statements	 (see	 Baker	 &	 Sang-Hun,	
2017;	Davis,	2017).	Academics	too	have	been	concerned	with,	and	indeed	confused	by,	
this	 question,	 only	 for	 some	period	 longer	 than	 the	 last	 two	 years	 that	 have	 seen	 the	
candidacy	and	election	of	Donald	Trump	as	President	of	the	United	States.	Recognising	
that,	perhaps	something	we	can	all	 agree	on,	politicians	 talk	quite	a	 lot,	 there	exists	a	
body	of	research	on	what	the	consequences	of	their	statements	might	be.	
Much	 of	 this	 literature	 focuses	 particularly	 on	 periods	 of	 conflict	 between	 states	 and	




to	 questions	 of	 why	 state	 leaders	 may	 or	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 deter	 aggression	 from	
adversaries	via	 their	 spoken	 statements.	 In	particular,	 the	great	majority	of	 this	work	
focused	upon	threatening	or	hostile	statements.	Indeed,	many	later	works	(see	Bueno	de	
Mesquita,	 1992;	 Schultz,	 2001;	 Sartori,	 2005)	 still	 considered	 their	 subject	 of	
observation	 deterrent	 threats	made	 by	 political	 leaders.	 The	 question	 they	 sought	 to	
answer	was	under	which	conditions	such	threats	would	be	successful	or	unsuccessful	in	
deterring	an	adversary.	
This	 study	 also	 focuses	 on	 the	 context	 of	 disputes	 between	 states.	However,	 it	 differs	
markedly	 from	preceding	 literature	 in	 that	 it	moves	 away	 from	an	 exclusive	 focus	 on	
hostile	statements	used	by	political	leaders.	I	contend	herein	that	omitting	statements	in	
which	political	 leaders	 express	 conciliatory	 intentions	 regarding	 their	 adversaries	has	
been	a	notable	gap	in	the	scholarship	on	the	subject	of	political	leadership	speech	and	its	
consequences.	While	 there	have	now	been	efforts	 (see	McManus,	2014)	 to	 investigate	
and	 compile	 the	 types	of	 hostile1	statements	US	presidents	use	 regarding	 adversaries,	
there	 has	 not	 been	 any	 effort	 to	 code	 and	 compile	 those	 statements	 in	 which	 US	
presidents	express	conciliatory	intentions.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	even	during	times	
of	 intense	disputes	presidents	use	 conciliatory	 statements	 to	 address	adversaries.	 For	
example,	in	the	late	1950s	Dwight	Eisenhower	declared	that	the	US	would	“always	keep	
open	the	door	of	honest	discussion”	(Peters	&	Woolley,	2018)	despite,	and	in	response	





have	 an	 independent	 effect	 on	 the	 enacted	 foreign	 policy	 of	 their	 own	 state.	 The	
question	becomes	not	whether	hostile	statements	made	by	US	presidents,	for	example,	










that	 adversary.	 This	 thesis	 analyses	 this	 connection,	 investigating	 whether	 US	
presidents’	use	of	conciliatory	and	hostile	statements	has	a	relationship	with	the	US’	use	
of	armed	force	against	adversaries.	
1.2 What to Expect From the Following 
The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	explore	the	veracity	of	the	quote	with	which	it	began.	Do	
words	matter?	 In	 particular,	 do	 the	 conciliatory	 and	hostile	 statements	US	 presidents	
use	publicly	 in	 times	of	 international	 disputes	matter	 in	 that	 they	have	 a	 relationship	
with	whether	the	US	uses	armed	force	against	its	adversaries?	
I	explore	these	questions	via	quantitative	methods.	Using	a	dataset	including	272	dyadic	
militarised	 interstate	 disputes	 involving	 the	 US	 between	 1950-2010,	 I	 measure	 the	
proportion	 of	words	 uttered	 by	US	 presidents	 in	 the	 context	 of	 each	 dispute	 that	 are	
accounted	 for	 by	 conciliatory	 or	 hostile	 statements.	 Employing	 logistic	 regression	
analysis	 I	 investigate	whether	 variation	 in	 the	 proportion	 of	 words	 accounted	 for	 by	
conciliatory	 and/or	 hostile	 statements	 is	 related	 to	 variation	 in	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 armed	
force	 against	 adversaries;	 the	 US	 employs	 armed	 force	 in	 some	 disputes	 but	 not	 in	
others.	This	analysis	is	built	upon	a	rigorous	coding	process	in	which	I	built	a	dictionary	
of	 conciliatory	 terms	by	 reading	 a	 random	sample	of	 presidential	 speech	made	 in	 the	
context	of	the	aforementioned	272	dyadic	militarised	interstate	disputes.	
Collecting	 data	 on	 the	 use	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 by	 US	 presidents	 represents	 a	
significant	 addition	 to	 existing	 literature	 on	 the	 nature	 and	 consequences	 of	 public	
verbal	 communication	 used	 by	 political	 leaders	 during	 times	 of	 dispute.	 Firstly,	
examining	conciliatory	statements	 forces	us	to	re-examine	existing	theory.	 In	doing	so	
we	see	that	existing	theoretical	arguments	that	link	hostile	statements	made	by	political	
leaders	 to	 their	 state’s	 subsequent	 dispute	 behaviour	 apply	 equally	 to	 conciliatory	
statements.	This	helps	to	demonstrate	that	the	prevailing	focus	on	hostile	statements	in	
foregoing	 literature	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 convention,	 rather	 than	 theoretical	 consideration.	
Secondly,	it	simply	gives	us	a	greater	descriptive	understanding	of	the	public	statements	
used	by	US	presidents	during	disputes.	Intuitively	we	know	that	US	presidents	express	
conciliation	 to	 adversaries	 at	 times,	 yet	 before	now	 there	has	 not	 been	 an	 attempt	 to	
systematically	 collect	 and	 codify	 the	 statements	by	which	presidents	have	historically	
done	so.	Thirdly,	incorporating	both	conciliatory	and	hostile	statements	into	an	analysis	
of	 how	presidential	 statements	might	 influence	 the	US’	 dispute	 behaviour,	 such	 as	 its	
use	 of	 force	 against	 adversaries,	 offers	 greater	 analytic	 accuracy.	 Such	 an	 analysis	
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recognises	 the	 empirical	 reality	 that	 US	 presidents	 often	 use	 both	 conciliatory	 and	
hostile	 statements	 in	 a	 single	 dispute	 and	 that	 both	 types	 of	 statements	 may	 have	
differing	effects	on	the	odds	that	the	US	uses	force	against	an	adversary.	
My	 statistical	 analysis	 yields	 two	 findings.	 First,	 conciliatory	 statements	 alone	 do	 not	
exhibit	 a	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	 variation	 in	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 force	
against	adversaries.	Variation	in	the	proportion	of	words	uttered	by	US	presidents	in	the	
context	 of	 each	 dispute	 that	 are	 accounted	 for	 by	 conciliatory	 statements	 does	 not	
appear	 related	 to	 variation	 in	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 force.	 This	 finding	 points	 to	 a	 need	 for	
further	 theoretical	development	 in	 the	 field,	as	existing	 theory	and	empirical	evidence	
suggest	that	there	should	be	such	a	statistically	significant	relationship.	
Second,	 when	 measuring	 presidential	 speech	 in	 a	 way	 that	 accounts	 for	 both	
conciliatory	and	hostile	statements	used	by	US	presidents	in	the	context	of	disputes	we	






statements	 increases	 relative	 to	 the	 proportion	 of	 words	 accounted	 for	 by	 hostile	
statements	 the	 odds	 of	 the	 US	 using	 armed	 force	 against	 its	 adversary	 decrease.	
Statistical	 modelling	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements	 performs	 better	 than	 a	measure	 of	 hostile	 statements	 alone	 in	 explaining	




various	 arguments	 in	 existing	 literature	 for	 why	 the	 public	 statements	 made	 by	 US	
presidents	regarding	an	adversary	should	or	should	not	influence	the	US’	use	of	armed	
force	 against	 that	 adversary.	 These	 arguments	 almost	 exclusively	 focus	 on	 hostile	
statements.	 In	 the	 Theoretical	 Framework	 I	 note	 that	 if	 we	 accept	 the	 arguments	
suggesting	 that	 hostile	 presidential	 statements	 should	have	 an	 influence	 on	US	use	 of	
armed	force,	then	so	too	should	conciliatory	statements.	I	conclude	that	there	is	a	need	
to	test	the	notion	that	US	presidential	statements	towards	an	adversary	influence	US	use	
of	 armed	 force	against	 that	 adversary,	 and	 to	do	 so	when	measuring	both	hostile	 and	
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conciliatory	statements.	Research	Design	and	Methodology	parts	one	and	two	explain	the	
quantitative,	 statistical	 processes	 by	 which	 I	 went	 about	 this	 testing	 and	 the	 data	
collection	 and	 coding	 processes	 through	which	 I	 collected	 data	 on	 presidential	 use	 of	
conciliatory	 statements	 in	 dispute	 settings	 between	 1950-2010.	 The	 Descriptive	
Statistics	and	Inferential	Statistics	chapters	present	the	findings	of	this	testing.	I	end	with	





2 Literature Review 
A	mentor	of	mine	tells	me	that	conducting	a	 literature	review	is	 like	 looking	for	(or	at	
least	looking	to	explain	the	existence	of)	the	“empty	room”;	a	room	yet	to	be	furnished	
with	the	research	questions,	theoretical	propositions,	hypotheses	or	empirical	findings	
of	 previous	 studies.	 The	 room	 represents	 a	 research	 gap	 or	 question	 yet	 to	 be	 asked.	
While	 the	 room	 is	 empty,	 it	 has	 parameters	 or	 boundaries.	 Rooms	 in	 which	 other	





This	 chapter	 begins	 by	 explaining	 the	 surrounding	 rooms.	 I	 introduce	 foregoing	
literature	 that	 has	 sought	 to	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 public	 statements	
political	leaders	make	in	the	context	of	disputes	and	the	outcomes	of	those	disputes	or	
the	 behaviour	 of	 participating	 states	 therein.	 I	 trace	 the	 evolution	 of	 this	 literature,	
discuss	 the	ways	 in	which	 key	 concepts	 are	 conceptualised	 and	 highlight	 the	 puzzles	
presented.	Following	this	I	identify	what	I	believe	to	be	an	empty	room:	there	have	been	




2.1 Communication in Politics 




adversary.	 Fundamental,	 then,	 to	 this	 enquiry	 is	 communication	 and	 how	 it	 is	
conceptualised.	
I	wish	to	avoid	a	discussion	of	the	philosophy	of	language.	However,	it	needs	to	be	made	
clear	 at	 the	 outset	 that	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 different	 ways	 of	 conceptualising	
communication	and,	therefore,	there	are	different	ways	to	examine	how	communication	
might	 influence	 individual	 or	 group	 behaviour.	 Christer	 Jönsson’s	 (1990)	
Communication	 in	 International	Bargaining	 provides	 a	 nice	 explanation	 of	what	 is	 the	
key	 point	 of	 contention.	 Jönsson	 contrasts	 a	 “traditional	 approach”	 of	 studying	
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communication	against	a	“constructivist	approach”.	The	former	“highlights	the	process	
of	 exchanging	 messages	 while	 treating	 the	 meaning	 of	 these	 messages	 as	 given”	
(Jönsson,	 1990,	 p.	 13).	 Constructivist	 thought,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 more	 concerned	
with	the	production	of	meaning	and	the	power	of	language	to	construct	the	very	objects,	
categories,	 etc.,	 to	which	we	 otherwise,	 under	 the	 traditional	 view	 of	 communication,	
would	say	language	refers.2	
Herein	I	investigate	the	relationship	between	political	leaders’	statements	and	their	use	
of	 armed	 force	 against	 adversaries	 in	 a	manner	 in	 line	with	 the	 traditional	 approach	
described	 above.	 This	 is	 not	 because	 I	 believe	 this	 approach	 is	 the	 only	 one	 with	
worthwhile	things	to	say	on	the	role	of	communication	in	international	disputes.	Nor	is	
it	 because	 I	 believe	 such	 an	 approach	 represents	 the	 best	 understanding	 of	
communication	as	a	phenomenon.	Rather,	as	I	will	demonstrate	below,	there	is	a	long-
existing,	well-established,	 body	 of	 literature	 investigating	 the	 role	 of	 political	 leaders’	
statements	in	influencing	the	course	of	international	disputes	that	has	(largely)	adopted	
the	 traditional	 approach	 to	 communication.	 I	wish	 to	 examine	 this	 body	 of	 literature,	
point	out	the	gaps	that	I	believe	exist	in	it	and	go	some	way	towards	filling	in	these	gaps	
while	operating	under	the	same	assumptions	held	in	this	body	of	literature.	In	doing	so	I	
hope	 to	 show	 that	 the	 gaps	 I	 perceive	 and	 the	propositions	 I	 have	 to	 fix	 them	do	not	
simply	 stem	 from	 differing	 assumptions	 about	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 interest:	
communication.	This	 should	help	 to	 illustrate,	 I	 think,	 that	 the	 gaps	 in	 the	 literature	 I	
wish	 to	 highlight	 are	 a	 product	 of	 convention	 rather	 than	 scholarly	 perspective	 or	
approach.	
2.2 Rationalist Accounts: Bargaining and Game Theory 
2.2.1 The Literature and the Puzzles it Presents 
The	 body	 of	 literature	 I	 examine	 is	 situated	 within	 the	 bargaining	 model	 of	 war	













be	 part	 of	 these	 bargaining	 processes,	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	 bargaining	 having	 failed	
(Reiter,	 2003).	 War	 is	 one	 tactic	 that	 a	 state	 may	 use	 to	 pursue	 its	 objectives	 and	
strengthen	its	hand	at	the	bargaining	table.	Blainey	(1977),	Schelling	(1960)	and	Snyder	
and	Diesing’s	(1977)	work	is	seminal.	
Much	 of	 the	 literature	 consists	 of	 the	 application	 of	 game	 theory3,	 through	 formal	
models,	to	the	phenomena	of	international	interaction.	Examples	of	formal	models	being	
employed	are	numerous	(see	Bueno	de	Mesquita,	1992;	Fearon,	1994a;	Ramsay,	2011;	
Wagner,	 2000).	 Some	 work,	 while	 not	 utilising	 formal	 models,	 accepts	 the	 same	 or	
similar	 rational	 decision	 making	 assumptions	 (explained	 below)	 to	 examine	
communication	(see	Huth,	1984;	Thyne,	2006;	Walter,	2009).	Powell	(2002)	and	Reiter	
(2003)	offer	explanations	of	the	field’s	development.	





is	 about	 the	 instrumental	 selection	 of	 actions	 to	 maximise	 expected	 utility	 given	
particular	aims.”	 In	relation,	Huth	and	Russett	(1984,	p.	500)	say,	 “...expected	utility	 is	




Huth	and	Russett	 (1984)	 focus	on	how	 relative	power	 can	alter	 the	 effectiveness	of	 a	
state	 leader’s	deterrent	 threats.	On	 the	other	hand,	Sartori’s	 (2005)	work	deliberately	
attempts	 to	 look	 at	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 such	 threats	 while	 holding	 variables	
accounting	 for	relative	power	constant.	However,	 in	one	way	or	another,	all	studies	 in	
this	field	concern	themselves	with	international	communication	and	adopt	what	Jönsson	
(1990)	describes	as	the	traditional	approach	in	their	investigations.	
Much	of	 the	 current	 interest	 in	 the	 role	 of	 communication	on	 the	 international	 scene,	





















the	 possibility	 that	 states	may	 be	 unable	 to	 reach	 agreement	 short	 of	 armed	 conflict	
“…because	one	or	more	states	would	have	an	incentive	to	renege	on	the	terms”	(Fearon,	
1995,	p.	381).	
The	 upshot	 of	 the	 puzzle	 Fearon	 (1995)	 presents	 is	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 communicate	
verbally	 should	 not	 have	 any	 influence	 upon	 a	 state’s	 future	 action	 in	 a	 dispute,	
including	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 uses	 armed	 force	 against	 the	 adversary.	 In	 fact,	 Fearon	
(1995,	 p.	 396)	 claims	 that	 the	 ex	 ante	 probability	 of	war	 is	 no	 different	 in	 a	 formally	
modelled	 game	 where	 such	 communication	 is	 allowed	 to	 when	 it	 is	 not.	 Verbal	 or	
written	communication	is	 ineffective	at	reducing	the	odds	of	 fighting	due	to	the	above	
two	barriers.	Referring	to	the	first	barrier,	Fearon	(1995,	p.	396)	explains,	
…regardless	of	B’s	 true	willingness	 to	 fight,	B	does	best	 to	make	 the	
announcement	that	 leads	to	the	smallest	grab	by	A-	 that	 is,	B	has	an	







Essentially,	 if	B	says	 that	 it	 is	 committed	 to	 fight	over	an	 issue,	A	 learns	nothing	 from	
this	because	B	is	incentivised	to	say	exactly	that	in	order	to	try	and	deter	A.	Moreover,	




communicative	 act	 in	 question	 is	 “cheap”,	 and,	 as	 a	 logical	 corollary,	 b)	 cheap	 signals	
cannot	 be	 effective	 in	 altering	 state	 behaviour.	 The	 fact	 that	 “costly”	 signals	 can	
influence	state	behaviour	is	not	contested	in	the	literature.5	
The	point	of	discussing	Fearon’s	puzzle	 is	 that	 it	brings	 to	 the	 fore	what	much	of	 this	
body	 of	 literature	 seeks	 to	 explain.	 When	 coupled	 with	 an	 observation	 of	 reality	 a	
tension	becomes	 clear	 that	 calls	 for	 explanation.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 Fearon	 (1995)	has	
offered	 an	 argument,	 the	 logic	 of	 which	 is	 “undeniable”	 under	 rationalist	 principles	
(Ramsay,	 2011).	 The	 argument	 apparently	 shows	 that	 verbal	 and	 written	
communication	should	not	 impart	new	information	to	other	parties	and	so	should	not	
affect	the	rational	calculation	involved	in	deciding	on	matters	of	war	and/or	negotiation.	






and	 other	 their	 preferences	 and	 intentions	 through	 verbal	 or	 written	 statements.	
Ramsay	 (2011,	 p.	 1016)	 cites	 a	 number	 of	 historical	 cases	 in	 which	 state	 leaders	
exchanged	 “encouraging	 and	 compromising	messages”,	 helping	war	 to	 be	 avoided.	 Of	
note	are	 the	partion	of	Poland	between	European	powers	 in	 the	1700s,	Germany	and	
Great	 Britain	 dividing	 colonial	 territories	 in	 the	 late	 1800s,	 Chamberlain’s	 diplomatic	
engagement	with	Hitler	over	German	ambitions	in	Czechoslovakia	and	the	Soviet	Union	
and	United	 States’	 engagement	with	 one	 another	 during	 the	Berlin	 Crisis	 in	 the	 early	
1960s.	Moreover,	Janice	Gross	Stein	(1991,	p.	436)	has	pointed	to		border	confrontations	
between	 India	 and	 Pakistan	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 that	 were	 deescalated	 through	 “the	




period	 of	 decreased	 tension	 between	 the	 USSR	 and	 US	 during	 the	 1960s	 began	with	
Kennedy’s	conciliatory	“A	Strategy	of	Peace”	speech	in	November	1963.	
Regarding	 threatening	 statements,	 Sartori	 (2002,	 p.	 122)	 notes	 that	 despite	 Fearon’s	
(1995)	 argument,	 history	 shows	 that	 “When	 states	do	use	diplomatic	 threats	 to	deter	
actions,	 they	 often	 succeed	 in	 pursuading	 their	 challengers	 to	 back	 down.”	 Sartori	
higlights	 examples	 of	 the	 US	 compelling	 the	 USSR	 to	 live	 up	 to	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	
Anglo-Russian	Treaty	(in	which	it	had	agreed	to	remove	its	troops	from	Iran	by	March	
1946)	 and	 the	 US’	 success	 in	 deterring	 Turkey	 from	 invading	 Cyprus	 in	 1964	 via	
threatening	diplomatic	statements.	Kurizaki	(2007)	cites	the	Alaska	boundary	dispute	of	
1903	 as	 another	 example	 of	 threatening	 statements	 assisting	 in	 avoiding	 armed	
violence,	 as	 threats	 from	 Theodore	 Roosevelt	 succesfully	 helped	 deter	 Canada	 from	
challenging	 US	 claims.	 What	 could	 explain	 the	 tension	 between	 Fearon’s	 (1995)	
supposedly	 undeniable	 logic	 and	 observed	 cases	 such	 as	 the	 above	 in	which	 political	
leaders	have	used	verbal	and	written	statements	to	help	settle	disputes	short	of	armed	
force?	
2.3 Communication - A Multifaceted Phenomenon 
Communication	is	not	a	homogenous	group	of	interactions.	Communication	includes	the	
use	of	spoken	language.	In	this	regard	the	literature	refers	to	announcements	(Fearon,	
1995),	 threats	 (Guisinger	 &	 Smith,	 2002;	 Sartori,	 2002)	 and	 political	 statements	





say	 that	 it	 has	 “...no	 effect	 on	 either	 side’s	 payoffs...”	 (Fearon,	 1995,	 p.	 396).	 In	 other	
words,	the	act	is,	 in	itself,	 inconsequential	with	regard	to	the	payoffs	each	side	derives	
from	the	outcome	of	a	dispute.	Costly	signals,	on	the	other	hand,	refer	to	those	signals	
where	 “...	 some	 price	 is	 imposed	 regardless	 of	 subsequent	 actions.”	 (Gartzke	 &	 Li,	 p.	
566).	In	this	case	the	signal	itself	imposes	a	cost	upon	the	sender.	The	example	Gartzke	
and	Li	(2003)	give	is	the	economic	cost	of	mobilising	two	aircraft	carriers	as	a	signal	of	
preparedness	 to	 fight	 over	 an	 issue,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 cheap	 signal	 of	 verbally	
professing	preparedness.		
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2.3.1 Verbal Communication 
In	 attempting	 to	understand	 the	 tension	between	Fearon’s	 (1995)	 logic	 and	empirical	
observation,	much	of	the	literature	looks	specifically	at	verbal	statements	made	by	state	
leaders.	This	 focus	 is	adopted	because,	at	 face	value,	 these	signals	epitomise	what	 it	 is	
for	 a	 signal	 to	 be	 cheap.	 They	 epitomise	 the	 form	 of	 communication	 from	which	 the	
tension	 arises.	 From	 a	 rational	 viewpoint	 they	 should	 be	 ineffective	 in	 altering	 state	
behaviour	but	from	historical	observation	seem	to	do	just	that.	As	Anne	Sartori	(2002,	p.	
125)	 states	 “Diplomacy	 is	 the	 epitome	 of	 ‘cheap	 talk.’	 It	 includes	 speeches,	
conversations,	 and	 diplomatic	 notes.”6	Tingley	 and	 Walter	 (2011,	 p.	 996)	 add,	 “Most	
bargaining	models	 assume	 that	 verbal	 threats	or	promises	 that	 inflict	no	 costs	on	 the	
sender	will	have	 little	or	no	 influence	on	 those	receiving	 the	message.”	 In	essence	 the	
view	 that	 permeates	 the	 literature	 really	 amounts	 to	 simply	 believing	 in	 the	 popular	
saying	“talk	is	cheap.”	
But	 does	 talk	 being	 cheap	 really	 prevent	 it	 from	 being	 consequential	 in	 international	
affairs	and,	specifically,	 the	decision	of	a	state	to	employ	armed	force?	If	not,	 then	this	
would	explain	the	tension	between	Fearon’s	(1995)	logic	and	empirical	observation.		As	
will	 be	 shown	 below,	 most	 of	 the	 work	 in	 the	 bargaining	 model	 of	 war	 literature,	
including	 Fearon	 (1994a)	 himself,	 ultimately	 concludes	 that	 verbal	 statements	 can	 be	
influential.	Verbal	statements	announcing	a	state’s	policy	are	cheap,	yet	it	is	argued	that	
they	 can	 a)	 inform	 an	 adversary	 as	 to	 a	 state’s	 willingness	 and	 ability	 to	 fight,	 thus	
allowing	both	states	an	increased	ability	to	negotiate	a	settlement	short	of	armed	force,	
and	b)	give	states	an	increased	ability	to	commit	to	a	particular	course	of	action.	
2.4 Verbal Statements 
The	verbal	statements	made	by	political	leaders	in	times	of	dispute	are	said	to	be	able	to	
be	 influential	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 Some	 arguments	 posit	 some	 kind	 of	 cost	 that	
results	from	political	leaders	having	made	a	public	statement.	For	example,	Gartzke	and	
Li	 (2003,	p.	568)	assert	 that	economic	 integration	means	 that	 “The	 fervor	with	which	
leaders	make	political	 threats	now	 imparts	an	economic	cost.”	Capital	 flight	 can	occur	
when	 investors	see	war	as	 likely	 in	a	region,	suggesting	 that	 there	are	economic	costs	
associated	with	hostile	rhetoric	from	political	 leaders.	Other	arguments	claim,	utilising	
either	 formal	 models	 or	 laboratory	 experiments,	 that	 even	 with	 no	 associated	 cost	






2011;	 Tingley	 and	 Walter,	 2011;	 Trager,	 2010).	 Despite	 some	 diversity	 in	 the	
mechanisms	 by	 which	 the	 public	 statements	 made	 by	 political	 leaders	 are	 said	 to	
influence	both	their	own	state’s	action	and	the	course	of	a	dispute	more	generally,	two	
types	 of	 arguments	 have	 gained	 the	majority	 of	 scholarly	 attention.	 These	 arguments	
relate	to	the	domestic	audience	costs	and	reputational	damage	that	can	be	inflicted	on	a	
political	leader	via	their	public	statements.7	I	deal	with	each	below.	
2.4.1 Domestic Audience Costs 
Fearon’s	(1994a)	article,	Domestic	Political	Audiences	and	the	Escalation	of	International	
Disputes	 is	 typically	cited	as	 the	starting	point	 for	 the	wide	body	of	 literature	 that	has	
since	 developed	 on	 the	 costs	 domestic	 publics	 can	 impose	 on	 political	 leaders	 for	
careless	 use	 of	 publicly	 issued	 statements	 regarding	 an	 international	 dispute.	 Fearon	
(1994a)	 contested	 that	 while	 threats	 issued	 towards	 an	 adversary	 were	 technically	
cheap,	they	could	generate	costs	for	political	leaders	were	they	to	back	down	at	a	later	









statements	 made	 by	 political	 leaders	 become,	 essentially,	 a	 costly	 signal.	 This	 would	
help	 explain	 how	 state	 leaders	 have	 used	 their	 public	 statements	 to	 help	 them	 avoid	
wars	with	adversaries,	as	noted	by	Ramsay	(2011).	If	it	costs	a	political	leader	to	make	a	
threatening	statement	indicating	that	they	are	willing	to	use	armed	force	and	then	back	
down	 from	 doing	 so,	 the	 threat	 is	 informative	 to	 an	 adversary.	 Given	 that	 Political	
Leader	A	would	suffer	costs	for	backing	down	after	threatening,	Political	Leader	B	can	
infer	 that	 there	 is	 at	 least	 some	degree	of	 resolve	on	 the	part	 of	 Political	 Leader	A	 to	








own	policy	 in	 light	of	 this	new	 information.	They	may	 reconsider	whether	 they	 really	
want	 to	 continue	 to	 confront	 Political	 Leader	 A	 if	 there	 is	 some	 degree	 of	 resolve	 on	
his/her	part	to	use	armed	force.	Moreover,	such	a	threat	helps	commit	Political	Leader	A	





domestic	 audience	 cost	 literature	 (see	Bueno	de	Mesquita	 and	Lalman,	 1992;	 Schultz,	
2001;	 Smith,	 1998)	 opened	 by	 drawing	 on	 a	 separate	 body	 of	 literature	 that	 had	
demonstrated	 that	 unsuccessful	 involvement	 in	 wars	 had	 negative	 consequences	 for	
leadership	 tenure.	 This	 logic	 was	 extended,	 suggesting	 that	 leaders	 might	 also	 face	
abbreviated	terms	in	office	for	poor	management	of	disputes	in	the	period	prior	to	the	
use	of	armed	force.	However,	greater	specificity	was	needed	and	much	of	the	literature	
has	 since	 been	 dedicated	 to	 exploring	 the	 so-called	 “microfoundations”	 of	 domestic	
audience	costs.	
Fearon	 (1994a)	 initially	 offered	 a	 somewhat	 vague	 notion	 of	 why	 a	 domestic	 public	





(such	 as	 issuing	 threats)	 in	 dispute	 management	 was	 an	 indication	 of	 their	
(in)competence.	 Incompetence	was	punished	by	 the	general	public.	Taking	a	different	
tack,	 Guisinger	 and	 Smith	 (2002)	 argued	 that	 domestic	 publics	 punished	 political	
leaders	for	damaging	their	state’s	reputation	in	the	eyes	of	other	states.	In	this	version	of	
the	 domestic	 audience	 cost	 argument	 domestic	 publics	 punished	 political	 leaders	 not	
due	to	their	own	assessment	that	they	were	incompetent,	but	because	they	believe	that	
their	leaders	have	lost	a	reputation	as	honest	deal-brokers	on	the	international	stage	by	
escalating	 a	 dispute	 and	 then	backing	down.	All	 three	 of	 these	 studies	 utilised	 formal	
modelling	techniques	to	reach	the	conclusions	mentioned.	
More	 recently,	 survey	 studies	 have	 been	 conducted	 to	 try	 and	 generate	 empirical	
evidence	 on	 the	 matter.	 Tomz	 (2007),	 conducting	 his	 research	 in	 the	 US,	 found	 that	
many	 people’s	 (72%	 of	 respondents)	 objections	 to	 a	 president	 escalating	 a	 dispute	
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through	 threats	 and	 then	 backing	 down	 came	 from	 their	 dislike	 of	 the	 inconsistency	
between	 words	 and	 deeds.	 There	 were	 numerous	 reasons	 participants	 disliked	
inconsistency.	The	most	prevalent	opinion,	in	line	with	Guisinger	and	Smith	(2002),	was	
that	 such	 inconsistency	 would	 damage	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	 US	 on	 the	 international	
stage.	 Other	 responses	 suggested	 a	 simple	 preference	 for	 honesty	 for	 ethical	 reasons.	
Yet	 another	 opinion	 expressed	 was	 that	 flip-flopping	 by	 backing	 down	 after	 having	
made	 threats	 demonstrated	 incompetence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 president,	 an	 opinion	 in	
line	with	Smith	(1998).	These	findings	were	further	explored,	and	largely	confirmed,	in	






leaders	 than	 existed	 when	 Fearon	 (1994a)	 initiated	 this	 inquiry	 in	 1994,	 points	 of	
contention	 remain.	 Some	 studies	 have	 investigated	 the	 contexts	 in	 which	 domestic	
publics	can	impose	audience	costs.	Fearon	(1994a)	supposed	that	such	costs	could	only	
exist	 in	 democratic	 countries,	 as	 non-democratic	 leaders	 cannot	 be	 punished	 at	 the	
ballot	 box	 for	 their	 actions	 during	 international	 disputes.	 Partell	 and	 Palmer	 (1999),	
Eyerman	 and	Hart	 (1996)	 and	 Gelpi	 and	 Griesdorf	 (2001),	 using	multiple	 datasets	 of	
international	 disputes,	 conducted	 statistical	 analyses	 supportive	 of	 this	 claim.	 Trager	
and	Vavreck	(2011)	carried	out	a	randomised	experiment	the	conclusions	of	which	also	
supported	Fearon’s	(1994a)	assumption,	yet	demonstrated	that	in	the	case	of	the	US	the	
political	 party	 to	which	 a	 president	 belonged	 influenced	 how	 they	 incurred	 audience	
costs.	Similarly,	Schultz	(2001)	 investigated	how	the	existence	of	opposition	parties	 in	
democracies,	not	just	the	ability	of	the	citizenry	to	remove	an	elected	leader	from	office,	
could	 allow	 democratic	 leaders	 to	 communicate	 effectively	with	 their	 adversaries.	 As	
opposition	parties	do	not	necessarily	have	 incentives	 to	support	an	 incumbent	 leader,	




Findings	 include	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 presence	 of	 audience	 costs	 and	









settled.	 However,	 what	 cannot	 be	 denied	 is	 that	 they	 are	 one	 of	 the	 most	 widely	
promoted	 reasons	 for	why	 it	 is	 that	 statements	made	 by	 political	 leaders	 do	 seem	 to	
have	an	influence	on	a	state’s	behaviour	during	disputes	and,	indeed,	dispute	outcomes	
(McManus,	 2014).	To	 recap	 the	 central	 logic	 of	 all	 domestic	 audience	 cost	 arguments,	
domestic	 publics	 are	 seen	 as	 capable	 of	 punishing	 leaders	 for	 their	 behaviour	 in	
managing	international	disputes.	The	example	most	widely	used,	as	I	will	expand	upon	
below,	 is	 the	 case	 in	 which	 a	 political	 leader	 threatens	 an	 adversary	 and	 then	 backs	
down.	For	a	number	of	reasons	discussed	above,	domestic	audiences	are	said	to	oppose	




costs	 suffered	by	 its	political	 leader	 if	 they	 should	back	down.	 In	 the	 second	case,	 the	
dispute	outcome	may	be	altered	if	the	adversary	is	deterred	by	a	threat,	believing	that	
the	 costs	 the	 adversary	 leader	would	 incur	 if	 they	 backed	 down	make	 his/her	 threat	
credible.	




the	 leading	 proponent	 of	 such	 arguments.	 Sartori	 (2005,	 p.	 5)	 claims	 that	 public	
statements	 can	 be	 used	 by	 state	 leaders	 to	 avoid	 conflict	 or	 achieve	 their	 goals	 in	 a	





communicate	 in	 a	 dispute	 does	 not	 alter	 the	 chances	 that	 they	 are	 able	 to	 reach	 a	
negotiated	 settlement	when	 states	 have	 incentives	 to	 deceive	 their	 adversary.	 Because	
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deception	 hinders	 the	 ability	 of	 states	 to	 resolve	 their	 disputes	 short	 of	 combat	 and	







diplomacy	 to	attain	a	mutually	beneficial	 ‘trade’	of	 issues	over	 time”	 (Sartori,	2002,	p.	
122).	A	state’s	reputation	for	honesty	increases	its	ability	to	achieve	this	trade	of	issues	
without	 recourse	 to	 violence,	 and	 is	 thus	 valuable.	 A	 reputation	 for	 honesty,	 Sartori	
argues,	is	acquired	through	either	being	honest	or	simply	not	being	discovered	to	have	
been	dishonest	(bluffing)	in	having	made	a	threat	to	deter	an	adversary.	A	reputation	for	
bluffing	 is	 acquired	 through	 being	 caught	 having	made	 a	 threat	 against	 an	 adversary	
that	was	not	backed	up	(in	cases	where	the	adversary	was	not	deterred).	










dispute	 outcome.	 State	 leaders	may	 be	more	 likely	 to	 follow	 through	 on	 a	 threat,	 for	
example,	 because	 to	 not	 do	 so	would	 damage	 their	 state’s	 reputation	 for	 honesty.	Or,	
regarding	dispute	outcome,	 following	 through	on	 the	 threat	might	not	be	necessary	 if	





for	 resolve	 discussed	 by	 Jervis	 (1970)	 and	 others.8	Reputations	 for	 honesty	 are	more	
focused	 on	 communication	 during	 disputes	 than	 are	 reputations	 for	 resolve.	While	 a	
state’s	 reputation	 for	 resolve	may	be	well	 known,	 once	 a	dispute	begins	 it	 is	 a	 state’s	
reputation	 for	 honesty/dishonesty	 that	will	 or	will	 not	 allow	 the	 state	 to	 convince	 its	
adversary	that	it	is	more	or	less	committed	to	fighting	over	an	issue	then	the	adversary	




from	 the	 audience	 cost	 literature,	 recent	work	 has	 essentially	 combined	 the	 two.	 The	
aforementioned	 survey	 studies	 of	 Tomz	 (2007)	 and	 Levy	 et	 al	 (2015)	 have	 provided	
empirical	evidence	in	support	of	Guisinger	and	Smith’s	(2002)	earlier	claim	that	it	may	
be	 exactly	 this	 damage	 to	 a	 state’s	 reputation	 that	 causes	 domestic	 publics	 to	 punish	
their	political	leaders	for	not	following	through	on	their	threats.	




war,	a	great	deal	of	 the	 literature	has	 focused	on	how	one	state	might	deter	or	coerce	
another	in	order	to	achieve	this.	In	this	regard,	when	it	comes	to	public	statements	made	
by	political	leaders,	threats	are	the	primary	type	of	public	statements	from	which	many	





contribute	 by	 analysing	 whether	 these	 statements,	 in	 conjunction	 with	 hostile	
statements	 such	as	 threats,	 influence	 the	 likelihood	 that	a	 state	 leader	will	use	armed	
force	against	 its	adversary.	 In	 this	 final	section	of	my	 literature	review	I	discuss	 those	
studies	within	(or	with	links	to)	the	bargaining	model	of	war	literature	that	have	given	






2.5.1 Conciliatory Communication 




USSR	 and	 US	 at	 that	 time	 fits	 nicely	 within	 the	 bargaining	 model	 of	 war	 literature.	
Osgood	compares	the	two	states	to	people	who	are	standing	on	either	end	of	a	seesaw.	
The	seesaw	is	grounded	 in	the	middle,	but	both	ends	(where	the	people	are	standing)	
hang	out	over	a	high	cliff.	Neither	person	wants	 to	 fall	 (intended	 to	represent	nuclear	





Osgood	 believed	 trust	 between	 the	 parties	 was	 required.	 He	 proposed	 a	 process	 he	
termed	GRIT	 (Graduated	Reciprocation	 in	Tension-reduction),	 in	which	states	entered	
into	 a	 process	 of	 offering	 reciprocated	 conciliatory	 gestures.	 Osgood	 (1962,	 p.	 87)	
labelled	this	process	“tension-decreasing”,	as	opposed	to	the	US’	policy	of	deterrence	he	
perceived	 as	 being	 ”tension-increasing”.	 Highlighting	 his	work’s	 connections	with	 the	
bargaining	model	of	war	literature,	Osgood	(1962,	p.	88)	stated	that	what	he	proposed	
is	 perhaps	 best	 viewed	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 international	 (rather	 than	
interpersonal)	 communicating	 and	 learning	 situation,	 where	 the	





do	 so	without	 endangering	 its	 security	 as	 a	 whole,	 but	 was	 explicit	 that	 GRIT	would	
entail	 small	 acts	 in	 which	 a	 state’s	 security	 was	 diminished	 in	 the	 short-term.	 The	
central	thesis	of	GRIT	was	that	through	conciliatory	acts,	states	could	communicate	their	







psychology	 to	 form	a	number	of	propositions	regarding	what	 type	of	 conciliatory	acts	
might	 be	 most	 likely	 to	 induce	 reciprocation.	 However,	 being,	 generally	 speaking,	
theoretical,	his	work	did	not	subject	his	arguments	to	empirical	analysis.	
An	early	attempt	to	subject	Osgood’s	(1962)	thinking	to	empirical	enquiry	came	in	1967	
when	 Amitai	 Etzioni	 (1967)	 wrote	 The	 Kennedy	 Experiment.	 Conducting	 a	 historical	
analysis	of	 the	period	 in	US-USSR	relations	between	 June	10	and	November	22,	1963,	
Etzioni	 argued	 that	 the	 behaviour	 displayed	 by	 the	 US	 and	 USSR	 (and	 their	 leaders,	




strategic	 bombers,	 US	 recognition	 of	 the	 Hungarian	 delegation	 at	 the	 UN,	 Soviet	
agreement	to	a	direct	communication	link	between	the	US	and	USSR,	and	US	approval	of	
greater	 trade	 with	 the	 USSR	 as	 representing	 a	 process	 approximating	 GRIT.	 What	 is	




and	 practitioners,	 since	 the	 work	 of	 Osgood	 and	 Etzioni	 there	 has	 not	 been	 much	
theoretical	 development	 of	 their	 ideas.	 Kydd	 (2000a	 and	 2000b)	 himself	 constructs	
formal	models	and	adopts	rationalist	principles	in	an	attempt	to	show	that	it	is	possible	
(and	 rational)	 for	 states	 to	 reassure	 each	 other	 while	 in	 conflict	 or	 distrusting	 each	
other,	 thus	 allowing	 cooperation.	 Harking	 back	 to	 the	 problem	 Fearon	 (1995)	 posed,	
Kydd	(2000b)	argued	that	when	states	could	benefit	from	cooperation	(e.g.	by	avoiding	








Other	 notable	 exceptions	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 attention	 given	 to	 conciliatory	 interactions	
between	 states	 include	 the	 work	 of	 Louis	 Kriesberg	 (1981,	 1984),	 Janice	 Gross	 Stein	
(1991)	 and	 Christopher	 Mitchell	 (1990).	 Kriesberg	 (1981,	 1984)	 notes	 that	
international	 disputes	 are	waged	 through	 both	 coercive	 and	 non-coercive	means,	 but	
that	 it	 is	 coercive	 actions	 that	 garner	most	 scholarly,	 policy	 and	popular	 attention.	 In	
disputes	 states	 attempt	 to	 induce	 adversaries	 to	 act	 in	 a	 way	 consistent	 with	 their	
interests.	 This	 can	 be	 achieved	 via	 coercion,	 defined	 by	 Kriesberg	 (1981,	 p.	 37)	 as	
“violent	and	nonviolent	negative	sanctions,	encompassing	their	actual	employment	and	
their	 threatened	 use.”	 These	 negative	 sanctions	 include	 things	 such	 as	 direct	military	
force,	 the	 threat	 thereof	 and	 economic	 boycott	 (Kriesberg,	 1981,	 p.	 37).	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 non-coercive	 inducements	 either	 persuade	 an	 adversary	 to	 consent	 to	 a	 state’s	
requests	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	 adversary’s	 self	 interest	 or	 propagated	 values,	 or	 by	
rewarding	 the	 adversary	 via	 positive	 sanctions	 (Kriesberg,	 1981,	 p.	 37).	 Analysing	
disputes	 between,	 among	 others,	 Israel	 and	 Egypt,	 and	 the	 US	 and	 Soviet	 Union,	
Kriesberg	 (1981)	 highlights	 common	 types	 of	 non-coercive	 inducements.	 These	
included	assuring	adversaries	that	they	would	not	join	alliances	pitted	against	them	(e.g.	
Sadat	assured	Israel	that	Egypt	would	not	align	with	other	states	 in	the	region	against	
Israel),	 offers	 to	 withdraw	 troops	 from	 contested	 territories	 and	 promises	 to	 allow	
adversaries	access	to	contested	territories	or	resources	(Kriesberg,	1981).	
Where	as	Kriesberg	 (1981)	offers	a	historical	analysis	of	how	conciliatory	gestures	or	
inducements	 have	 been	 used,	Mitchell	 (1990),	 in	 a	 process	 similar	 to	Osgood	 (1962),	
and	as	a	 forerunner	 to	his	 later	work	(Mitchell,	2000),	develops	hypotheses	regarding	
how	a	state	can	most	effectively	transfer	conciliatory	signals	to	an	adversary.	That	is	to	
say,	 he	 asks	 what	 characteristics	 conciliatory	 gestures	 should	 possess	 in	 order	 to	
increase	 the	 chances	 that	 they	 will	 be	 understood	 to	 be	 a	 conciliatory	 act	 by	 the	





present	 in	any	single	conciliatory	gesture	 from	a	state,	calling	on	empirical	analysis	 to	
determine	patterns	in	how	these	characteristics	interact	with	the	international	context	
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in	 which	 they	 are	 made	 to	 increase	 or	 decrease	 the	 likelihood	 that	 an	 adversary	
recognises	a	conciliatory	gesture.	
Stein’s	 (1991)	 work	 on	 reassurance	 between	 states	 differentiates	 itself	 conceptually	
from	deterrence	theory.	Like	many	strategies	of	deterrence	the	strategy	of	reassurance	
presumes	“ongoing	hostility”	between	states	(Stein,	1991,	p.	432).	However,	strategies	
of	 reassurance	 root	 the	 sources	 of	 hostility	 “not	 in	 an	 adversaries’	 search	 for	
opportunity	 but	 in	 an	 adversary’s	 needs	 and	weaknesses”	 (Stein,	 1991,	 p.	 432).	 This	
difference	in	focus	allows	for	different	questions	to	be	asked.	In	particular,	if	the	ability	
to	 avoid	 war	 is	 not	 only	 determined	 by	 a	 state’s	 ability	 to	 deter	 an	 adversary	 from	
aggression,	 but	 also	 by	 the	 ability	 to	 assure	 an	 adversary	 of	 one’s	 own	 peaceful	




limited	 security	 regimes.	 Providing	 examples	 of	 how	 each	 has	 been	 used	 historically,	
Stein	argues	that	these	strategies	have	been	successfully	used	to	convey	nonthreatening	
intentions	between	adversaries	in	the	past.	As	an	example	of	 irrevocable	commitment,	
Stein	 discusses	 the	 tensions	 between	 Egypt	 and	 Israel	 in	 the	 1970s.	 She	 argues	 that	
Sadat’s	 visit	 to	 speak	 in	 the	 Israeli	Knesset	was	 so	unpopular	with	Sadat’s	 supporters	





The	 aforementioned	 studies	 demonstrate	 a	 potential	 for	 conciliatory	 interaction	
between	states	even	when	confronted	with	the	barriers	to	communication	that	Fearon	
(1995)	discusses,	and	continue	to	make	valuable	contributions	to	a	literature	that,	as	I	
have	 discussed	 here,	 typically	 focuses	 on	 hostile	 interactions	 between	 states.	 These	
studies	 do	 not	 extensively	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	 verbal	 statements	 in	 conciliatory	




it	 to	be	credible	 to	an	adversary,	 and,	2)	public	 statements	by	political	 leaders	do	not	
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impose	 such	 costs.	 Kydd	 (2000b,	 p.	 415),	 for	 example,	 states	 that	 “The	 essence	 of	
reassurance	 is	costly	signals”.	Mitchell	(1990)	argues	that	conciliatory	gestures	should	
impose	 costs	on	 the	 state	undertaking	 the	 gesture,	 in	order	 to	 increase	 the	 likelihood	
that	 the	 adversary	 will	 interpret	 the	 act	 as	 conciliatory.	 Moreover,	 Mitchell	 (1990)	
suggests	 that	when	 state	 leaders	wish	 to	demonstrate	 conciliatory	 intentions	 towards	




and	 considers	 costly	 signals,	 through	 irrevocable	 commitments,	 as	 a	 central	 tactic	 of	








of	 conciliation,	describing	 the	 role	of	 “persuasive	arguments”,	 “promises”,	 “offers”	and	
“assurances”	 as	 non-coercive	 inducements.	 However,	 Kriesberg’s	 (1981)	 work	 is	 an	
analysis	of	historical	cases	in	which	these	types	of	non-coercive	inducements	appeared	
to	 play	 some	 role	 in	 dispute	 de-escalation,	 and	 a	 description	 of	 what	 these	 actions	
typically	looked	like.	Kriesberg	(1981)	offers	few	thoughts	on	the	extent	to	which	non-
coercive	inducements	are	responsible	for	the	instances	of	dispute	de-escalation	he	cites,	
recognising	 the	 difficulty	 of	 separating	 out	 the	 effects	 of	 these	 specific	 actions	 from	
structural	 factors.	 For	 example,	 Kriesberg	 (1981,	 p.	 44)	 believes	 that	 efforts	 by	 US	
officials	to	highlight	to	USSR	officials,	through	their	spoken	statements,	that	it	was	in	the	
interests	 of	 both	 the	 USSR	 and	 US	 to	 keep	 China	 non-nuclear,	 along	with	 other	 non-
coercive	inducements,	played	a	“contributory	role”	in	achieving	the	Partial	Nuclear	Test	
Ban	Agreement	in	1963.	However,	Kriesberg	(1981)	is	clear	that	it	is	the	convergence	of	




reputation,	 just	 as,	 it	 has	 been	 argued,	 happens	 when	 threating	 statements	 are	 not	
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backed	 up.9	One	 exception	 is	 the	 recent	 work	 of	 Kydd	 and	 McManus	 (2017),	 who	
attempt	 to	 understand	 how	 state	 leaders	may	 use	 a	 strategy	 of	 both	 threatening	 and	
assuring	statements	when	engaging	an	adversary.	Following	the	aforementioned	study	
of	Tingley	(2014),	they	assume	that	state	leaders	pay	a	cost	for	attacking	an	adversary	
after	 promising	 not	 to.10	They	 find	 that	 both	 threats	 and	 assurances	 can	 alter	 the	
likelihood	that	a	dispute	will	be	resolved	by	armed	force.	Threats	can	help	State	A	draw	
greater	 concessions	 from	 State	 B,	 thus	 decreasing	 the	 need	 for	 State	 A	 to	 use	 armed	
force	to	make	the	gains	it	wants.	Assurances	State	A	will	not	use	armed	force	lessen	the	
benefits	State	A	would	gain	from	armed	force,	as	these	would	be	counterweighted	by	the	
costs	 imposed	 on	 State	 A’s	 leader	 for	 violating	 her/his	 word,	 and	 thus	 decrease	 the	
likelihood	that	State	A	will	use	armed	force.		
2.5.2 Moving Forward 
The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	address	the	lack	of	analysis	that	the	public	statements	made	
by	 political	 leaders,	 other	 than	 threats	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 hostile	 statements,	 have	
received.	I	intend	to	do	this	in	three	main	ways.	First,	I	demonstrate	that	the	theoretical	
case	used	in	the	bargaining	model	of	war	literature	to	argue	that	threatening	statements	
should	 impact	 a	 state’s	 dispute	 behaviour	 also	 applies	 to	 conciliatory	 statements.	
Specifically,	I	show	that	it	is	a	logical	extension	of	existing	theory	and	empirical	evidence	




















which	US	presidents	 express	 conciliation	 in	 the	 context	of	 international	disputes.	As	 I	
highlight	 above,	 while	 foregoing	 studies	 have	 analysed	 the	 nature	 of	 conciliatory	
interactions	 between	 states	 in	 dispute,	 the	 role	 that	 spoken	 statements	 play	 in	 these	
processes	has	received	 less	attention.	We	know	that	political	 leaders	use	 their	spoken	
statements	 to	 express	 conciliation.	 Etzioni	 (1967)	 cites	Kennedy’s	A	Strategy	of	Peace	
speech	as	part	of	a	tension-reduction	process	that	took	place	between	the	US	and	USSR	
in	 the	 early	 1960s,	 for	 example.	However,	 so	 far	 as	 I	 can	 see,	 there	has	not	 been	 any	
systematic	effort	made	to	collect	data	on	the	types	of	statements	political	leaders	use	to	
express	conciliatory	 intentions.	 I	 construct	a	dictionary	of	words	and	phrases	used	by	
US	 presidents	 to	 express	 conciliation,	 analysing	 a	 representative	 sample	 of	 official	
transcripts	of	their	public	speech	during	international	disputes.	This	will	not	only	allow	
us	 to	know	what	 statements	US	presidents	use	 to	express	conciliatory	 intentions,	but,	
equal	 in	 importance,	 allow	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 president’s	 use	 of	 conciliatory	
statements	and	their	use	of	armed	force	to	be	tested	empirically.	
My	 third	 way	 of	 contributing	 is	 to	 conduct	 the	 first	 large-n	 quantitative	 analysis	 of	
whether	 there	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 presidential	 use	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements	 during	 a	 dispute	 and	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 armed	 force	 against	 an	 adversary.	 I	
discuss	 the	 first	 of	 these	 points	 in	 the	 following	Theoretical	Framework	 chapter,	with	




3 Theoretical Framework 





the	 literature	 discussed	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapter	 and	 establish	 hypotheses.	 Drawing	
largely	 on	 domestic	 audience	 cost	 literature	 I	 demonstrate	 that	 existing	 theory	 and	
empirical	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 variation	 in	 the	 use	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 by	
political	 leaders	 in	 the	 context	 of	 disputes	 should	 be	 associated	 with	 variation	 in	 a	
state’s	use	of	armed	force	against	its	adversaries;	a	lack	of	theoretical	development	and	
empirical	 exploration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 in	 dispute	 settings	 stems	
from	 scholarly	 convention,	 rather	 than	 any	 theoretical	 basis.	 Similarly,	 I	 demonstrate	
that	existing	theory	and	empirical	evidence	would	lead	us	to	believe	that	variation	in	the	
balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 -	 the	 proportion	 of	 a	 political	 leader’s	
speech	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 dispute	 that	 is	 accounted	 for	 by	 conciliatory/hostile	
statements,	relative	to	the	proportion	accounted	for	by	hostile/conciliatory	-	should	be	
associated	with	variation	 in	 the	use	of	 force	by	 the	US	against	 its	 adversaries.	 I	 argue	
that	 the	 logical	 extension	 of	 much	 of	 the	 foregoing	 literature	 is	 to	 hypothesise	 that	
conciliatory	 statements	 should	 be	 negatively	 associated	 with	 a	 state’s	 use	 of	 armed	
force.	
3.1 Defining Key Concepts 
3.1.1 Disputes (MIDs) 




Militarized	 Interstate	 Disputes	 Data-set	 to	 define	 a	 militarised	 interstate	 dispute.	
Therefore,	“MID”	or	simply	“dispute”	are	often	used	for	the	sake	of	brevity.	An	example	
of	a	MID	is	the	dispute	between	China	and	Taiwan	in	2001	wherein	China	attempted	to	





dispute	 involved	 a	 number	 of	 individual	 “militarised	 incidents”	 involving	 both	 sides	
during	the	course	of	the	dispute.	
Disputes	 are	defined	as	 “united	historical	 cases”	 as	 they	are	 composed	of	 at	 least	one	
(and	 often	 many)	 “militarised	 incidents”	 (Jones	 et	 al.,	 1996,	 p.	 169).	 A	 militarised	
incident	is	a	“...single	military	action	involving	an	explicit	threat,	display,	or	use	of	force	
by	one	system	member	state	towards	another	system	member	state...”(Jones	et	al.,	1996,	
p.	 169).	 These	 different	 incidents	 are	 types	 of	 behaviour:	 displays,	 threats,	 military	
action.	One	of	these	behaviours,	threats,	constitutes	verbal	communication	in	itself	and	
highlights	the	focus	on	threatening	statements	in	foregoing	literature.	
The	 importance	 of	 the	MID	 period	 for	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 a	 time	 period	 in	
which	the	occurrence	of	armed	violence	between	the	disputing	parties	can	reasonably	
be	said	to	have	been	greater	 than	zero.	This	provides	a	 time	period	throughout	which	
the	 verbal	 statements	 of	 political	 leaders	 can	 be	 collected.	We	 can	 then	 see	 whether	
conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 used	 by	 a	 political	 leader	 are	 associated	with	 the	
occurrence	of	a	state	using	armed	force	during	this	period.	
The	MID	dataset	categorises	five	levels	of	hostility,	1)	no	militarised	action,	2)	threat	to	
use	 force,	3)	Display	use	of	 force,	4)	use	of	 force	and	5)	War.	Each	of	 these	categories	
contains	 a	number	of	 actions	within	 it.	 For	 example,	 both	 “threat	 to	occupy	 territory”	
and	 “threat	 to	 declare	war”	 come	under	 category	2),	while	 “mobilisation”	 and	 “fortify	
border”	 come	 under	 category	 3).	 In	 the	 example	 of	 the	 dispute	 between	 China	 and	
Taiwan,	given	above,	 the	dispute	escalated	as	hostility	 levels	 increased.	 Initially	China	
threatened	 to	declare	war	and	 (in	 a	 separate	 incident)	 threatened	 to	use	 force.	These	
actions	fall	within	the	second	category	of	hostility.	However,	as	the	dispute	progressed	
both	 sides	 engaged	 in	 displays	 of	 force,	 actions	 that	 fall	 within	 the	 third	 category	 of	
hostility	(Ghosn	et	al.,	2004).	
3.1.2 Armed Force 
Later	 iterations	 of	 the	 MID	 dataset	 breakdown	 the	 data	 on	 hostility	 by	 participant	
(Ghosn	et	al.,	2004).	This	means	that	we	can	see	not	only	 the	highest	 level	of	hostility	
that	 a	 MID	 exhibited,	 but	 what	 the	 respective	 levels	 of	 hostility	 employed	 by	 each	
participating	state	were.	 It	 is	 in	this	way	that	I	determine	whether	a	state	used	armed	
force	against	its	adversary.	Armed	force	is	defined	by	a	handful	of	militarised	incidents.	
If	a	state	participates	in	any	of	these	incidents	it	is	said	to	have	employed	armed	force	

























































1000	or	more	battle	deaths	 then	the	dispute	 is	said	 to	have	elevated	 to	a	state	of	war	
(Jones	et	al.,	1996,	p.	171).	
3.1.3 Conciliatory Statements 
The	 type	 of	 statements	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 are	 public	 statements	 made	 by	 political	
leaders	 in	 the	 context	 of	 disputes.	 Conciliatory	 statements	 are	 defined	 as	 any	 verbal	
statement	made	by	a	state’s	political	leader	that	directly	refers	to	the	dispute	in	question	
and,	 a)	 expresses	 a	willingness,	 preference	 or	 commitment	 to	 interact	with	 the	 other	
party	 to	 the	 dispute	 in	 a	 non-coercive	 manner,	 and/or,	 b)	 expresses	 a	 willingness,	
preference	 or	 commitment	 to	 not	 interact	 with	 the	 other	 party	 to	 the	 dispute	 in	 a	
coercive	manner.	
An	 element	 of	 this	 definition	 that	 deserves	 further	 explanation	 is	 the	 focus	 on	 the	
statements	of	political	leaders.	It	is	not	possible	to	gather	information	on	the	statements	
made	 by	 all	 parties	 that	 might	 have	 some	 investment	 in	 how	 a	 state	 acts	 during	 a	
particular	dispute.	Nor	 is	 it	possible	to	gather	this	 information	for	all	people	who	may	
have	some	say	in	how	the	state	acts	in	such	a	context.	Rather,	we	must	determine	whose	
statements	 would	 be	most	 likely	 to	 shape	 state	 action	 during	 disputes.	 In	 this	 thesis	




of	 policy	 implementation	 in	 international	 affairs.”	 Also,	 for	 these	 reasons,	 it	 is	 the	
statements	 of	 political	 leaders	 that	 the	 political	 leadership	 of	 the	 opposing	 state	 are	
most	likely	to	be	interested	in	and	responsive	to.		
3.2 Theoretical Links 
Understanding	 the	 concepts	 of	 interest,	 we	 require	 a	 theoretical	 account	 of	 why	
variation	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 used	 by	 a	 political	 leader	 in	MIDs	
might	be	associated	with	variation	in	their	state’s	use	of	armed	force.	I	argue	that	both	
domestic	 audience	 cost	 arguments	 and	 reputational	 arguments	 presented	 in	 the	
preceding	Literature	Review	 can	provide	 such	an	account.	This	 is	despite	 the	 fact	 that	
until	now	these	arguments	have	almost	exclusively	been	applied	to	hostile	statements.	
3.2.1 Bargaining Model of War Revisited 





states	 to	 avoid	 war	 (Ramsay,	 2011).	 Rationalist	 arguments	 were	 put	 forward	 that	
avoided	 this	 contradiction	with	 reality	 by	 claiming	 that	while	 talk	was	 cheap	 it	 often	
brought	about	costs	later,	or,	alternatively,	that	state	leaders	had	incentives	to	act	in	line	





Such	 arguments	 typically	 appealed	 to	 costs	 that	 domestic	 audiences	 could	 impose	 on	
state	 leaders	 for	making	 empty	 statements,	 or	 the	 benefits	 a	 state	may	 gain	 from	 its	
leaders	having	a	reputation	for	following	through	on	their	words.	I	contend	here	that	the	
underlying	logic	of	both	types	of	argument,	along	with	recent	empirical	evidence	yielded	





3.2.1.1 Domestic Audience Costs and Conciliatory Statements 
Most	 domestic	 audience	 cost	 arguments	 revolve	 around	 the	 notion	 that	 escalating	 a	
dispute	 (via	 threats)	 and	 then	 backing	 down	 is	 costly	 for	 the	 political	 leadership	 of	 a	
country	 because	 its	 domestic	 population	 will	 disapprove.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 why	
exactly	 domestic	 publics	 would	 act	 this	 way	 has	 been	 a	 point	 of	 contention.	 The	






The	 question	 is	whether	 conciliatory	 statements	 could	 also	 incur	 audience	 costs,	 and	
thus	make	 certain	 courses	 of	 action	 less	 likely.	 If	 so,	 intuitively,	we	would	 expect	 the	
opposite	relationship	to	that	between	hostile	statements	and	backing-down.	If	domestic	







Recent	 empirical	work	 in	 the	 form	 of	 survey	 studies	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	 are	
good	 reasons.	Begun	by	Tomz	 (2007)	 and	 followed	by	Tingley	 (2014)	 and	Levy	 et	 al.	




is	 strategic	 selection	 bias.	 If	 leaders	 take	 the	 prospect	 of	 audience	
costs	 into	 account	 when	 making	 foreign	 policy	 decisions,	 then	 in	
situations	when	 citizens	would	 react	 harshly	 against	 backing	 down,	
leaders	 would	 tend	 to	 avoid	 that	 path,	 leaving	 little	 opportunity	 to	
observe	the	public	backlash.	
Essentially,	audience	costs	are	hard	to	observe	precisely	because	cases	in	which	they	are	





which	 the	US	 simply	 refrains	 from	getting	 involved	 in	 a	 dispute.	 The	 second	 group	 is	





this	 current	 discussion,	 however,	 is	 why	 participants	 disapproved	 of	 the	 president’s	
backing	down	from	a	threat.	Tomz	(2007,	p.	835)	found	that	72%	of	participants	dislike	
the	president	backing	down	after	having	made	 threatening	 statements	because	 it	was	








for	 reputation”	 (Tomz,	 2007,	 p.	 835).	 Indeed,	 Tomz	 (2007,	 p.	 836)	 declares	 that	 his	
evidence	supports	a	“reputation-based	theory	of	audience	costs.”	Guisinger	and	Smith’s	
(2002)	 account	 in	 which	 leaders	 are	 punished	 for	 “destroying	 the	 country’s	 honest	
record	 and	 thus	putting	 in	 jeopardy	 the	 future	benefits	 of	 being	 able	 to	 communicate	
during	a	crisis”	(cited	in	Tomz,	2007),	is	noted	in	particular.	
Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	very	 inconsistency	Tomz	 (2007)	 claims	 to	be	 responsible	 for	
domestic	punishment	of	political	 leaders	 is,	at	 least	theoretically,	equally	as	applicable	
to	 conciliatory	 statements,	 he	 only	 extended	 his	 analysis	 as	 far	 as	 threatening	
statements.	 	 A	 logical	 corollary	 of	 Tomz	 (2007)	 work	 is	 that	 we	 might	 also	 expect	
domestic	publics	to	punish	political	leaders	for	making	conciliatory	statements	and	then	
escalating	 a	 dispute	 or	 becoming	 more	 deeply	 involved	 in	 it.	 This	 is	 equally	 as	
inconsistent	 as	 threatening	 a	 state	 and	 then	 backing	 down.	 Recognising	 that	 Tomz’s	
(2007)	work	implied	this	but	that	no	empirical	evidence	existed	to	substantiate	such	a	






2. The	 “Back	 in”	 condition	 where	 the	 president	 eventually	 turned	 around	 and	
deployed	military	force	after	initially	saying	the	United	States	would	stay	out	of	
the	conflict.	
After	 being	 presented	 with	 the	 scenario	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	 report	 their	
approval/disapproval	 of	 the	 president’s	 actions.	 Levy	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 found	 that	 a	
president’s	 approval	 drops	 12%	 after	 promising	 not	 to	 become	 involved	 in	 a	 dispute	
and	 then	deciding	 to	use	 armed	 force.	This	 supports	 the	notion	 that	domestic	publics	
punish	political	 leaders	for	not	keeping	to	their	conciliatory	commitments	not	to	fight,	




However,	 the	 conciliatory	 statements	 Levy	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 look	 at	 are	 “negative	
commitments”;	 commitments	 to	not	do	 things.	 So,	while	providing	empirical	 evidence	
that	 domestic	 audiences	 punish	 political	 leaders	 for	 breaching	 these	 types	 of	
conciliatory	statements,	their	findings	do	not	extend	to	conciliatory	statements	in	which	






(2015),	 that	 domestic	 publics	 do	 value	 political	 leaders	 acting	 consistently	with	 their	
public	 agreements	 with	 other	 states.	 In	 a	 research	 design	 in	 which	 an	 increasingly	
powerful	state	proposes	to	take	possession	of	US	territory	on	an	island	on	which	both	
states	currently	have	territory,	an	earlier	public	statement	agreeing	to	this	from	the	US	
political	 leadership	 increased	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 survey	 participants	 accepted	 the	
proposal,	while	all	other	material	factors	remained	the	same.	However,	Tingley	(2014)	
does	 not	 specify	 what	 these	 statements	 involve	 in	 terms	 of	 either	 a	 “positive”	
commitment	to,	for	example,	sit	down	and	work	out	this	exchange	with	the	challenging	
state,	 or	 a	 “negative”	 commitment	 to	 simply	 not	 challenge	 the	 other	 state	 in	 taking	
possession	of	the	territory.	
3.2.2 Incorporating “Positive” Conciliatory Statements 
The	point	here	 is	not	 to	 reiterate	 the	 content	of	 the	Literature	Review.	Rather,	 tracing	
these	developments	demonstrates	that	there	is	no	theoretical	reason	presented	by	the	





armed	 force.	Discussing	whether	 leaders	might	be	more	 severely	punished	by	publics	





those	 statements	 that	 are	 conciliatory	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 promise	 to	 refrain	 from	
using	armed	force.	If	 inconsistency	is	the	motivating	factor	for	a	public	to	punish	their	
political	 leaders,	 this	 suggests	 they	 will	 do	 so	 when	 their	 leaders	 make	 “positive”	
conciliatory	statements	 towards	an	adversary	and	 then	use	armed	 force	against	 them.	
As	made	explicit	by	my	definition	of	 conciliatory	statements	 in	 section	3.1.3,	 I	 include	
both	positive	and	negative	conciliatory	statements	in	my	analysis	herein.	
For	 the	 above	 reasons,	 I	 believe	 existing	 theory	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 entail	
Hypothesis	1;	
H1:	 The	 use	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 by	 a	 political	 leader	 during	 an	 MID	 will	 be	
negatively	associated	with	their	state	using	armed	force	in	that	MID.	
3.2.3 Why a Negative Association? 
It	is,	perhaps,	somewhat	easier	to	hypothesise	on	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	







win	 to	 backing	 down	 from	 earlier	 threats	 (Trager	 and	 Vavreck,	 2011).	 The	 issue,	 in	
terms	of	hypothesising	a	relationship	between	such	hostile	statements	and	a	state’s	use	
of	armed	force,	is	that	while	these	statements	commit	a	state	leader	to	the	use	of	armed	
force,	 they	may	also	make	armed	force	unnecessary.	 If	 the	threat	 is	successful	and	the	
adversary	backs	down	or	is	compelled	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	threat,	then	there	is	
no	 longer	 the	 need	 for	 the	 political	 leader	 to	 pursue	 armed	 force.	 As	Matthew	 Baum	
(2004,	p.	605)	puts	it,	threats	“may	increase	the	odds	of	winning	without	firing	a	shot.”	
Thus,	threatening	statements	increase	a	political	leader’s	willingness	to	use	armed	force	
to	 achieve	 their	 goals,	 but	 simultaneously	 increase	 the	 chances	 of	 their	 goals	 being	
achieved	without	the	use	of	force.	
This	 tension	 does	 not	 exist	 with	 conciliatory	 statements.	 As	 demonstrated	 above,	 if	
inconsistency	 is	 the	 reason	why	 domestic	 publics	 punish	 political	 leaders	 for	 backing	




asked	 whether	 conciliatory	 statements	 would	 invite	 aggression	 from	 an	 adversary,	
which	in	turn	might	require	the	use	of	armed	force	to	repel	them.	However,	it	is	difficult	
to	think	of	an	explanation	conforming	to	the	rational	decision-making	principles	of	the	
bargaining	 model	 of	 war	 that	 would	 predict	 this	 to	 occur	 systematically.	 Kydd	 and	
McManus	 (2017)	 demonstrate	 that	 assurances	 (essentially	 negative	 conciliatory	
statements)	offered	by	one	state	to	another	increase	the	range	of	dispute	outcomes	that	
satisfy	both	parties	and	can	be	achieved	without	fighting	over	an	issue.		
3.2.4 Possible Objections to Hypothesis One 
I	have	tried	to	show	that	Hypothesis	One	(H1)	 is	 the	 logical	hypothesised	relationship	
between	 conciliatory	 statements	 and	 a	 state’s	 use	 of	 armed	 force	when	 accepting	 the	
core	 tenets	 of	 the	 bargaining	 model	 of	 war	 and	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 we	 have	
regarding	how	domestic	audience	costs	work.	However,	I	am	aware	that	there	could	be	
further	objections	questioning	whether	 this	 relationship	will	be	borne	out	 in	 reality.	 I	








Regarding	 the	 first	 point,	 domestic	 audience	 cost	 arguments	 recognise	 that	 political	
leaders	have	incentives	to	lie;	they	merely	serve	to	point	out	that	this	deception	is	not	
costless,	as	domestic	publics	punish	political	leaders	for	doing	so.	A	pertinent	question	is	
how	 successfully	 political	 leaders	 might	 be	 in	 convincing	 their	 publics	 that	 new	
information	came	to	 light	 in	the	period	between	making	a	statement	(either	hostile	or	
conciliatory)	 and	 breaching	 that	 statement	 by	 acting	 inconsistently,	 thus,	 perhaps,	
mitigating	domestic	backlash.	
Levy	 et	 al.	 (2015),	 in	 an	 extension	 of	 their	 investigation	 into	 audience	 costs,	 ask	 this	
question.	 Interestingly,	 they	 find	 that	 participants	 in	 their	 survey	 rewarded	 the	 US	
president	for	backing	down	from	a	threat	when	presented	with	a	scenario	in	which	the	
president	had	received	new	information	suggesting	that	to	intervene	was	not	in	the	US’	













armed	 force	 there	 was	 no	 notable	 difference	 to	 presidential	 approval	 between	 the	
scenario	in	which	the	president	stated	his/her	intentions	to	use	force	outright	and	the	






Regarding	 the	 second	 of	 the	 objections	 mentioned	 above,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 the	
presence	 of	 a	 “rally	 ‘round	 the	 flag”	 phenomenon	 does	 not	 rule	 out	 domestic	 publics	
punishing	political	leaders	in	the	ways	described	above;	they	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	
Patrick	 James	 and	 Jean	 Sébastian	 Rioux	 (1998,	 p.	 783)	 explain	 the	 logic	 behind	 this	
“rally	effect”	as	such;	




Thus,	 the	 question	 regarding	 audience	 costs	 is	 why	 domestic	 publics	 would	 punish	









The	 second,	more	 important	 point,	 I	 think,	 is	 that	 it	 is	 consistent	with	 both	 domestic	
audience	 cost	 arguments	 and	 notions	 of	 a	 rally	 around	 the	 flag	 effect	 that	 political	
leaders	may	be	rewarded	 for	disputing	with	other	states,	yet	punished	 for	doing	so	 in	
such	 a	 way	 whereby	 they	 break	 their	 publicly	 made	 commitments	 (hostile	 or	
conciliatory).	There	are	no	obvious	theoretical	grounds	upon	which	to	predict	whether	





provide	 an	 account	 of	 why	 we	 would	 expect	 to	 see	 conciliatory	 statements	 having	 a	
positive	association	with	a	state’s	use	of	armed	force.		
3.2.5 Theorising a Connection Between Conciliatory and Hostile Statements, and the 
Use of Armed Force 
I	want	to	extend	the	theoretical	discussion	beyond	merely	talking	about	conciliatory	or	
hostile	 statements.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	 talk	 about	 the	balance	of	 statements	 struck	by	 a	
political	leader.	I	have	demonstrated	in	the	foregoing	that	existing	literature	has	largely	









violently,	 and	expresses	 the	measures	 they	are	undertaking	 to	achieve	 this,	but	 in	 the	
same	breath	announces	 the	military	 steps	 they	are	willing	 to	 take	 in	order	 to	achieve	
their	goals.	
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statements	 will	 account	 for	 differing	 proportions	 of	 all	 the	 words	 a	 political	 leader	
makes	 regarding	 a	 dispute.13	To	 take	 a	 fictional	 example,	 there	 could	 be	 a	 dispute	 in	
which	 conciliatory	 statements	 account	 for	 5%	 of	 all	 the	words	 regarding	 a	 particular	
dispute.	Hostile	statements	might	account	for	10%	of	all	words	regarding	this	dispute.	








The	underlying	 logic	 of	 this	 relationship	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 that	 of	H1.	As	discussed	 in	
section	3.2.3,	 it	 is	hard	to	hypothesise	a	relationship	between	hostile	statements	and	a	
state’s	 use	 of	 armed	 force.	 However,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 hostile	 statements	 are	
positively	 or	 negatively	 associated	 with	 a	 state’s	 use	 of	 armed	 force,	 given	 that	
preceding	 theory	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 suggest	 that	 conciliatory	 statements	will	 be	
negatively	 associated	with	 the	use	of	 armed	 force,	 the	 larger	 the	proportion	of	words	














statements,	 it	 does	 not	 account	 for	 the	 empirical	 reality	 that	 in	 disputes	 both	 type	 of	
statements	are	often	used	and	the	effects	of	one	possibly	interact	with	the	effects	of	the	
other.	 H2,	 like	 H1,	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 theory	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 found	 in	 the	
literature	discussed	in	the	Literature	Review.	However,	it	also	accounts	for	the	empirical	
reality	 that	 in	 many	 disputes	 political	 leaders	 use	 both	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements.	 Few	 studies	 have	 attempted	 to	 account	 for	 both	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements,	 although	 Kydd	 and	 McManus’	 (2017)	 recent	 work	 has	 headed	 in	 this	
direction.	




that	 might	 be	 important	 with	 regard	 to	 whether	 they	 (the	 statements)	 influence	 the	
likelihood	 that	 a	 state	 uses	 armed	 force;	 the	 level	 of	 commitment	 expressed	 by	 each	
statement.	




state	 is	 committed	 to	 a	 position”	 and	 highlights	 negative	 characterisations,	 threats,	
demands	and	refusals	as	pertinent	subcategories.	However,	negative	characterisations,	
demands	 and	 refusals,	 and	 threats	 are	 not	 treated	 as	 equally	 hostile	 statements	 by	
McManus	 (2014).	Rather,	 they	exist	 in	a	hierarchy	based	on	 the	 level	of	hostility	such	
statements	 express.	 Explicit	 threats	 towards	 an	 adversary	 are	 said	 to	 express	 the	
greatest	degree	of	hostility,	whereas	negative	characterisations	are	said	to	express	the	
least	hostility	of	the	categories.	
I	 attempt	 to	 measure	 conciliatory	 statements	 similarly.	 I	 subcategorise	 conciliatory	
statements	as	expressing	either	willingness,	preference	or	commitment	to	interact	with	
an	adversary	non-coercively.	I	explain	in	the	following	Methodology	and	Research	Design	
chapter	 how	 I	measure	 these	 different	 commitment	 levels.	 For	 now,	 I	 simply	want	 to	
touch	upon	the	reasons	we	have	for	believing	that	commitment	levels	should	matter.	
I	 show	 in	 the	 above	 how	 domestic	 audience	 cost	 arguments	 link	 a	 political	 leader’s	
statements	towards	an	adversary	and	the	decision	of	whether	or	not	to	use	armed	force	
against	 that	 adversary.	 The	 basic	 contention	 is	 that	 domestic	 publics	 punish	 political	
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leaders	 for	 inconsistency	 between	 their	 statements	 and	 deeds.	 The	 question	 then	
becomes	 whether	 domestic	 audiences	 punish	 leaders	 more	 for	 acting	 in	 a	 way	
inconsistent	with	 highly	 committed	 statements	 (whether	 conciliatory	 or	 hostile)	 than	
they	do	 for	acting	 inconsistently	with	 less	 committed	 statements.	While	 there	has	not	
been	much	research	conducted	on	 this	question,	preliminary	 findings	seem	to	suggest	
that	they	do.	
Trager	 and	Vavreck	 (2011)	 investigated	how	much	 control	 of	 audience	 costs	 political	
leaders	had	during	a	dispute	prior	to	the	initiation	of	armed	force.	What	were	the	things	
that	political	 leaders	could	do	 in	order	 to	manage	 the	costs	 that	 they	would	pay	were	
they	 to	 act	 inconsistently	 with	 their	 earlier	 statements?	 Trager	 and	 Vavreck	 (2011)	
found	that	the	language	that	political	leaders	use	was	influential.	They	state,	
Our	results	 indicate	that	the	magnitude	of	audience	costs	are	 indeed	
under	 direct	 presidential	 control	 based	 on	 the	 rhetoric	 or	 language	
that	 presidents	 use	 when	 issuing	 threats.	 Vague	 threats,	 relative	 to	
specific	ones,	yield	lower	audience	costs	if	left	unfulfilled…presidents	
do	 not	 have	 to	 engage	 the	 enemy	militarily	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 the	
penalties	 that	 come	 from	 backing	 down	 –	 they	 just	 have	 to	 choose	
more	dramatic,	specific	language	(Trager	and	Vavreck,	p.	527).	
Similarly,	 Levy	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 recognise	 the	 possibility	 that	 their	 finding	 that	 domestic	
publics	punish	political	leaders	more	for	backing	down	from	a	threat	to	use	armed	force	
than	 they	do	 for	not	 fulfilling	a	promise	 to	not	use	armed	 force	could	be	due	not	 to	a	
difference	between	 the	 two	 types	of	 statements	 (a	hostile	 threat	versus	a	 conciliatory	
promise)	 but	 because	 in	 their	 experiment	 the	 threat	 was	 made	 with	 more	 explicit	
conditions	upon	which	it	would	be	enacted.	
Measuring	 the	 level	 of	 commitment	 that	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 involve	
helps	 to	 account	 for	 the	 effect	 that	 these	 differences	 may	 have	 on	 whether	 a	 state	
ultimately	uses	armed	force	against	an	adversary.	A	more	specific	commitment	to	non-
coercion,	for	example,	is	likely	to	be	punished	more	harshly	by	a	domestic	public	than	a	
less	 specific	 statement	 presenting	 non-coercion	 as	 one	 of	 a	 suite	 of	 options.	 In	 the	
Inferential	 Statistics	chapter	 I	 test	 for	 a	 relationship	 between	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements,	 and	 use	 of	 armed	 force,	 while	 differentiating	 between	 the	 commitment	
levels	of	both	conciliatory	and	hostile	statements.	
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3.2.7 Concluding Remarks and Further Considerations 
This	 chapter	 began	 by	 outlining	 central	 concepts.	 I	 explained	 the	 definitions	 I	 adopt	
from	existing	literature	with	regard	to	disputes	and	armed	force,	and	went	on	to	define	a	
conciliatory	 statement.	 Drawing	 on	 literature	 presented	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapter	 I	
outlined	 the	 theoretical	 case	 linking	 the	 public	 speech	 of	 political	 leaders	 in	 times	 of	
dispute	 and	 their	 states’	 use	 of	 armed	 force	 against	 adversaries.	 As	 a	 result	 I	
hypothesised	 that	 conciliatory	 statements	 used	 by	 political	 leaders	 in	 the	 context	 of	
disputes	 should	 be	 negatively	 associated	with	 a	 state’s	 use	 of	 armed	 force	 against	 its	
adversaries.	 Similarly,	 I	 hypothesised	 that	 the	 more	 conciliatory	 the	 balance	 of	
conciliatory	and	hostile	statements	used	by	a	political	 leader	during	a	dispute,	the	less	
likely	 it	 will	 be	 that	 this	 leader’s	 state	 employs	 armed	 force.	 I	 ended	 this	 process	 of	
drawing	 theoretical	 connections	 by	 highlighting	 how	 the	 commitment	 expressed	 by	
conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 is	 another	 factor	 to	 account	 for	 in	 analysing	 the	
relationship	between	political	leaders’	statements	and	their	states’	use	of	armed	force.	
In	 establishing	 the	 above	 theoretical	 connections	 between	 political	 leadership	 speech	
and	a	state’s	use	of	armed	force	I	drew	on	domestic	audience	cost	literature.	A	point	that	
needs	 to	 be	 made	 clear	 is	 that	 while	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 hypotheses	
established	earlier	in	this	chapter	extend	from	theory	and	empirical	evidence	produced	
by	studies	analysing	domestic	audience	costs,	 the	empirical	 testing	 that	 takes	place	 in	
this	 thesis	 (the	 methods	 of	 which	 are	 explained	 in	 the	 following	 chapters)	 is	 not	
intended	to	help	establish	whether	or	not	domestic	audience	costs	exist.	Rather,	I	have	
discussed	 audience	 costs	 at	 such	 length	 because	 they	 motivate	 my	 hypotheses	 and	
ground	my	empirical	enquiry	in	the	preceding	literature.	I	am	interested	in	whether	the	
use	 of	 hostile	 and,	 in	 particular,	 conciliatory	 statements	 by	 political	 leaders	 in	 the	










to	 go	 some	way	 towards	 filling	 the	 research	 gaps	 illustrated	 in	 the	Literature	Review.	
Secondly,	 it	 aims	 to	 provide	 evidence	 from	 empirical	 observation	 in	 order	 to	 test	 the	
hypotheses	presented	in	the	Theoretical	Framework.	
I	 have	 split	my	 research	design	and	methodology	 section	 into	 two	chapters.	This	 first	
chapter	 is	designed	 to	explain	how	 I	went	about	collecting	and	coding	 information	on	
the	conciliatory	statements	used	by	US	presidents.	I	have	explained	above	that	this	is	an	
under-examined	phenomenon.	McManus	(2014,	p.	5)	claims	that	she	conducts	her	own	
work	 (on	 hostile	 statements)	 amidst	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 regarding	 the	 universe	 of	
statements	 that	 presidents	 use	 to	 signal	 hostility.	 This	 is	 also	 true	 of	 conciliatory	
statements.	 To	 this	 author’s	 knowledge	 there	 has	 not	 been	 a	 previous	 effort	 to	
empirically	collect	or	codify	US	presidential	statements	that	are	conciliatory	 in	nature.	
For	this	reason,	I	have	put	aside	space	to	discuss	this	matter	thoroughly.	The	second	of	
these	 chapter	 details	 the	 variables	 used	 in	 my	 statistical	 analysis	 and	 how	 they	 are	
operationalized.	It	also	outlines	the	statistical	techniques	by	which	I	test	the	hypotheses	
presented	in	the	Theoretical	Framework.	
This	 chapter	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 First,	 a	 unit	 of	 analysis	 is	 identified	 and	 defined.	
Defining	a	unit	of	analysis	is	the	most	basic	step	in	outlining	any	quantitative	research	
design,	 but	 also	 helps	 to	 delimit	 the	 time	 period	 over	 which	 data	 on	 conciliatory	
statements	was	collected.	Second,	I	explain	the	process	by	which	I	collected	the	body	of	
statements	 US	 presidents	 made	 in	 the	 context	 of	 each	 dispute.	 Third,	 I	 recount	 the	
process	 by	which	 I	 coded	 some	 of	 these	 statements	 as	 conciliatory.	 Fourth,	 I	 discuss	
steps	 I	 took	 to	 ensure	 my	 coding	 of	 statements	 as	 conciliatory	 was	 rigorous.	 In	 the	
following	discussion	I	indicate	where	my	coding/process	follows	McManus	(2014).	
4.1 Unit of Analysis 
The	unit	of	analysis	herein	 is	 the	dyadic	militarised	 interstate	dispute	(MID)	 involving	
the	United	States	(US)	between	1950-2010.	I	use	McManus’	(2014)	dataset	of	272	cases	
of	dyadic	MIDs	in	which	the	US	was	one	disputing	party.	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	
why	 the	 selection	 of	 this	 data	 is	 appropriate	 in	 testing	 the	 hypotheses	 present	 in	 the	
Theoretical	Framework	chapter.	
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McManus	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 dyadic	MIDs	 are	 an	 appropriate	 unit	 of	 analysis	 for	 her	
exploration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 hostile	 statements	 in	 dispute	 settings.	 Noting	 pragmatic	
benefits,	 McManus	 (2014,	 p.	 4)	 states,	 “Using	 the	 MID	 dataset	 allows	 me	 to	 test	 my	
hypothesis	on	the	largest	possible	set	of	relevant	observations”.	McManus	also	observes	
theoretical	benefits.	Citing	Dafoe,	Renshon	and	Huth	(2014)	she	continues,	“...most	MIDs	
engage	 a	 state’s	 reputation,	 so	 they	 should	 be	 good	 cases	 for	 testing	 expectations	
derived	from	domestic	audience	cost	theory	and	international	reputational	cost	theory”	
(McManus,	 2014,	 p.	 4).	 Both	 these	 benefits	 also	 apply	 here.	 The	 long-standing	 and	
widely	 accepted	Militarised	 interstate	 Disputes	 Dataset	 (Palmer,	 D’Orazio,	 Kenwick	 &	
Lane,	2015)	provides	comprehensive	data	on	interstate	disputes	over	the	time	period	of	
interest.	Moreover,	 it	 is	beneficial	 that	MIDs	are	disputes	 in	which	domestic	audiences	
might	punish	political	leaders	for	their	handling	of	disputes,	as	domestic	audience	cost	
theory	 was	 drawn	 upon	 in	 forming	 the	 hypotheses	 presented	 in	 the	 Theoretical	
Framework.	
4.1.1 What Does it Mean for a MID to be “Dyadic”? 
Many	 MIDs	 are	 multilateral,	 made	 of	 two	 conflicting	 blocs	 at	 least	 one	 of	 which	 is	
composed	of	multiple	states.	World	War	Two	and	the	Korean	War	are	two	examples	of	
such	disputes	that	escalated	to	warfare.	To	break	these	MIDs	down	into	dyadic	MIDs	is	
to	 break	 the	 participating	 states	 into	 dyads.	 For	 example,	 during	 the	Korean	War	 the	




armed	 force	 against	 the	 opposing	 bloc.	 In	 trying	 to	 analyse	 whether	 the	 statements	
made	by	presidents	about	North	Korea,	for	example,	influence	the	odds	of	the	US	using	
armed	 force	 against	 North	 Korea,	 we	 need	 to	 know	 whether	 the	 US	 ultimately	 used	
armed	force	against	North	Korea	specifically,	not,	for	example,	states	such	as	China	that	
were	aligned	with	North	Korea	during	the	Korean	War.	
4.1.2 Why the US? 
Although	consideration	had	been	given	to	focusing	solely	on	dyadic	MIDs	involving	the	






every	 country	 over	 all	 distinct	 militarised	 interstate	 disputes.	 Inevitably,	 some	
subsection	of	MIDs	needs	to	be	identified	for	study.	MIDs	involving	the	US	made	sense	
upon	 pragmatic	 grounds.	 The	 primary	 reason	 for	 this,	 as	 McManus	 notes,	 is	 that	




MIDs	 involving	 the	 US	 as	 the	 unit	 of	 analysis.	 Primarily,	 the	 US	 is	 a	 democratic	 state	
(Marshall,	Gurr	&	Jaggers,	2017).	Being	democratic,	it	has	been	argued,	allows	leaders	to	
incur	 audience	 costs	 as,	 unlike	 dictatorships	 or	 other	 types	 of	 authoritarian	 regimes,	






in	 focusing	 upon	 the	 US	 we	 are	 restricted	 in	 what	 we	 can	 conclude	 about	 the	
relationship	 between	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 and	 a	 state’s	 use	 of	 armed	
force	where	 the	US	 is	not	 involved.	There	could	be	something	 fundamentally	different	
about	the	US	in	relation	to	other	states	that	influences	the	relationship	(or	lack	thereof)	
between	these	variables.	A	prime	example	would	be	that	the	US	is	extremely	militarily	
powerful.	 This	 fact	 could	 influence	 both	 the	 statements	US	political	 leaders	 choose	 to	
use,	as	well	as	their	use	of	armed	force	against	adversaries.	Factors	like	this	need	to	be	
controlled	 for,	 and	 how	 I	 attempt	 to	 do	 so	 is	 explained	 in	 the	 following	 chapter.	
However,	it	 is	not	possible	to	control	for	everything	that	makes	the	US	different	to	the	
“average”	state.	Therefore,	if	a	relationship	is	observed	between	conciliatory	statements,	
for	 example,	 and	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 armed	 force,	 this	 cannot	 be	 generalised	 to	 hold	with	
regards	to	other	states.	It	may,	however,	suggest	that	this	idea	should	be	taken	seriously	
and	given	scholarly	attention.	
4.2 Data Collection - What did I aim to collect? 
Before	statements	could	be	coded	as	either	conciliatory	or	hostile,	the	body	of	relevant	
statements	for	each	dyadic	MID	needed	to	be	defined	and	collected.	That	is	to	say	that	
the	 body	 of	 statements	 in	 which	 political	 leaders	 discussed	 a	 dispute	 needed	 to	 be	










4.2.1 Presidential Statements 
As	alluded	to	at	the	start	of	this	chapter,	I	focus	on	statements	of	US	presidents.	In	the	
Theoretical	Framework	I	often	referred	to	statements	of	 “political	 leaders”,	as	disputes	
involving	 the	 US	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 defined	 as	 my	 unit	 of	 analysis.	 A	 focus	 on	 the	
statements	 of	 US	 presidents	 is	 a	 natural	 decision,	 given	 my	 unit	 of	 analysis	 and	 the	
established	tradition	of	 focusing	on	the	statements	of	political	 leaders	 in	the	 literature	
cited	in	the	Literature	Review.	
While	a	number	of	other	people	within	US	foreign	policy	circles,	such	as	the	Secretary	of	
State,	 undoubtedly	 influence	 US	 actions	 in	 dealing	 with	 disputes,	 focusing	 on	 the	
statements	of	presidents	is	advantageous	for	a	number	of	reasons.	Pragmatically,	there	
exists	 a	 comprehensive	 collection	 of	 public	 statements	 made	 by	 US	 presidents,	 the	
Public	Papers	of	the	Presidents	of	the	United	States	(Peters	&	Woolley,	2018).	The	Public	
Papers	contain	“All	public	presidential	statements	and	remarks	released	by	the	Office	of	
the	 Press	 Secretary	 since	 1929”	 (McManus,	 2014,	 p.	 6).	 The	 existence	 of	 the	 Public	
Papers	 is	 beneficial	 as	 having	 to	 search	 only	 one	 resource	 in	 collecting	 presidential	
statements	means	more	cases	of	disputes	are	feasibly	included	within	the	scope	of	a	PhD	
thesis.	The	Public	Papers	also	provide	consistency	and	accuracy.	Unlike	media	sources,	
the	 Public	 Papers	 cover	 all	 the	 public	 statements	 released	 by	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Press	
Secretary	and	avoid	problems	of	media	framing.	
Additionally,	a	focus	on	the	statements	of	the	president	is	an	extension	of	the	theoretical	
assumption	 that	 “governments	 are	 the	 central	 agents	 of	 policy	 implementation	 in	
international	affairs”	(Bueno	de	Mesquita	and	Lalman,	1992,	p.	11).	As	the	Commander	
in	Chief	of	 the	US’	military,	 focusing	upon	the	statements	of	 the	president	hones	 in	on	





4.2.2 Statements Prior to the Use of Armed Force 
It	 was	 important	 not	 to	 collect	 statements	 that	 presidents	 had	 made	 regarding	 an	
adversary	following	US	use	of	armed	force	against	that	adversary.	To	do	so	would	have	
raised	an	issue	of	reverse	causality	in	the	following	statistical	analysis.	In	order	to	test	
whether	 variation	 in	 US	 presidential	 use	 of	 statements	 expressing	 conciliation	 or	
hostility	towards	an	adversary	is	correlated	with	variation	in	the	US’	use	of	armed	force	
against	 those	 adversaries,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 include	 only	 such	 statements	 that	
occurred	prior	to	force	being	used.	




secondary	 sources.14	After	 an	 extensive	 search,	 there	were	 only	 four	 dyadic	MIDs	 for	
which	 I	 felt	 that	 I	 could	 not	 confidently	 identify	 the	 first	 date	 on	which	 the	 US	 used	
armed	 force,	 despite	 being	 coded	 by	 McManus	 (2014)	 as	 the	 US	 having	 used	 armed	
force.	These	dyadic	MIDs	were	excluded	from	my	analysis.	
4.3 Data Collection - The collection process 
4.3.1 A Random Sample 
Data	was	collected	from	a	random	sample	of	the	remaining	268	dyadic	MIDs	included	in	
McManus’	 (2014)	dataset.	 It	 quickly	became	apparent	 that	 it	would	not	be	 feasible	 to	

















time	 for	 presidents	 to	 have	multiple	 opportunities	 to	 speak	 publicly	 about	 a	 dispute.	
Unlike	 in	 the	 21st	 Century	 where	 the	 twenty-four	 hour	 news	 cycle	 and	 social	 media	
mean	 that	 presidents	 often	 have	 many	 engagements	 broadcast	 each	 day,	 it	 was	 not	
unusual	during	the	1950s,	for	example,	for	the	president	to	speak	on	a	subject	publicly	
only	a	couple	of	times	each	month.	Generating	a	random	sample	ensures	that	disputes	at	
different	 chronological	 stages	 of	 the	 1950-2010	 period	 are	 represented.	 This	 is	
important,	accounting	for	possible	changes	in	use	of	English	over	the	course	of	this	time.	







Following	this,	each	document	was	searched	 for	references	 to	 the	US’	adversary	using	
the	same	search-terms	that	had	been	used	to	search	the	Public	Papers.	
Some	 of	 the	 occasions	 in	 which	 presidents	 mention	 dispute	 adversaries	 are	 lengthy	
public	appearances	in	which	the	adversary	or	dispute	is	only	discussed	briefly	as	one	of	
many	topics	covered.	Following	McManus	(2014),	using	the	“control+f”	function	I	found	
all	 the	 instances	 in	 a	 document	 in	which	 the	 adversary	was	mentioned.	 I	 read	 every	
paragraph	 that	 mentioned	 the	 adversary	 as	 well	 as	 those	 paragraphs	 immediately	
preceding	 and	 following.	 I	 continued	 this	 process	 of	 reading	 preceding	 and	 following	
paragraphs	 until	 the	 adversary	 was	 no	 longer	 being	 discussed.	 I	 copied	 all	 those	









by	 US	 presidents	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 dispute,	 and	 was	 the	 body	 of	 text	 from	 which	
statements	were	coded.	
4.4 Coding Conciliatory Statements 
Having	 found	 the	 appropriate	 body	 of	 presidential	 statements	 to	 work	 with,	 those	
statements	 corresponding	 to	 the	 definition	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 needed	 to	 be	
coded	 as	 such.	 To	 recap	 the	 definition	 presented	 in	 the	 Theoretical	 Framework,	
conciliatory	statements	are	defined	as	any	verbal	statement	made	by	a	state’s	political	
leader	 that	 directly	 refers	 to	 the	 dispute	 in	 question	 and,	 a)	 expresses	 a	 willingness,	





were	 selected	 and	 included	 in	 the	dictionary	until	 I	 felt	 that	 all	 conciliatory	words	 or	
phrases	from	each	document	had	been	collected.	Each	instance	of	a	conciliatory	word	or	
phrase	was	coded	for	a	number	of	other	features	as	well.	
I	 coded	every	 instance	of	a	dictionary	entry	with	a	 “moderate”	or	 “high”	based	on	 the	
confidence	I	had	that	a	given	instance	of	a	word	or	phrase	matched	the	definition	of	a	
conciliatory	 statement.	 For	 example,	 I	 came	 across	 eight	 instances	 of	 the	 phrase	
“peaceful	means”	that	I	deemed	conciliatory.	Typically	in	these	instances	the	president	
was	expressing	 that	he	 felt	a	dispute	could	only	be	resolved	non-violently.	However,	 I	
was	only	highly	confident	that	such	conciliatory	sentiments	were	being	expressed	on	six	
of	 the	 eight	 occasions.	 Therefore,	 two	 instances	 of	 “peaceful	 means”	 were	 coded	 as	
“moderate”,	indicating	that	I	believed	them	to	be	conciliatory	but	also	that	I	was	not	as	
confident	in	those	instances	as	I	was	in	others.	
Every	 instance	 of	 a	 conciliatory	 statement	was	 also	 coded	 as	 a	 “1”,	 “2”	 or	 “3”	 for	 the	
commitment	to	non-coercion	that	 it	expressed.	Statements	were	coded	as	a	“1”	 if	 they	




with	 the	dispute	partner	 as	 the	US’	 preferred	option	of	 a	 suite	 of	 options.	 Statements	
were	 coded	 as	 a	 “3”	 if	 they	 express	 a	 commitment	 to	 engage	 the	 adversary	 in	 a	 non-
coercive	manner.	This	final	category	of	statements	presents	non-coercive	interaction	as	
	 50	
the	option	 that	 the	US	has	 chosen.	Based	on	 the	average	 level	of	 commitment	 to	non-
coercion	expressed	in	all	the	instances	of	a	given	conciliatory	word	or	phrase,	each	word	
or	 phrase	 included	 in	 my	 dictionary	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 was	 given	 an	 overall	
coding	 of	 either	 “openness”,	 “preference”	 or	 “commitment”.	 As	 I	 demonstrate	 in	 the	
Inferential	Statistics	 chapter,	 this	 allowed	me	 to	 conduct	 statistical	 analysis	 in	which	 I	





US	 presidential	 statements	 made	 in	 the	 context	 of	 these	 14	 disputes	 following	 the	
collection	 method	 described	 in	 the	 immediately	 preceding	 section.	 These	 statements	
had	 been	 collected	 as	 part	 of	 an	 earlier	 research	 project.	 Including	 conciliatory	
statements	used	during	these	disputes	in	my	dictionary	possibly	means	that	conciliatory	
statements	 used	 in	 the	 1990s	 are	 overrepresented.	 However,	 I	 decided	 that	 this	was	
outweighed	 by	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 dictionary	 being	 as	 comprehensive	 as	 possible.	 In	
order	to	best	describe	the	statements	used	by	US	presidents	to	express	conciliation,	as	
well	as	form	the	best	basis	from	which	to	analyse	the	amount	of	conciliatory	statements	
used	 by	 presidents	 during	 each	 of	 the	 268	 dyadic	MIDs	 included	 in	my	 analysis,	 it	 is	
helpful	that	my	dictionary	of	conciliatory	statements	be	drawn	from	as	big	a	sample	of	
presidential	 statements	 made	 during	 disputes	 as	 possible.	 Thus,	 my	 dictionary	 of	
conciliatory	 statements	 was	 assembled	 by	 collecting	 and	 coding	 the	 statements	 US	
presidents	 had	 made	 in	 68	 (or	 25%)	 of	 the	 272	 dyadic	 MIDs	 in	 which	 the	 US	 was	
involved	between	1950-2010.	







Feedback	 was	 generally	 positive.	 In	 those	 very	 rare	 instances	 where	 there	 was	




described	 in	 the	 Data	 Collection	 -	 The	 collection	 process	 section	 above	 into	 AntConc	
(Anthony,	2014)	text	analysis	software.	That	is	to	say	that	I	included	all	the	statements	




dictionary.	 My	 confidence	 was	 based	 on	 the	 “moderate”	 or	 “high”	 coding	 of	 each	
instance	of	these	words	or	phrases	I	described	above.	
My	 dictionary	 included	 only	 those	 instances	 of	 a	word	 or	 phrase	 that	were	 coded	 as	
conciliatory.	 Thus,	 while	 the	 dictionary	 contained	 a	 lot	 of	 useful	 information	 on,	 for	
example,	 the	confidence	with	which	 I	had	coded	each	 instance	of	a	word	or	phrase	as	
conciliatory,	it	did	not	have	any	information	on	how	many	instances	of	a	word	or	phrase	
existed	 in	 the	 text	 that	 had	 not	 been	 coded	 as	 conciliatory	 and,	 therefore,	 were	 not	
included	in	the	dictionary.	This	is	vital	information.	In	order	to	know	whether	the	usual	




the	 50	 characters	 of	 text	 either	 side	 of	 the	 searched	 word	 or	 phrase.	 Thus,	 the	
researcher	can	gain	some	idea	of	not	only	how	often	a	word	or	phrase	is	used	in	a	body	
of	 text,	 but	 also	 how	 it	 is	 used,	 by	 seeing	 how	 search	 terms	were	 used	 in	 a	 broader	
sentence	or	paragraph.16	Searching	for	dictionary	items	that	I	was	not	very	confident	in	
having	 included,	 I	 read	all	 the	 instances	of	 a	word	or	phrase	 returned	 from	 the	KWIC	
search.	Where	the	majority	of	instances	of	a	word	or	phrase	were	not	used	by	presidents	
to	 express	 conciliation,	 even	 if	 some	 instances	 had	 been,	 this	 word	 or	 phrase	 was	
removed	completely	 from	the	dictionary	of	 conciliatory	statements.	While	doing	 this	 I	











inter-coder	 reliability	 process.	 I	 randomly	 selected	 40	 conciliatory	 words	 or	 phrases	
from	the	dictionary	I	had	constructed,	representing	10	per	cent	of	dictionary	entries.	 I	
also	randomly	selected	26	words	or	phrases	from	McManus’	(2014)	dictionary	of	hostile	
statements,	 representing	10	per	cent	of	 the	264	 items	 in	McManus’	 (2014)	dictionary.	





these	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 words	 and	 phrases.	 I	 exported	 the	 output	 of	AntConc’s	
(Anthony,	2014)	concordance	function	to	Microsoft	Word,	highlighting	the	search	terms	
and	 separating	 each	 instance	 of	 a	 word	 or	 phrase,	 along	 with	 its	 corresponding	
contextual	text,	into	a	separate	paragraph.	I	randomised	the	order	of	these	paragraphs.	
A	 fellow	 PhD	 candidate	 at	 the	 National	 Centre	 for	 Peace	 and	 Conflict	 Studies	 kindly	
volunteered	 to	 act	 as	 an	 independent	 coder.	 I	 conducted	a	 training	 session	 in	which	 I	
presented	this	 independent	coder	with	 instructions	that	can	be	 found	in	Appendix	A2.	
Following	 these	 instructions	both	 the	 independent	 coder	 and	 I	 coded	each	of	 the	445	
instances	 of	 the	 randomly	 selected	 entries	 from	 both	my	 own	 and	McManus’	 (2014)	
dictionaries	 as	 either	 “conciliatory”,	 “hostile”	or	 “neither”,	 using	 the	 contextual	 text	 to	
assist	 in	doing	 so.	 Following	 this	 I	 conducted	a	 coding	 comparison	query	 in	NVivo	11	




dictionary	 were	 not	 the	 result	 of	 my	 own	 personal	 bias	 or	 individual	 interpretation.	
Practical	 constraints	 meant	 inter-coder	 reliability	 was	 conducted	 between	 only	 two	
coders.	 Nonethe	 less,	 a	 Kappa	 coeefficient	 of	 0.83	 indicates	 that	 my	 definition	 of	
conciliatory	statements	and	coding	process	are	reliable.	
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
This	 chapter	 offered	 a	 thorough	 explanation	 of	 how	 I	 collected	 US	 presidential	
statements	made	in	the	context	of	dyadic	MIDs	and	the	process	by	which	I	coded	some	
of	these	statements	as	conciliatory.	I	began	by	explaining	the	theoretical	and	pragmatic	




so	 utilising	 the	Public	 Papers	 of	 the	Presidents	 of	 the	United	 States	 (Peters	 &	Woolley,	
2018).	Reading	all	the	presidential	speech	yielded	from	this	search,	I	identified	instances	
of	words	and	phrases	that	matched	my	definition	of	a	conciliatory	statement.	Every	time	
an	 instance	 of	 a	 word	 or	 phrase	 was	 identified	 it	 was	 added	 to	 my	 dictionary	 of	
conciliatory	statements,	thus	being	coded	as	conciliatory.	I	also	coded	each	instance	of	a	
conciliatory	word	or	phrase	to	denote	the	confidence	in	my	initial	coding	decision	and	






5 Research Design and Methodology Two 
In	 the	 following	 I	 familiarise	 the	 reader	 with	 the	 variables	 used	 in	 my	 inferential	
statistical	analysis	and	discuss	the	process	by	which	this	analysis	is	conducted.	First,	the	
independent	 and	dependent	variables	 are	defined	and	operationalised.	 In	particular,	 I	
dedicate	a	significant	amount	of	space	to	explaining	how	I	calculate	presidential	use	of	
conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 in	 the	 context	 of	 each	 of	 the	 268	 dyadic	 MIDs	
analysed.	Second,	 I	 identify	 the	US’	 share	of	 capabilities	 in	a	dyad	and	 the	adversary’s	
political	system	as	variables	that	need	to	be	controlled	for.	I	expand	upon	the	theoretical	
and	methodological	grounds	for	including	these	variables	in	my	analysis.	I	also	explain	
how	 each	 of	 these	 variables	 is	 operationalised.	 Third,	 I	 explain	 my	 use	 of	 logistic	
regression	analysis	in	testing	for	relationships	between	the	independent	and	dependent	
variables,	briefly	outlining	the	 fundamentals	of	 this	statistical	 technique.	 I	conclude	by	
discussing	those	statistics	calculated	in	order	to	test	the	robustness	of	the	relationships	
reported	by	my	initial	logistic	regression	analysis.	
5.1 Variables Included in My Inferential Analysis 







































































































5.1.1 Dependent Variable 
The	dependent	variable	of	 this	study	 is	Force	Used,	 a	dichotomous	variable	measuring	




(Ghosn,	 Palmer	 &	 Bremer,	 2004),	 I	 converted	 this	 information	 into	 a	 dichotomous	
variable.	 To	 recap,	 the	 MID	 dataset	 categorises	 five	 levels	 of	 hostility	 for	 each	
participating	state,	1)	no	militarised	action,	2)	threat	to	use	force,	3)	display	use	of	force,	
4)	use	of	force	and	5)	war.	I	coded	those	disputes	in	which	the	US	reached	level	four	or	
five	 as	 a	 “1”,	 a	 case	 in	 which	 the	 US	 had	 employed	 armed	 force.	 Cases	 in	 which	 the	
highest	level	of	hostility	reached	by	the	US	was	a	one,	two	or	three	were	coded	as	“0”,	a	
case	in	which	the	US	had	not	used	armed	force.	
5.1.2 Independent Variables 
Generally	speaking,	the	phenomena	of	interest	to	this	study	are	the	public	statements	US	
presidents	 use	 during	 international	 disputes.	 In	 particular,	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 the	
conciliatory	and	hostile	statements	 leaders	use,	as	well	as	 the	balance	 that	 they	strike	
between	 these	 two	 types	 of	 statements.	 For	 that	 reason,	 there	 are	 three	 main	
independent	 variables	 used	 herein:	 Conciliatory	 Statements,	 Hostile	 Statements	 and	
Balance.	I	have	argued	that	of	these	three	variables	Balance	should	be	the	most	reliably	
related	 to	Force	Used,	 as	accounting	 for	both	 the	conciliatory	and	hostile	 statements	a	
president	uses	 is	a	more	accurate	representation	of	 the	 totality	of	 statements	used	by	
presidents	 during	 disputes.	 Thus,	Balance	 is	 the	 primary	 independent	 variable	 of	 this	
study.	
As	 stated	 in	 Table	 2,	 all	 three	 independent	 variables	 are	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 a	







5.1.2.1 Conciliatory Statements 




coding	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 (described	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapter)	 and	 my	




the	body	of	presidential	 statements	made	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	54	dyadic	MIDs	 in	my	
random	sample	of	 disputes	 and	 the	14	dyadic	MIDs	 for	which	 I	 had	 already	 collected	
data,	as	described	in	sections	4.2	and	4.3.	
McManus	 (2014)	 had	 also	 collected	 statements	 presidents	 had	made	 about	 a	 dispute	
adversary	up	to	60	days	prior	to	the	US’	dispute	with	that	adversary	beginning.	 I	read	
over	this	text.	There	appeared	to	be	no	significant	differences	in	the	words	or	phrases	
that	 US	 presidents	 used	 to	 express	 either	 conciliation	 or	 hostility	 during	 this	 time	
period,	when	compared	to	the	words	or	phrases	used	to	express	conciliation	or	hostility	
during	disputes.	 In	addition,	 this	 text	gave	me	a	body	of	US	presidential	statements	to	
analyse	for	the	46	dyadic	MIDs	that	began	with	a	US	use	of	armed	force.	As	I	mentioned	
in	 the	preceding	chapter,	 I	 cannot	analyse	presidential	statements	 that	occur	after	 the	
US	uses	force,	due	to	issues	of	reverse	causality.	In	disputes	that	begin	with	a	US	use	of	
armed	force	there	is	no	time	period	that	is	both	after	the	start	date	of	the	dispute	and	
prior	 to	armed	 force	being	used.	 Including	 statements	 that	presidents	made	 in	 the	60	






not	 account	 for	 the	 differing	 duration	 of	 disputes.	 McManus	 (2014)	 normalises	 her	
scores	 by	 dividing	 them	 by	 the	 length	 of	 the	 dispute	 (in	 days)	 to	 resolve	 this	 issue.	






















Whether	 a	word	 or	 phrase,	 all	 entries	 in	my	dictionary	 are	 single	 conceptual	 units	 of	
meaning	and	have	a	specific	semantic	role.	Furthermore,	some	phrases	in	my	dictionary	















more	 than	 one	word,	 because	 they	 are	 each	 a	 single	 conceptual	 unit	 of	meaning	 they	
were	 counted	 as	 a	 single	 “hit”	 when	 calculating	 each	 dyadic	 MID’s	 Conciliatory	
Statements	score.	
5.1.2.2 Hostile Statements 
The	Hostile	Statements	value	of	each	observation	was	calculated	via	a	process	identical	





statements	 made	 in	 the	 context	 of	 each	 of	 the	 268	 dyadic	 MIDs	 and	 the	 60	 days	




ranging	 between	 zero	 and	 one,	 indicating	 the	 percentage	 of	 total	 words	 used	 by	 the	
presidents	that	were	hostile.	
5.1.2.3 The Balance of Statements 
Balance	 is	 a	 measure	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 proportions	 of	 presidential	 statements	
made	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 dispute	 that	 are	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile.	 It	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	
recognise	the	empirical	reality	that	at	times	presidents	use	both	conciliatory	and	hostile	




words	 regarding	 the	 dispute	 than	 did	 conciliatory	 statements.	 Observations	 with	
positive	 scores	 represent	 dyadic	MIDs	 in	which	 conciliatory	 statements	 constituted	 a	




5.1.3 Control Variables 
I	 include	 control	 variables	 in	 my	 analysis	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 them	 having	 a	 strong	
theoretical	connection	to	the	independent	and	dependent	variables	as	well	as	a	history	
of	being	included	in	the	analyses	of	foregoing	literature	cited	in	the	Literature	Review.	I	
am	 wary	 of	 adopting	 an	 attitude	 of	 “the	 more	 the	 merrier”	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	
inclusion	 of	 control	 variables.	 A	 body	 of	 statistical	 scholarship	 denouncing	 the	
haphazard	 inclusion	 of	 variables	 in	 statistical	 models	 has	 formed	 (See	 Achen,	 2002,	
2005;	Clarke,	 2005).	 For	 this	 reason	 I	 include	 the	 two	 control	 variables	 that	 I	 believe	
have	the	strongest	case	for	inclusion	in	my	statistical	modelling.	
5.1.3.1 Relative Capabilities 
Relative	Capabilities	 is	 controlled	 for	 as	many	 theorists	of	 international	 relations	have	
long	held	that	power	helps	drive	state	behaviour.	In	particular,	it	has	been	widely	held	




Huth	 and	Russett	 (1984)	 note	 that	 relative	 capabilities	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 political	
leaders’	 decisions	 to	 use	 armed	 force	 against	 an	 adversary.	 Their	 state’s	 relative	
capabilities	influence	decision-makers’	perceptions	both	of	what	they	can	gain	through	
force	 and	 how	 likely	 an	 adversary	 is	 to	 resist	 militarily.	 Indeed,	 empirical	 evidence	
suggests	that	states	are	more	likely	to	use	armed	force	where	the	balance	of	capabilities	
favours	 them	 (Huth,	 Gelpi	 and	 Bennett,	 1993;	 Huth	 &	 Russett,	 1993;	 cited	 in	 Sartori,	
2005,	 p.	 116).18	Relative	 capabilities	may	 also	 affect	 a	 political	 leader’s	 calculation	 on	
whether	to	make	certain	types	of	statements	about	an	adversary.	Fearon	(1994b,	p.	236)	
notes	that	“Conventional	wisdom	holds	that	in	international	disputes,	a	state’s	military	
threats	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 work	 the	 more	 the	 state	 is	 favoured	 by	 the	 balance	 of	
power”.19		If	this	were	the	case	then	we	would	expect	to	find	state	leaders	favoured	by	
the	 balance	 of	 capabilities	 were	more	 likely	 to	make	 threatening	 statements.	 Indeed,	
Sartori’s	(2005)	empirical	analysis	supports	this.	
Many	of	the	studies	cited	in	the	Literature	Review	control	for	the	relative	capabilities	of	
disputing	 states.	 Schultz	 (2001),	 Sartori	 (2005),	 Gartzke	 and	Li	 (2003),	 and	McManus	







controlled	 for	 in	 foregoing	 literature	 (See	 Eyerman	 &	 Hart	 (1996);	 Partell	 (1999);	
Sartori	(2005);	Schultz	(2001)).	It	is	not	hard	to	see	why	this	matter	has	attracted	a	lot	











democracies	 are	 less	 likely	 to	war	with	 one	 another	 and	more	 likely	 to	 resolve	 their	
disputes	by	nonviolent	means.20	This	is	certainly	important	to	account	for	herein.	As	the	
US	is	a	democracy	(Marshall	et	al.,	2017),	it	is	important	to	know	whether	its	adversary	
in	a	given	dispute	 is	a	democracy	also.	 If	democracies	are	more	 likely	 to	 resolve	 their	
disputes	with	 one	 and	 other	 short	 of	 violence,	 then	 the	 US	may	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 use	
armed	force	in	those	disputes	where	it	confronts	a	democratic	adversary.	
Further	more,	Rival	Democracy	could	 also	 be	 related	 to	 the	 statements	 US	 presidents	
make	 about	 an	 adversary.	 If	 leaders	 of	 democracies	 are	more	 susceptible	 to	 audience	
costs	than	non-democracies21,	then	this	should	counteract	the	incentives	for	democratic	
leaders	 to	misrepresent	 their	 level	 of	 willingness	 or	 capability	 to	 fight.	 If	 democratic	
leaders	 recognise	 that	 both	 themselves	 and	 adversarial	 democratic	 leaders	 face	
potential	 audience	 costs	 for	 not	 following	 through	 on	 public	 statements	 (hostile	 or	
conciliatory),	 this	would	 allow	 them	 to	more	 easily	 convey	 information	 through	 their	
public	statements.	US	presidents	have	more	reason	to	believe	the	statements	made	by	
the	leaders	of	democratic	states	than	they	do	the	leaders	of	non-democratic	states.	This	
could	 lead	 to	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 use	 of	 both	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 by	US	





















5.2 Measuring Commitment Levels of Statements 
The	statistical	analysis	in	the	following	chapter	also	includes	variables	created	in	order	







similarly	 breaks	 down	 the	 264	 words	 and	 phrases	 in	 her	 dictionary	 of	 hostile	
statements	 into	 the	 three	 subcategories	 of	 “negative	 characterisation”,	 “demand	 or	
refusal”	 and	 “explicit	 threat”.	 Each	 type	 of	 hostile	 statement	 expresses	more	 hostility	
than	the	last.	
Incorporating	 independent	 variables	 measuring	 certain	 subsets	 of	 conciliatory	 and	
hostile	statements	in	place	of	the	main	independent	variables	listed	above	allowed	me	
to	 explore	 whether	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 main	 independent	 variables,	 e.g.	
Conciliatory	 Statements,	 and	 the	 dependent	 variable,	 Force	 Used,	 changed	 when	 only	
including,	 for	 example,	 the	most	 committedly	 conciliatory	 statements	 in	my	 analysis.	


























































































































5.3 Statistical Testing 
In	chapter	seven,	Inferential	Statistics,	I	employ	binomial	and	multiple	logistic	regression	
to	 test	 the	 hypotheses	 presented	 in	 the	 Theoretical	 Framework.	 Logistic	 regression	
shares	some	similarities	with	the	more	commonly	utilised	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS)	
regression,	but	is	specifically	tailored	for	use	when	the	dependent	variable	in	question	is	





probabilities	 rather	 than	 odds	 to	 predict	 dichotomous	 outcomes,	 as	 OLS	 regression	
would.23	A	 consequence	 is	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 independent	 and	 dependent	
variables	 is	 reported	as	 the	 change	 in	 the	 log-odds	of	 the	dependent	variable	per	one	
unit	change	in	an	independent	variable	(Osborne,	2015).	
Due	 to	 its	 use	 of	 log-odds	 rather	 than	 raw	 values,	 drawing	 inferences	 from	 logistic	
regression	outputs	tends	to	be	less	straight-forward,	as	compared	to	OLS.	That	being	the	
case,	 the	 odds-ratio	 is	 often	 considered	 to	 be	 more	 important	 in	 interpreting	 the	
relationships	 between	 variables	 reported	 by	 logistic	 regression	 than	 the	 logistic	
regression	 coefficients	 (Field,	 2012).	 The	 odds	 ratio	 is	 the	 exponentiated	 logistic	
regression	 coefficient	 (Menard,	 2010),	 reporting	 the	 change	 in	 odds	 of	 the	dependent	
variable	 being	 a	 “1”,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 “0”,	 per	 one	 unit	 increase	 in	 an	 independent	
variable.	 In	other	words,	 the	odds	ratio	will	 tell	us	 the	change	 in	odds	of	 the	US	using	
armed	force	per	one	unit	increase	in	any	of	the	aforementioned	independent	variables.	
An	 odds	 ratio	 value	 greater	 than	 one	 indicates	 that	 an	 increase	 in	 an	 independent	




Despite	 these	 differences	 to	 OLS,	 logistic	 regression	 is	 still	 susceptible	 to	 problems	
arising	from	outliers	and	multicollinearity,	which	I	explain	below.	
5.4 Robustness Tests 
The	 results	 of	 binomial	 logistic	 regression	 analysis	 indicate	whether	 the	 independent	





However,	 the	 results	 of	 these	 analyses	 need	 to	 undergo	 robustness	 tests.	 Robustness	
tests	ensure,	to	the	best	of	our	ability,	that	the	results	yielded	from	our	initial	testing	are	
not	driven	by	anomalies	in	the	data	or	violations	of	the	assumptions	upon	which	logistic	
regression	 analysis	 rests.	 The	 following	 robustness	 tests	 attempt	 to	 account	 for	 the	







more	 independent	 variables	 share	 a	 strong	 linear	 relationship	 (Allison,	 1999).	 The	
central	problem	caused	by	multicollinearity	 is	 that	 the	coefficients	of	 the	 independent	
variables	 in	question	will	have	 large	standard	errors	(Allison,	1999).	This	has	a	ripple	
effect	 the	ultimate	upshot	 of	which	 is	 that	 it	will	 be	more	difficult	 to	 find	 statistically	
significant	coefficients	(Allison,	1999).	Larger	standard	errors	mean	that	the	coefficients	
are	less	robust	(Allison,	1999).	
There	are	a	number	of	ways	 in	which	 to	diagnose	multicollinearity.	A	common	way	 is	
through	the	use	of	variation	inflation	factors	(VIFs)	(Allison,	1999;	Gordon,	2010).	VIFs	
allow	us	to	determine	how	much	larger	the	standard	error	of	a	variable	is	compared	to	
what	 it	would	be	 if	 it	were	not	 correlated	with	other	 independent	variables,	 achieved	
through	acquiring	the	square	root	of	the	VIF	(Allison,	1999;	Gordon,	2010).	It	is	debated	
as	 to	 what	 value	 VIFs	 should	 be	 before	 we	 start	 to	 be	 concerned	 regarding	 the	




is	 present.	 In	 section	 7.5	 I	 explain	 that	 I	 find	multicollinearity	 exists	 when	 including	
Conciliatory	Statements,	Hostile	Statements	and	Balance	 in	 the	 same	 regression	model.	
This	 is	 due	 to	 how	 Balance	 is	 calculated	 (see	 Table	 2).	 The	 value	 of	 Balance	 in	 any	
dispute	depends	on	 the	value	of	Hostile	Statements	and	Conciliatory	Statements	in	 that	
same	 dispute.	 In	 section	 7.6	 I	 explain	 how	 I	 avoid	 issues	 of	multicollinearity	 through	
careful	 logistic	 regression	 model-building;	 building	 multiple	 models	 that	 include	
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different	 combinations	 of	Conciliatory	Statements,	Hostile	 Statements	and	Balance,	 but	
never	all	three	at	the	same	time.	
5.4.2  Residuals 
Residuals	 are	 simply	 “the	 observed	 values	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable	 minus	 the	
predicted	 values”	 (Allison,	 1999,	 p86).	 The	 main	 purpose	 of	 conducting	 logistic	
regression	 herein	 is	 to	 produce	 an	 equation,	 the	 function,	 which	 speaks	 to	 the	
generalised	 relationship	between	 the	 independent	and	dependent	variables	presented	
above.	 In	 visual	 terms,	 this	 is	 the	 line	 that	 one	 sees	 running	 through	 the	 scatter	 of	
various	observations	when	a	 regression	 is	depicted	as	 a	plot.	This	 line	 represents	 the	
best	 fitting	 general	 relationship	 between	 two	 variables.	 Specific	 observations	 will	
typically	differ	from	this	line.	
Statistical	software	such	as	R	(Core	R	Team,	2017)	can	produce	residual	values	for	each	
observation,	 alerting	 us	 to	 those	 observations	 that	 are	 so	 far	 away	 from	 the	 line	 that	
they	might	have	a	disproportionate	 influence	on	the	generalised	relationship	reported	
by	a	regression	model.	Often	statistical	programmes	will	present	studentised	residuals,	
which	 are	 simply	 individual	 residuals	 divided	by	 their	 standard	 error	 (Allison,	 1999).	





Leverage	 values,	 often	 called	 “hat	 values,”	 measure	 the	 distance	 of	 the	 dependent	
variable	value	in	a	particular	observation	from	the	mean	value	of	the	dependent	variable	
across	all	the	cases	included	in	the	analysis	(Gordon,	2010).	Leverage	values	range	from	
0-1	 and	 the	 larger	 they	 are	 the	 greater	 the	 distance	 described	 above	 (Gordon,	 2010).	
The	 effect	 of	 large	 leverage	 values	 is	 that	 they	 may	 “greatly	 alter	 the	 coefficient	




















5.4.5 Dealing with Outliers and Influential Observations 
The	 above	 three	 statistics	 -	 residuals,	 leverage	 and	 DFBETA	 -	 are	 all	 used	 to	 raise	
awareness	 of	 observations	 that	 may	 unduly	 influence	 the	 results	 of	 a	 regression	
analysis.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 this,	 as	 we	 do	 not	 want	 to	 generalise	 any	
relationship	between	the	independent	and	dependent	variables	that	is	driven	by	a	small	
subset	of	observations.	In	section	7.10	I	explain	that	I	do	encounter	observations	in	my	
data	 that	 have	 problematically	 high	 DFBETA	 and	 leverage	 values.	 I	 rerun	 logistic	
regression	 analysis	 while	 excluding	 these	 observations,	 in	 order	 to	 see	 if	 the	 initial	
results	of	my	multiple	logistic	regression	models	change	when	doing	so.	The	removal	of	
problematic	 observations	 is	 one	 way	 to	 gauge	 sensitivity	 of	 results	 to	 outlying	 and	
influential	observations	(Gordon,	2010).	
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
In	the	above	I	described	the	independent	and	dependent	variables	incorporated	in	my	
statistical	 analysis,	 reiterating	 their	 conceptual	 definitions	 and	 explaining	 the	ways	 in	




variables,	Democracy	and	Relative	Capabilities,	 included	 in	my	analysis,	 outlining	 their	





Before	 using	 those	 inferential	 statistical	methods,	 however,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 present	
the	 data	 that	 was	 collected	 and	 coded	 via	 the	 processes	 described	 in	 this	 and	 the	
preceding	 chapter.	 I	 do	 this	 in	 the	 following	Descriptive	Statistics	chapter.	 Descriptive	
statistics	allow	us	 to	better	understand	 the	data	being	utilised	and	offer	 initial	 insight	








that	 follow.	 Firstly,	 I	 offer	 a	 general	 overview	 of	 the	 data.	 I	 plot	 the	 distribution	 of	
independent	variables	for	dyadic	MIDs	involving	the	US	between	1950-2010.	That	is	to	
say	 that	 I	 show	what	 proportion	 of	words	 uttered	 by	US	 presidents	 in	 the	 context	 of	
dyadic	MIDs	between	1950-2010	were	typically	conciliatory	or	hostile.	I	also	show	the	
typical	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 presidential	 statements.	 I	 find	 that	 hostile	
statements	 typically	 constitute	 a	 greater	 proportion	 of	 words	 uttered	 by	 presidents	
about	a	dyadic	MID	than	do	conciliatory	statements.	Secondly,	I	present	information	on	
the	distributions	of	 the	 control	variables	 that	will	be	 incorporated	 into	 the	 regression	
models	 used	 in	 the	 Inferential	 Statistics	 chapter.	 I	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 US	 employs	
armed	force	 less	often	where	 it	confronts	democratic	adversaries	or	 is	not	as	strongly	
favoured	by	the	balance	of	capabilities.	Finally,	I	describe	the	relationship	between	the	
primary	independent	and	dependent	variables	of	this	study;	Balance	and	Force	Used.	
6.1 Distribution of Dyadic MIDs by Conciliatory and Hostile Statements 










conciliatory	 and/or	 hostile	 words	 in	 many	 dyadic	 MIDs	 in	 which	 the	 US	 has	 been	
involved.	Moreover,	conciliatory	statements	never	constitute	more	than	two	per	cent	of	
all	words	uttered	by	 the	president	 in	 any	dispute,	 and	hostile	 statements	never	more	





in	 human	 languages	 is	 such	 that	 there	 are	 “a	 few	 very	 common	 words,	 a	 middling	





Additionally,	 58	 of	 the	 268	 dyadic	 disputes	 are	 not	 mentioned	 publicly	 by	 a	 US	




surprising.	 International	 disputes	 compete	 with	 domestic	 policy,	 electoral	 cycles	 and	
other	international	disputes	to	make	it	into	presidential	statements.	
The	 dashed	 vertical	 lines	 in	 Figure	 1	 intercept	 the	 x-axis	 at	 the	mean	 values	 of	 both	
Conciliatory	 Statements	 and	 Hostile	 Statements.	 We	 can	 see	 that	 on	 average	 hostile	
statements	 constitute	a	higher	percentage	of	 all	 the	words	US	presidents	utter	during	
dyadic	MIDs.	Moreover,	 the	distribution	by	Hostile	Statements	 has	 a	higher	max-value	
than	 that	 of	Conciliatory	Statements.	 Clearly,	 hostile	 statements	were	 a	more	 common	
feature	 of	 presidential	 speech	 towards	US	 adversaries	 between	1950-2010	 than	were	













6.1.1 Distribution of Dyadic MIDs by Balance of Conciliatory and Hostile Statements 
Having	seen	the	distribution	of	dyadic	MIDs	by	both	the	percentage	of	conciliatory	and	





Those	 dyadic	 MIDs	 distributed	 on	 the	 X-axis	 to	 the	 left	 of	 zero	 are	 cases	 in	 which	 a	
greater	proportion	of	words	uttered	by	US	presidents	about	the	dispute	were	accounted	
for	 by	 hostile	 statements,	 compared	 to	 conciliatory	 statements.	 As	 the	 vertical	 line	
intercepting	 the	X-axis	at	 the	median	value,	as	well	as	Figure	1,	 indicates,	 this	state	of	















6.1.2 Points of Note Regarding the Use of Conciliatory and Hostile Statements by US 
Presidents in Dyadic MIDs 
There	 are	 three	main	 points	 to	 summarise	 from	 the	 preceding.	 First,	 there	 are	many	
disputes	in	which	the	US	president	does	not	direct	any	conciliatory	or	hostile	statements	
toward	 the	 adversary.	 In	 many	 of	 these	 cases	 the	 president	 does	 not	 say	 anything	
regarding	 the	 adversary	 at	 all.	 Second,	 both	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	
constitute	a	small	percentage	of	US	presidential	words	used	in	regard	to	an	adversary.	
Points	 one	 and	 two	 are	 not	 surprising,	 as	 explained	 above.	 Third,	 hostile	 statements	
constitute	 a	 greater	 percentage	 of	 words	 used	 by	 US	 presidents	 than	 conciliatory	
statements,	 in	most	dyadic	MIDs.	This	 is	an	 interesting	 finding,	only	made	possible	by	
utilising	the	data	on	conciliatory	statements	collected	for	this	project.	
6.2 Control Variables 




























































in	what	 proportion	 of	 the	US’	 dyadic	MIDs	 does	 the	US	 confront	 a	 democracy,	 and	 in	
what	proportion	does	the	US	confront	a	non-democracy?	Second,	in	what	proportion	of	














force	six	 times,	representing	30%	of	 these	disputes.	The	US	used	armed	force	 in	71	of	
the	177	disputes	in	which	it	confronted	a	non-democratic	adversary,	representing	40%	
of	 such	 disputes.	 Figure	 5	 and	 Figure	 6	 suggest,	 respectively,	 that	 the	US	 is	 both	 less	
likely	to	confront	democratic	states	in	the	first	place	and	less	likely	to	use	armed	force	
against	 such	 states	 when	 in	 dispute	 with	 them.	 As	 with	 relative	 capabilities,	 the	
relationship	 between	 adversary	 political	 system	 and	US	 use	 of	 armed	 force	 is	 further	
explored	in	the	next	chapter.	
6.3 Presidential Speech and the Use of Armed Force 
In	 the	 final	 section	of	 this	 chapter	 I	 turn	 to	 the	primary	 relationship	examined	 in	 this	
thesis;	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	
utilised	by	US	presidents	and	 the	US’	use	of	armed	 force	as	a	 tool	 to	 resolve	disputes.	
What	 needs	 to	 be	 explained	 is	 whether	 the	 number	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements	 varies	 between	 those	 disputes	 in	 which	 armed	 force	 is	 used	 and	 those	
disputes	in	which	it	is	not	used.	


















not	 use	 armed	 force	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 theoretical	 expectations	 discussed	 in	 the	
Theoretical	Framework	and	is	consistent	with	H1:	
H1:	 The	 use	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 by	 a	 political	 leader	 during	 an	 MID	 will	 be	
negatively	associated	with	their	state	using	armed	force	in	that	MID.	
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between	 Conciliatory	 Statements	 and	 Force	 Used.	 This	 is	 explored	 further	 in	 the	
following	chapter.	
6.3.2 Hostile Statements and Use of Armed Force 















again	depicted	by	 the	diamond-shaped	points.	 These	 values	 are	0.96%	and	0.72% for	
the	right	and	left-hand	plot	respectively.	
6.3.3 The Balance of Statements and Force Used 











support	 H2.	 The	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 is	 closer	 to	 even,	 as	
opposed	to	more	strongly	favouring	hostile	statements,	in	disputes	where	armed	force	
is	 not	 used.	With	 the	 two	 diamond-shaped	 points	 once	 again	 representing	 the	 mean	
values,	 we	 see	 that	 the	mean	 in	 cases	 where	 armed	 force	 is	 used	 is	 lower	 (meaning	
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the	 differences	 in	 these	 distributions	 are	 the	 product	 of	 chance,	 rather	 than	 a	
statistically	 significant	 relationship	 between	 Balance	 and	 Force	 Used.	 Despite	 the	
aforementioned	 features	 of	 Figure	 9,	 it	 does	 not	 offer	 clear	 support	 for	H2.	 In	 fact,	 it	
highlights	 the	 need	 for	 further	 investigation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	Balance	and	
Force	Used	via	inferential	statistical	techniques,	as	conducted	in	the	following	chapter.		
6.3.4 Conciliatory and Hostile Statements, and the Use of Armed Force – Levels of 
Commitment 

















hostile	 statements,	 those	 words	 or	 phrases	 that	 are	 associated	 with	 negative	










the	 same	 relationship	holds	as	presented	 in	Figure	9	above.	Armed	 force	 is	 less	often	




hostile	 statements.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 this	 means	 retaining	 those	
statements	that	express	a	commitment	to	non-coercive	interaction	with	the	adversary.	
In	the	case	of	hostile	statements	this	means	retaining	those	statements	that	express	an	
explicit	 threat	 towards	an	adversary.	The	balance	of	 these	 statements	 is	measured	by	
subtracting	 the	 percentage	 of	 words	 accounted	 for	 by	 explicit	 threats	 from	 the	






The	 trend	 in	 figures	9	and	10	 is	here	repeated,	with	 those	cases	 in	which	 the	US	uses	
armed	force	exhibiting	a	lower	mean	value.	Notably,	both	mean	values	are	above	zero	in	
Figure	 11,	 indicating	 that	 statements	 highly	 committed	 to	 conciliation	 in	 this	 data	
represent	a	higher	percentage	of	all	words	used	by	US	presidents	during	disputes	than	
do	statements	expressing	a	high	degree	of	hostility,	regardless	of	whether	armed	force	is	




Figures	9,	10	and	11	all	demonstrate	 that	 in	dyadic	MIDs	where	 force	 is	not	used	 the	
proportion	 of	 conciliatory	 to	 hostile	 statements	 is	 greater	 than	 in	 dyadic	MIDs	where	





product	 of	 chance.	Whether	H2	 is	 supported	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 results	 of	 the	 following	
inferential	statistical	analysis.	
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6.4 Concluding Remarks 
As	stated	at	the	outset,	the	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	familiarise	the	reader	with	the	data	
used	 in	 this	 study.	 To	 begin,	 my	 unit	 of	 analysis,	 the	 dyadic	 MID	 involving	 the	 US	
between	 1950-2010,	 was	 distributed	 upon	 values	 of	 the	 independent	 variables:	
Conciliatory	 Statements,	 Hostile	 Statements	 and	 Balance.	 We	 saw	 that	 on	 average	
conciliatory	and	hostile	statements	account	for	only	a	small	percentage	of	words	uttered	
by	US	presidents	about	dyadic	MIDs.		Despite	this,	on	average,	hostile	statements	were	a	
more	 common	 feature	of	 presidential	 speech	 than	 conciliatory	 statements	 throughout	
this	time	period.	
Following	 this,	 I	 presented	data	 on	my	 two	 control	 variables,	Democracy	 and	Relative	
Capabilities.	First	 I	explored	how	observations	of	 the	unit	of	analysis	were	distributed	
across	 varying	 values	 of	 these	 two	 variables.	 Second,	 I	 investigated	 the	 relationship	
between	 these	 variables	 and	 US	 use	 of	 armed	 force.	 I	 found	 that	 the	 US	 typically	
possesses	around	85%	of	the	capabilities	held	between	itself	and	its	adversary,	and	that	
this	 figure	 increases	 to	89%	when	 looking	at	 those	cases	 in	which	 the	US	used	armed	
force;	 suggesting	 that	 the	 US	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 use	 armed	 force	 when	 the	 balance	 of	
capabilities	 is	 more	 strongly	 in	 its	 favour.	 Regarding	 the	 political	 system	 of	 the	
adversary,	 the	 US	 rarely	 confronted	 democracies	 and,	 compared	 to	 non-democracies,	
used	armed	force	against	them	less	often	when	it	did.	This	indicates	that	the	US	may	be	
less	inclined	to	use	armed	force	when	confronting	a	democratic	adversary.	
Finally,	 I	 began	 to	 look	 for	 possible	 relationships	 between	 the	 independent	 and	
dependent	 variables	 of	 this	 study:	 the	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements,	
and	US	use	of	 armed	 force.	 I	 compared	how	dyadic	MIDs	were	differently	distributed	
upon	values	of	Conciliatory	Statements	and	Hostile	Statements	when	armed	force	was	or	
was	 not	 used.	 I	 examined	 the	 relationship	 between	 Balance	 and	 Force	 Used	 by	
comparing	how	dyadic	MIDs	were	differently	distributed	upon	values	of	Balance	when	
armed	 force	 was	 or	 was	 not	 used,	 as	 seen	 in	 Figure	 9.	 Using	 figures	 10	 and	 11	 I	
examined	if	the	relationship	between	the	balance	of	conciliatory	and	hostile	statements,	
and	 use	 of	 armed	 force,	 changed	 when	 retaining	 only	 those	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements	that	expressed	greater	levels	of	commitment.	
In	analysing	the	descriptive	statistics	presented	above,	I	found	that	support	for	H1	and	
H2	 was	 mixed.	 Regarding	 H1,	 higher	 levels	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 are	 used	 in	
disputes	where	 the	 US	 did	 not	 use	 armed	 force,	 compared	 to	 those	where	 it	 did.	We	
would	 expect	 to	 find	 this	 to	 be	 the	 case	were	 H1	 correct.	 However,	 the	 difference	 is	
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of	 affairs	 if	 H2	was	 supported.	Moreover,	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 hostile	 and	
conciliatory	statements	between	disputes	where	armed	force	is	used,	and	those	where	it	
is	not,	 is	more	stark	 than	 the	difference	 in	 conciliatory	 statements.	That	 is	 to	 say	 that	







7 Inferential Statistics 
In	the	Descriptive	Statistics	chapter	I	highlighted	patterns	of	interest	within	the	data.	In	
the	 final	 section	 of	 that	 chapter	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 increased	 use	 of	 conciliatory	
statements	 by	 US	 presidents	 in	 the	 context	 of	 dispute	 seemed	 to	 be	 negatively	
associated	with	the	US’	use	of	armed	force.	Conversely,	increased	hostile	statements	in	
the	 context	 of	 dispute	 seemed	 to	 be	 positively	 associated	 with	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 armed	
force.	 Consequently,	 in	 dyadic	 MIDs	 where	 force	 is	 not	 used	 the	 proportion	 of	
conciliatory	to	hostile	statements	is	greater	than	in	dyadic	MIDs	where	force	is	used.	To	
determine	whether	these	differences	are	simply	due	to	chance	requires	inferential	tests.	
This	chapter	has	 three	sections,	each	designed	to	 further	explore	and	substantiate	 the	
relationships	 between	 the	 variables	 defined	 in	Research	Design	and	Methodology	Two	
and	preliminarily	investigated	in	the	preceding	Descriptive	Statistics	chapter.	In	the	first	
I	use	binomial	logistic	regression	in	an	attempt	to	understand	the	relationship	between	
US	 presidential	 statements	 and	 US	 use	 of	 armed	 force.	 This	 first	 section	 gives	 an	
indication	 of	whether	 there	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 presidential	 statements	 and	US	
use	 of	 armed	 force,	 as	 well	 as	 what	 the	 nature	 of	 that	 relationship	 is	 (positive	 or	
negative).	 I	 find	 that,	 contrary	 to	 H1,	 while	Hostile	 Statements	 and	 Balance	 exhibit	 a	
statistically	significant	relationship	with	US	use	of	armed	force,	Conciliatory	Statements	
does	 not.	 In	 the	 second	 section	 I	 employ	 multiple	 logistic	 regression,	 in	 order	 to	
understand	how	the	results	of	the	first	section	might	change	when	including	the	control	
variables	 discussed	 in	 the	 research	 design	 and	 methodology	 chapters.	 My	 analysis	
demonstrates	 that	Balance	 is	 negatively	 associated	with	 the	US	 using	 armed	 force,	 as	
hypothesised	 by	 H2.	Balance	 is	 also	 the	measure	 of	 US	 presidential	 statements	most	
reliably	 related	 to	 US	 use	 of	 armed	 force.	 Finally,	 in	 the	 third	 section,	 I	 perform	
robustness	 tests	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 findings	 in	 section	 two	 are	 not	 the	 result	 of,	 for	
example,	outliers	in	the	data.	




transformation	 it	 is	 converted	 from	 the	 original	 unit	 of	 measurement	 to	 standard	
deviations	from	the	mean.	The	main	benefit	of	using	z-scores,	as	opposed	to	raw	scores,	
is	 that	 doing	 so	 makes	 different	 distributions	 comparable.	 As	 Cohen	 (2013,	 p.	 100)	
states,	 “In	 any	 distribution	 for	 which	 μ	 and	 σ	 can	 be	 found,	 any	 raw	 score	 can	 be	
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expressed	 as	 a	 z-score”. 27 	Z-scores	 from	 different	 distributions	 can	 be	 directly	
compared,	which	means	“Telling	someone	how	many	standard	deviations	your	score	is	
above	 or	 below	 the	 mean	 is	 more	 informative	 than	 telling	 your	 actual	 (raw)	 score”	
(Cohen,	 2013,	 p.	 100).	 Because	 all	 the	 variables	 that	 will	 be	 included	 as	 predictor	
variables	in	the	statistical	models	below	are	distributed	differently,	as	demonstrated	in	
the	Descriptive	Statistics	chapter,	converting	the	data	to	z-scores	makes	the	results	of	the	
statistical	 models	 more	 easily	 comparable	 and	 interpretable.	 All	 variables	 in	 the	
following	 analysis	 are	 converted	 to	 z-scores	 except	 for	Democracy	and	Force	Used,	 as	
dichotomous	variables	such	as	these	cannot	be	converted	in	this	manner.	




this	 reason,	 I	 present	 the	 output	 of	 the	 binomial	 logistic	 regression	 in	 which	 I	 use	
Balance	 as	 the	 independent	 variable	 as	 Model	 1	 in	 Table	 8.	 I	 present	 this	 alongside	
Model	2	and	Model	3	where	Hostile	Statements	and	Conciliatory	Statements	are	used	as	
















  Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 













-0.354*** 0.70 		 		 		 		
(0.135) (0.56-0.87) 		 		 		 	
	 		 		 		 		 		 	
Hostile Statements 
		 		 0.303** 1.35 		 	
		 		 (0.133) (1.09-1.69) 		 	
	 		 		 		 		 		 	
Conciliatory 
Statements 
		 		 		 		 -0.119 0.89 
		 		 		 		 (0.140) (0.70-1.11) 
       
Constant 
-0.931*** 0.39 -0.926*** 0.40 -0.912*** 0.40 
(0.138) (0.31-0.49) (0.137) (0.31-0.49) (0.135) 0.32-0.50 
		 	 	 		
Observations 268  268 268 
Log Likelihood -157.159 -158.103 -160.354 
Likelihood Ratio 7.136 5.248 0.746 
R2 (Hosmer-
Lemeshow) 0.022 0.016 0.002 
R2 (Cox-Snell) 0.027 0.019 0.003 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 318.318 320.207 324.709 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
	
7.3 Testing the Hypotheses 
The	 results	 of	 the	 above	 binomial	 logistic	 regressions	 do	 not	 support	 H1.	 Due	 to	
Conciliatory	Statements	 having	 a	 statistically	 insignificant	 coefficient,	we	 do	 not	 know	
what	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	Conciliatory	Statements	and	Force	Used	is,	if	
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there	 is	 any	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 at	 all.	 Moreover,	 Model	 3	 including	
Conciliatory	Statements	as	its	independent	variable	has	the	poorest	fit	to	the	data	of	the	
three	models	presented,	as	seen	in	the	smaller	R2	values	and	larger	AIC	value.	
These	 results	 are	 contrary	 to	 the	 theoretical	 argument	 that	 Conciliatory	 Statements	
should	 be	 negatively	 associated	 with	 Force	 Used,	 especially	 when	 considering	 that	
Hostile	Statements	 does	have	 a	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	with	Force	Used.	 In	
the	 Theoretical	 Framework	 chapter	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 theoretical	 arguments	 often	
utilised	to	assert	that	a	state	leader’s	hostile	statements	would	influence	their	decision	
of	 whether	 to	 use	 armed	 force	 were	 equally	 applicable	 to	 conciliatory	 statements.	
Recent	 literature	(see,	Levy	et	al.,	2015;	Tingley,	2014;	Tomz,	2007)	on	audience	costs	
suggests	 that	 domestic	 publics	 might	 also	 punish	 their	 leaders	 for	 breaking	 their	
conciliatory,	not	only	hostile,	statements.	The	upshot	of	this	argument	is	that	if	we	see	
Hostile	Statements	having	a	statistically	significant	relationship	with	Force	Used,	there	is	
no	 theoretical	 reason	 to	 not	 also	 see	 such	 a	 relationship	 between	 Conciliatory	
Statements	and	Force	Used.	However,	no	such	relationship	exists.	
Figures	12	and	13,	which	depict	models	2	and	3	of	Table	8,	respectively,	are	another	way	
of	demonstrating	 the	 lack	of	 support	 for	H1.	Figure	12	 shows	an	association	between	









chance	 alone.	 Conversely,	 as	 Conciliatory	 Statements	 and	 Force	 Used	 do	 not	 exhibit	 a	








the	 US	 using	 armed	 force	 decrease.	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 as	 the	 proportion	 of	 words	
accounted	for	by	conciliatory	statements	increases,	relative	to	the	proportion	accounted	
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that	 this	 model	 has	 a	 slightly	 superior	 fit	 to	 the	 data	 than	 do	models	 including	 only	




7.4 Incorporating Commitment Levels 
As	 detailed	 in	 the	 preceding	Descriptive	Statistics	 chapter,	 additional	 information	was	













Variable	 Coefficient	 Odds	Ratio	 %90	CI	 P-value	
Openness	 -0.069	(0.142)	 0.933	 0.726-1.165	 0.626	
Preference	 0.009	(0.135)	 1.015	 0.802-1.253	 0.950	
Commitment	 -0.225	(0.152)	 0.799	 0.615-1.014	 0.139	
Negative	Characterisation	 0.225	(0.133)	 1.253	 1.010-1.572	 0.090*	
Demand	or	Refusal	 0.226	(0.132)	 1.253	 1.009-1.561	 0.087*	
Explicit	Threat	 0.548	(0.160)	 1.729	 1.351-2.287	 0.0006*	
Balance	Level	One	 -0.238	(0.134)	 0.788	 0.627-0.978	 0.076*	
Balance	Level	Two	 -0.209	(0.134)	 0.812	 0.649-1.011	 0.119	




Openness,	 Preference,	 or	 Commitment	 are	 statistically	 significant.	 In	 contrast,	 when	




the	 positive	 association	 strengthens	 when	 moving	 from	 Negative	 Characterisation	
through	to	Explicit	Threat.	
Things	are	a	little	less	clear	cut	with	regard	to	Balance	Level	One,	Balance	Level	Two	and	
Balance	 Level	 Three.	 We	 see	 from	 Table	 9	 that	 all	 three	 variables	 have	 the	 negative	
relationship	with	Force	Used	 predicted	 in	 the	Theoretical	Framework.	 However,	while	
this	relationship	is	statistically	significant	for	Balance	Level	One	and	Balance	Level	Three,	
for	 Balance	 Level	 Two	 it	 is	 not.	 These	 findings	 are	 discussed	 in	 light	 of	 the	 multiple	
logistic	regression	conducted	immediately	below.	
7.5 Multiple Logistic Regression 
In	Research	Design	and	Methodology	Two	 I	explained	 the	variables	 I	would	be	using	 in	
conducting	 multiple	 logistic	 regression	 analysis.	 Before	 building	 models	 that	


















Capabilities	 0.338	 1.000	 -0.114	 -0.093	 -0.403	 0.212	
Hostile	
Statements	 0.068	 -0.114	 1.000	 -0.868	 0.228	 0.169	
Balance	 -0.160	 -0.093	 -0.868	 1.000	 0.285	 -0.221	
Conciliatory	










Table	 10	 demonstrates	 no	 more	 than	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 correlation	 between	
variables.	 It	 is	not	supposed	to	be	an	 indication	of	 the	nature	(positive	or	negative)	of	
the	relationships	between	variables.	Because	some	of	the	correlations	depicted	in	Table	
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10	 are	 biserial	 correlations	 (used	 when	 calculating	 the	 correlation	 between	
dichotomous	 and	 continuous	 variables),	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 reported	 is	
meaningless	 (Field,	2012,	p.	231).	Moreover,	 the	 table	does	not	 indicate	 the	statistical	
significance	between	variables,	other	than	those	correlations	that	need	to	be	calculated	




are	 excluded	 here	 due	 to	 their	 having	 missing	 values	 upon	 the	 Relative	 Capabilities	
variable.	
The	most	notable	feature	of	Table	10	is	that	it	points	to	likely	multicollinearity	between	





In	 particular,	 there	 is	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 correlation	 between	 Balance	 and	 Hostile	
Statements.	 This	 also	makes	 sense.	As	was	 shown	 in	 the	Descriptive	Statistics	chapter,	
hostile	 statements	 are	 simply	 more	 common	 than	 conciliatory	 statements	 during	 a	
dispute,	 on	 average.	 Therefore,	 hostile	 statements	 typically	 constitute	 a	 larger	 part	 of	
the	statements	upon	which	Balance	is	calculated.	In	preliminary	testing	multicollinearity	




Building	 a	 model	 one	 independent	 variable	 at	 a	 time	 allows	 us	 to	 learn	 what	 each	
independent	variable	 contributes	 to	 the	overall	 ability	of	 a	model	 to	explain	values	of	
the	outcome	variable.	It	also	allows	for	easy	comparison	between	models,	in	order	to	see	
which	 fits	 the	 data	 best.	 Table	 11	 contains	 four	 models.	 Each	 model	 includes	 an	
additional	independent	variable.	
The	order	in	which	variables	are	added	is	driven	by	existing	research,	meaning	that	this	
is	 an	 example	 of	 hierarchical	 regression	 (Field,	 2012,	 p.	 264).	Democracy	 is	 included	
first,	 due	 to	 the	 wide	 acceptance	 of	 the	 “democratic	 peace”	 thesis	 in	 international	
relations	 literature	and	the	unambiguous	theoretical	expectation	that	a	dyad	including	
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two	 democratic	 states	 should	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 experience	 violent	 interaction.	Relative	
Capabilities	 is	 included	 second.	 It	 is	 included	 second	 to	Democracy	because	while,	 like	
Democracy,	 it	 has	 been	 included	 in	 much	 of	 the	 foregoing	 empirical	 literature	 on	
questions	of	conflict	between	states,	there	is	less	of	a	clear	theoretical	expectation	as	to	
the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 it	 and	 Force	 Used.	 While	 such	 states	 have	 a	
greater	 capability	 to	 use	 force	 against	 their	 adversaries,	 it	 is	 precisely	 this	
preponderance	of	power	that	might	enable	them	to	manage	international	relations	and	








11.	 Finally,	 I	 add	 Balance.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 balance	 of	 hostile	 and	 conciliatory	
presidential	 statements	has	not	 thoroughly	been	considered	 in	 foregoing	 literature	on	
political	 leadership	speech.	Following	Field’s	(2012)	advice	on	conducting	hierarchical	





































Democracy 0.132 1.14 -0.106 0.90 -0.187 0.83 -0.206 0.81 
 (0.509) (0.47-2.56) (0.516) (0.37-2.04) (0.529) (0.33-1.92) (0.530) (0.32-1.89) 




** 1.50 0.444*** 1.56 0.399** 1.49 
   (0.161) (1.16-1.97) (0.164) (1.20-2.06) (0.173) (1.13-2.00) 
         
Hostile 
Statements 
    0.313
** 1.37 0.077 1.08 
     (0.138) (1.09-1.72) (0.318) (0.63-1.81) 
         
Balance       -0.265 0.77 
       (0.324) (0.44-1.29) 
         
Constant -0.979*** 0.38 -0.997*** 0.37 -1.001*** 0.37 -1.008*** 0.36 
 (0.145) (0.29-0.48) (0.149) (0.29-0.47) (0.151) (0.29-0.47) (0.152) (0.28-0.47) 
     
Observations 258 258 258 258 
Log Likelihood -151.763 -148.304 -145.688 -145.343 
Likelihood 
Ratio 0.066 6.983 12.216 12.906 
R2 (Hosmer-
Lemeshow) 0 0.023 0.040 0.043 
R2 (Cox-Snell) 0 0.027 0.046 0.049 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 
307.526 302.609 299.376 300.686 




to	 the	 data	 on	US	 use	 of	 armed	 force	 are	Relative	Capabilities	 and	Hostile	Statements.	
Model	1,	which	includes	Democracy	as	the	sole	predictor	variable,	has	R2	values	of	zero	
(when	 rounded	 to	 three	 decimal	 places),	 meaning	 that	 there	 is	 very	 little	 shared	
variability	 between	 Democracy	 and	 Force	 Used.	 Models	 two	 and	 three	 both	 offer	










This	might,	at	 first	glance,	 suggest	 that	Balance	is	unnecessary	 in	predicting	US	use	of	
armed	force.	This	is	inaccurate,	however.	Rather,	it	is	more	accurate	to	say	that	there	is	





as	 that	 presented	 in	 Table	 11	 no	 matter	 which	 order	 the	 independent	 variables	 are	
included,	 so	 long	 as	 they	 are	 all	 included.	 The	 question	 is	whether	Model	 3	 performs	
better	 when	 altering	 the	 order	 in	 which	 independent	 variables	 are	 added	 such	 that	
Balance	is	added	to	 the	 third	model	and	Hostile	Statements	is	added	to	 the	 fourth.	 If	 it	





































Democracy 0.132 1.14 -0.106 0.90 -0.207 0.81 -0.206 0.81 
	 (0.509) (0.47-2.56) (0.516) (0.37-2.04) (0.529) (0.32-1.88) (0.530) (0.32-1.89) 




** 1.50 0.385** 1.47 0.399** 1.49 
	 	 	 (0.161) (1.16-1.97) (0.163) (1.13-1.94) (0.173) (1.13-2.00) 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Balance 	 	 	 	 -0.336
** 0.71 -0.265 0.77 
	 	 	 	 	 (0.141) (0.56-0.90) (0.324) (0.44-1.29) 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Hostile 
Statements 
	 	 	 	 	 	 0.077 1.08 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.318) (0.63-1.81) 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Constant -0.979*** 0.38 -0.997*** 0.37 -1.010*** 0.36 -1.008*** 0.36 
	 (0.145) (0.29-0.48) (0.149) (0.29-0.47) (0.152) (0.28-0.46) (0.152) (0.28-0.47) 
	 	 	 	 	
Observations 258 258 258 258 
Log 
Likelihood -151.763 -148.304 -145.372 -145.343 
Likelihood 
Ratio 0.066 6.983 12.848 12.906 
R2 (Hosmer-
Lemeshow) 0 0.023 0.043 0.043 
R2 (Cox-Snell) 0 0.027 0.049 0.049 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 307.526 302.609 298.744 300.686 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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We	 see	 a	 very	 similar	 pattern	 to	 that	 in	 Table	 11	 unfold	when	moving	 from	Model	 1	




slightly	 better	 fit	 to	 the	 data	 than	 does	Model	 3	 of	 Table	 11,	 exhibited	 by	 its	 slightly	
higher	R2	and	slightly	 lower	AIC	values.	This	 tells	us	 that,	given	 there	 is	 little	value	 in	
including	both	Balance	and	Hostile	Statements	as	predictor	variables	in	the	same	model,	
we	should	prefer	to	include	Balance	at	the	expense	of	Hostile	Statements.	
Of	 course,	 at	 this	 point	 Conciliatory	 Statements	 would	 normally	 be	 included	 in	 this	
model-building	process.	However,	 preliminary	 testing	 found	 that,	 as	 suggested	by	 the	
above	 correlation	matrix,	when	 including	Balance,	Conciliatory	Statements	and	Hostile	
Statements	 together	 in	 a	 single	 model,	 multicollinearity	 became	 a	 problem	 in	
interpreting	the	regression	output.	For	this	reason	I	present	Table	13.	Table	13	includes	
three	 models,	 all	 of	 which	 use	 Force	 Used	 as	 their	 dependent	 variable	 and	 contain	
Relative	 Capabilities	 and	 Democracy	 as	 control	 variables.	 Models	 one,	 two	 and	 three	
include	 Balance,	 Hostile	 Statements	 and	 Conciliatory	 Statements	 as	 independent	
variables	 respectively.	 Table	 13	 allows	 us	 to	 compare	 how	 a	 model	 including	






Dependent variable:                                                                                                                                                   
Force.Used 




















Balance -0.336** 0.71 	 	 	 	
	 (0.141) (0.56-0.90) 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Hostile Statements 	 	 0.313
** 1.37 	 	
	 	 	 (0.138) (1.09-1.72) 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Conciliatory 
Statements 	 	 	 	
-0.046 0.95 
	 	 	 	 	 (0.159) (0.73-1.23) 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Relative 
Capabilities 
0.385** 1.47 0.444*** 1.56 0.386** 1.47 
	 (0.163) (1.13-1.94) (0.164) (1.20-2.06) (0.172) (1.12-1.97) 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Democracy -0.207 0.81 -0.187 0.83 -0.110 0.90 
	 (0.529) (0.32-1.88) (0.529) (0.33-1.92) (0.516) (0.36-2.04) 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Constant -1.010*** 0.36 -1.001*** 0.37 -0.998*** 0.37 
	 (0.152) (0.28-0.46) (0.151) (0.29-0.47) (0.149) (0.29-0.47) 
    
Observations 258 258 258 
Log Likelihood -145.372 -145.688 -148.262 
Likelihood Ratio 12.848 12.216 7.068 
R2 (Hosmer-
Lemeshow) 
0.043 0.040 0.023 
R2 (Cox-Snell) 0.049 0.046 0.027 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 298.744 299.376 304.524 











to	 the	 data	 and	 increased	 effect	 size,	 are	 small.	 It	 is	 reasonable	 to	 ask	whether	 these	
gains	warrant	 the	 time	and	 labour	required	 to	collect	data	 (as	 I	have	done	herein)	on	
conciliatory	 statements.	By	analysing	hostile	 statements	 alone,	 as	preceding	 literature	
has	 tended	 to	 do,	 are	 we	 able	 to	 gain	 sufficient	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	statements	of	political	 leaders	and	a	 state’s	dispute	behaviour?	 I	 address	
this	question	 in	chapter	8,	Discussion	and	Conclusions,	arguing	that	 it	 is	worth	utilising	
the	 balance	 of	 hostile	 and	 conciliatory	 statements	 in	 future	 research,	 as	 opposed	 to	
hostile	statements	alone.	
7.7 Revisiting the Hypotheses 





conciliatory	 statements	not,	 this	 is	 exactly	 the	 empirical	 state	of	 affairs	we	 see.	While	
recent	empirical	work	(Levy	et	al,	2015;	Tingley,	2014;	Tomz,	2007)	suggests	political	
leaders	 should	 face	 similar	 incentives	 to	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 conciliatory	












force,	 meaning	 that	 as	 the	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 favours	
conciliatory	 statements	 the	 odds	 of	 the	 US	 using	 armed	 force	 decreases.	 Moreover,	
models	 including	 the	Balance	variable	out-perform	models	accounting	 for	only	Hostile	
Statements	or	Conciliatory	Statements,	in	terms	of	their	fit	with	the	data.	Improvements	
upon	using	Balance	 over	Hostile	Statements	 in	multiple	 regression	models	 are	modest	
but	 consistent.	 Finally,	 variation	 in	Balance	 is	 associated	with	more	variation	 in	Force	
Used	 than	 either	 Conciliatory	 Statements	 or	 Hostile	 Statements,	 as	 seen	 by	 its	 larger	
coefficient.	
While	not	part	of	the	hypotheses	put	forward	in	the	Theoretical	Framework	chapter,	it	is	
also	 worth	 speaking	 briefly	 about	 the	 control	 variables,	 Relative	 Capabilities	 and	
Democracy.	Relative	Capabilities	 consistently	 had	 a	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	
with	Force	Used.	Moreover,	variation	in	this	variable	was	met	with	a	larger	change	in	the	





also	have	a	greater	ability	 to	compel	with	 threat	of	 force,	 thus	mitigating	 the	need	 for	
armed	force	to	be	used.	
Conversely,	Democracy	does	not	have	a	statistically	significant	relationship	with	US	use	
of	 armed	 force.	 Across	 the	 models	 presented	 above,	 the	 relationship	 between	
Democracy	and	 Force	Used	was	 not	 statistically	 significant.	 This	 is	 contrary	 to	 robust	
evidence	produced	 in	 international	relations	and	political	science	 literature	(Bueno	de	
Mesquita	 et	 al.,	 1999;	 Haarvard	 et	 al.,	 2018).	 I	 discuss	 this	 finding	 in	 the	 following	
Discussion	and	Conclusions	chapter.	
7.8 Incorporating Commitment Levels into Multiple Regression Analysis 
As	 with	 the	 binomial	 testing,	 it	 is	 worth	 breaking	 Conciliatory	 Statements,	 Hostile	
Statements	 and	 Balance	 into	 their	 three	 respective	 commitment	 levels.	 Doing	 so	 will	
allow	 us	 to	 see	 whether	 any	 of	 these	 subcategories	 have	 meaningfully	 different	
relationships	with	 Force	Used	 than	 the	 overall	 variable	 of	 which	 they	 are	 component	
parts.	Table	14	reports	the	relationships	between	each	of	these	nine	variables	and	Force	





Variable	 Coefficient	 Odds	Ratio	 %90	CI	 P-value	
Openness	 0.044	(0.157)	 1.045	 0.797-1.347	 0.777	
Preference	 0.036	(0.148)	 1.037	 0.804-1.321	 0.809	
Commitment	 -0.136	(0.159)	 0.873	 0.662-1.120	 0.391	
Negative	Characterisation	 0.200	(0.136)	 1.221	 0.979-1.542	 0.143	
Demand	or	Refusal	 0.276	(0.138)	 1.318	 1.051-1.663	 0.046*	
Explicit	Threat	 0.654	(0.193)	 1.923	 1.433-2.697	 0.0007*	
Balance	Level	One	 -0.197	(0.137)	 0.821	 0.649-1.024	 0.149	
Balance	Level	Two	 -0.247	(0.141)	 0.781	 0.616-0.984	 0.081*	
Balance	Level	Three	 -0.309	(0.179)	 0.734	 0.535-0.967	 0.084*	
	
When	breaking	down	Conciliatory	Statements	into	Openness,	Preference	and	Commitment	







speaking,	 the	 trend	 present	 in	 the	 binomial	 testing,	 in	which	more	 committed	 hostile	
statements	were	more	strongly	associated	with	US	use	of	armed	force,	is	strengthened	
under	 the	 multiple	 regression	 testing.	 However,	 unlike	 in	 binomial	 testing,	 Negative	
Characterisation	 no	 longer	 has	 a	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	 Force	Used.	





Used	 that	were	seen	 in	binomial	 testing	are	also	seen	here.	 Increases	 in	Balance	 at	all	
three	 levels	 are	 associated	 with	 decreases	 in	 Force	Used.	 Unlike	 in	 the	 results	 of	 the	
binomial	 testing,	 however,	 this	 negative	 relationship	 strengthens	 when	 moving	 from	
Balance	Level	One	through	to	Balance	Level	Three.	 In	the	results	of	the	binomial	testing	
Balance	Level	Two	had	a	smaller	negative	relationship	with	Force	Used	than	did	Balance	
Level	One.	Additionally,	 in	 the	 results	of	multiple	 regression	 testing	Balance	Level	Two	
becomes	statistically	significant	where	it	had	not	been	in	the	results	of	binomial	testing.	
Conversely,	Balance	Level	One	 loses	 the	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	with	Force	
Used	 that	was	present	 in	 the	results	of	 the	binomial	 testing.	These	 findings	are	also	 in	
line	 with	 theoretical	 expectations.	 The	 balance	 of	 less	 committed	 conciliatory	 and	
hostile	 statements	 being	 increasingly	 favourable	 to	 conciliatory	 statements	 is	 less	
reliably	correlated	with	US	use	of	armed	 force	 than	 is	 the	balance	of	more	committed	
conciliatory	and	hostile	statements	increasingly	favouring	conciliatory	statements.	
However,	 it	should	be	noted	that	while	Balance	Level	Two	offers	marked	improvement	
over	 Balance	 Level	 One,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 statistical	 significance	 of	 their	 respective	
coefficients,	Balance	Level	Three	only	offers	marginal	improvements	over	Balance	Level	
Two.	 This	 raises	 a	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 effect	 of	 differing	 levels	 of	 commitment	
expressed	 by	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 could	 be	 measured	 using	 only	 two	
distinct	 levels	 of	 commitment,	 rather	 than	 three.	 Separating	 the	 two	 highest	 levels	 of	
commitment	 expressed	 by	 hostile	 or	 conciliatory	 statements	 may	 be	 unnecessary.	 It	
might	 suffice	 to	 simply	 categorise	 the	 least	 committedly	 conciliatory	 or	 hostile	
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statements	 separately	 from	 all	 other	 levels	 of	 commitment	 expressed.	 This	 does	 not	
undermine	the	notion	that	the	commitment	expressed	by	presidential	statements	has	an	
effect	 on	 whether	 the	 US	 uses	 armed	 force	 against	 an	 adversary	 or	 not.	 It	 simply	
suggests	that	the	commitment	of	these	statements	could	be	effectively	measured	using	a	
dichotomous	 measure,	 such	 as	 coding	 each	 statement	 “low	 commitment”	 or	 “high	
commitment.”	The	details	of	how	to	classify	and	code	commitment	differently	would,	of	
course,	need	to	be	given	detailed	thought.	I	simply	highlight	this	point	here.	
7.9 Logistic Regression: Summary of Results 
H2	is	supported	by	the	results	of	the	multiple	logistic	regression	analysis	above.	Balance	
has	 the	 negative	 relationship	 with	 Force	 Used	 hypothesised,	 shares	 the	 largest	
correlation	 coefficient	 with	 Force	Used	 of	 the	 three	 independent	 variables	measuring	
presidential	 statements	 (Balance,	Hostile	 Statements	 and	 Conciliatory	 Statements)	 and	
those	models	that	include	Balance	as	the	measure	of	presidential	statements	fit	the	data	
on	 US	 use	 of	 armed	 force	 better	 than	 those	 using	 either	 Hostile	 Statements	 or	





hypothesised,	 that	 there	 would	 be	 a	 stronger	 correlation	 between	 highly	 committed	
statements	and	US	use	of	armed	force	than	between	less	committed	statements	and	the	
US’	use	of	armed	 force.	This	was	not	always	 the	case.	The	 relationship	between	Force	
Used	and	 the	 three	 commitment	 levels	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	were	 all	 statistically	
insignificant.	However,	in	multiple	regression	models	this	pattern	emerged	for	Balance	
and	 Hostile	 Statements;	 correlations	 between	 hostile	 statements,	 and	 the	 balance	 of	
conciliatory	and	hostile	statements,	and	US	use	of	armed	force	were	stronger	when	only	










of	 armed	 force,	 while	 conciliatory	 statements	 are	 not.	 This	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	
something	specifically	about	hostile	statements,	as	opposed	to	conciliatory	statements,	
that	means	they	have	an	independent	effect	on	the	US’	use	of	armed	force.	It	is	likely	that	
a	conclusive	explanation	of	why	this	 is	 the	case	will	extend	beyond	what	 is	 feasible	to	
analyse	in	this	thesis.	I	discuss	these	considerations	in	the	next	chapter.	


















(90% Confidence Interval) 
Democracy -0.207 0.81 
	 (0.529) (0.32-1.88) 
	 	 	
Relative Capabilities 0.385** 1.47 
	 (0.163) (1.13-1.94) 
	 	 	
Balance -0.336** 0.71 
	 (0.141) (0.56-0.90) 
	 	 	
Constant -1.010*** 0.36 
	 (0.152) (0.28-0.46) 
	 	
Observations 258 
Log Likelihood -145.372 
Likelihood Ratio 12.848 
R2 (Hosmer-Lemeshow) 0.043 
R2 (Cox-Snell) 0.049 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 298.744 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
	





In	 order	 for	 multiple	 regression	 models	 to	 give	 meaningful	 results	 the	 independent	
variables	themselves	cannot	be	highly	correlated	(Allison,	1999).	A	pertinent	example	of	
multicollinearity	 came	 in	 section	 7.5,	 where	 it	 was	 found	 that	 Balance,	 Hostile	
Statements	and	Conciliatory	Statements	exhibited	 collinearity	 and,	 therefore,	 could	not	
be	 included	 in	 the	 same	 regression	 models.	 Variation	 inflation	 factors	 (VIFs)	 are	 a	
statistical	measure	 of	whether	 one	 predictor	 variable	 has	 a	 strong	 linear	 relationship	












7.10.2 Outliers and Influential Cases 
As	 outlined	 in	 Research	 Design	 and	 Methodology	 Two,	 I	 generated	 standardised	 and	
studentised	 residuals,	 DFBETA	 and	 leverage	 figures	 to	 assess	whether	 any	 particular	
observations	 were	 having	 an	 undue	 influence	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	 regression	model	
presented	 in	Table	15.	Regarding	residuals,	 following	the	guidelines	offered	by	Allison	
(1999),	 Gordon	 (2010)	 and	 Field	 (2012),	 no	 problem	 was	 found.	 No	 residual	 values	
exceeded	 commonly	 accepted	 thresholds	 and	 observations	 that	 approached	 such	
thresholds	were	very	scarce	among	the	data.	However,	eight	observations	were	found	to	
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have	 DFBETA	 values	 that	 exceeded	 accepted	 thresholds,	 while	 20	 observations	 had	
leverage	values	that	exceeded	such	thresholds.	
A	blanket	exclusion	of	observations	that	prove	problematic	under	robustness	testing	is	
not	 necessarily	 a	 resolution	 to	 the	 problems	 posed.	 We	 cannot	 uncritically	 accept	
regression	 outputs	 when	 they	 change	 significantly	 with	 the	 inclusion/exclusion	 of	
certain	 observations.	 Outliers	 and	 influential	 observations,	 while	 having	 a,	 perhaps,	
undue	 influence	 on	 a	 model,	 are	 still	 representations	 of	 empirical	 occurrences	 that	
cannot	be	uncritically	excluded.	
However,	 if	 the	 output	 of	 a	 model	 is	 unchanging	 (robust)	 when	 excluding/including	




any	 significant	 changes	 between	 the	 two	 models.	 Balance	 retains	 its	 statistically	
significant	 relationship	 with	 Force	 Used,	 although	 at	 the	 lower	 threshold	 of	 .1,	 as	
opposed	to	 .05.	Relative	Capabilities	also	retains	 its	statistically	significant	relationship	
with	 Force	 Used,	 while	 Democracy	 still	 registers	 as	 insignificant.	 In	 general,	 the	













	 Model 1 Model 2 
Democracy -0.207 0.81 -0.024 0.98 
	 (0.529) (0.32-1.88) (0.590) (0.35-2.50) 
	 	 	 	 	
Relative Capabilities 0.385** 1.47 0.367** 1.44 
	 (0.163) (1.13-1.94) (0.168) (1.10-1.92) 
	 	 	 	 	
Balance -0.336** 0.71 -0.248* 0.78 
	 (0.141) (0.56-0.90) (0.147) (0.61-0.99) 
	 	 	 	 	
Constant -1.010*** 0.36 -1.053*** 0.35 
	 (0.152) (0.28-0.46) (0.157) (0.27-0.45) 
	 	 	
Observations 258 237 
Log Likelihood -145.372 -132.628 
Likelihood Ratio 12.848 9.218 
R2 (Hosmer-Lemeshow) 0.043 0.034 
R2 (Cox-Snell) 0.049 0.035 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 298.744 273.256 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
	
7.11 Testing “Linearity of the Logit” 
Like	all	regression	models,	logistic	regression	makes	a	number	of	assumptions	about	the	





Capabilities	 did	 not	 have	 a	 linear	 relationship	 with	 the	 log-odds	 of	 Force	 Used.	 In	
confronting	 this	 problem	Menard	 (2010)	 suggests	 assessing	whether	 the	 explanatory	
power	gained	 from	 including	Relative	Capabilities	 in	 the	model	outweighs	 the	 issue	of	
nonlinearity	 of	 the	 logit.	 During	 the	 multiple	 regression	 model-building	 conducted	
above,	Relative	Capabilities	was	found	to	be	one	of	the	variables	that	most	contributed	to	
increasing	a	model’s	goodness	of	 fit	 to	the	data.	For	this	reason,	I	 felt	that	there	was	a	
strong	case	to	be	made	for	leaving	Relative	Capabilities	in	the	model.	
However,	the	same	statistically	significant	relationship	still	exists	between	Balance	and	
Force	 Used	 when	 removing	 Relative	 Capabilities	 from	 the	 model	 shown	 in	 Table	 15,	
leaving	Democracy	as	the	sole	control	variable.	Thus,	in	either	case	Balance	maintains	its	
statistical	significant	relationship	with	Force	Used.	I	mention	Balance	because	while	it	is	
interesting	 and	 important	 to	 clarify	 the	 relationship	between	Relative	Capabilities	 and	
Force	Used,	 the	most	 important	 thing	 here	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	
Balance	and	Force	Used	is	not	a	consequence	of	breaching	assumptions	of	the	model.	It	is	
the	 statistical	 significance	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Balance	 and	 Force	 Used	 upon	
which	I	concluded	that	H2	was	supported	by	the	multiple	regression	analysis	conducted	
above.	 This	 relationship	 is	 still	 statistically	 significant	 when	 excluding	 Relative	
Capabilities	from	the	model	in	Table	15.	
An	 objection	 to	 removing	 Relative	 Capabilities	 might	 be	 that	 the	 model	 in	 Table	 15	
becomes	 too	 simple,	 omitting	 relevant	 variables,	 which	 is	 also	 a	 breach	 of	 the	
assumptions	 of	 logistic	 regression	 (Menard,	 2010).	 I	 acknowledge	 this	 potential	
criticism	 and	 in	 the	 following	 section	 attempt	 to	 account	 for	 variables	 that	 are	 not	
necessarily	as	common	in	preceding	studies	as	Relative	Capabilities	and	Democracy,	but	
which	 people	 may	 argue	 should	 be	 included	 in	 modelling	 the	 relationship	 between	
Balance	and	Force	Used.	
7.12 Alternative Explanations 










to	 both	 the	US	 using	 armed	 force	 during	 disputes	 and	 the	 statements	 that	 presidents	
make	 in	 those	 contexts.	 The	 salience	 of	 a	 dispute	 (or	 the	 issue	 over	which	 a	 dispute	
exists)	 to	 the	 American	 public	 and	 presidential	 administrations,	 and	 whether	 the	 US	
initiates	 the	dispute	 in	question,	might	both	be	 relevant	 factors.	These	variables	were	
often	 raised	 by	 colleagues	 when	 discussing	 my	 work	 with	 me,	 so	 I	 take	 them	 to	 be	
important	matters	to	deal	with	in	conducting	the	present	analysis.	
Functionally,	 these	 variables	 act	 the	 same	 as	 Democracy	 and	 Relative	 Capabilities;	
including	 them	 in	 statistical	 models	 allows	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	Balance	and	
Force	Used	 to	 be	 examined	while	 accounting	 for	 variables	 that	might	 have	 their	 own	
influence	upon	whether	the	US	uses	armed	force	or	whether	presidential	speech	is	more	
or	 less	 conciliatory	 or	 hostile.	 I	 include	 them	 here	 as	 alternative	 explanations,	 rather	
than	in	the	preceding	discussion	of	control	variables	in	chapter	five,	due	to	there	being	
limited	 precedent	 for	 including	 these	 variables	 in	 existing	 literature	 or	 limited	
theorising	behind	their	inclusion	where	they	are	utilised.	They	are	alternatives	to	those	
variables	 (such	 as	 Democracy	 and	 Relative	 Capabilities)	 that	 are	 most	 commonly	
included	in	statistical	models	or	theoretical	development	in	existing	literature.	
7.12.1 The Salience of Disputes 
It	 seems	 safe	 to	 assume	 that	 not	 all	 disputes	 will	 be	 considered	 equally	 pressing	 or	
concerning	to	the	US	public	or	US	presidential	administrations.	It	could	be	argued	that	
the	 perceived	 salience	 of	 a	 dispute	 in	 the	 public	 or	 political	 consciousness	 might	
influence	both	the	public	statements	presidents	make	regarding	a	dispute	and	also	the	





In	 an	 attempt	 to	 include	 the	 salience	 of	 each	 dispute	 in	my	 analysis	 I	 ran	 the	model	
displayed	in	Table	15,	this	time	including	the	NYT	Hits	variable	produced	by	McManus	
(2014)	as	 an	additional	 independent	variable.	NYT	Hits	measures	 the	daily	 average	of	
New	York	Times	articles	that	were	published	about	the	adversary	throughout	the	course	






Hits	 does	 not	 have	 a	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	 Force	 Used.	 This	 is	
depicted	in	Table	18,	presented	following	the	next	section	on	dispute	initiation.30	






of	war	 literature	 a	 state	 initiating	 a	dispute	with	 an	 act	 short	 of	 armed	 force,	 such	 as	
increased	preparedness	of	the	military,	mobilisation	of	previously	inactive	units,	border	




here	 in	our	modelling.	 I	 include	the	dichotomous	US	Side	A	variable	used	by	McManus	
(2014)	in	Table	18	to	account	for	dispute	initiation.	Observations	are	coded	with	a	“1”	















(90% Confidence Interval) 
Balance -0.323** 0.72 
	 (0.149) (0.56-0.92) 
	 	 	
Democracy -0.398 0.67 
	 (0.552) (0.26-1.62) 
	 	 	
Relative Capabilities 0.644** 1.90 
	 (0.313) (1.16-3.25) 
	 	 	
US Side A 1.580*** 4.86 
	 (0.316) (2.92-8.27) 
	 	 	
NYT Hits 0.257 1.29 
	 (0.283) (0.81-2.06) 
	 	 	
Constant -1.864*** 0.15 
	 (0.255) (0.10-0.23) 
	 	
Observations 258 
Log Likelihood -131.287 
Likelihood Ratio 41.018 
R2 (Hosmer-Lemeshow) 0.135 
R2 (Cox-Snell) 0.147 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 274.574 




with	Force	Used.	Thus,	while	 the	 theoretical	underpinnings	of	 the	bargaining	model	of	
war	 literature	may	not	provide	a	 theoretical	basis	upon	which	 to	expect	 that	a	 state’s	
initiation	of	a	dispute	would	be	correlated	with	 its	use	of	armed	 force	 in	 that	dispute,	
this	 is	 the	 empirical	 state	 of	 affairs.	 I	 discuss	 this	 in	 the	 following	 Discussion	 and	





7.13 Concluding Remarks 
In	 the	 course	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 conducted	 statistical	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 test	 the	
relationship	between	US	presidential	statements	of	conciliation	and	hostility	in	dispute	
settings,	and	US	use	of	armed	force	against	dispute	adversaries.	I	found	that	variation	in	
the	 proportion	 of	words	 accounted	 for	 by	 conciliatory	 statements	was	 not	 associated	
with	 variation	 in	 US	 use	 of	 armed	 force.	 H1	 was	 unsupported	 by	 my	 analysis,	 as	
Conciliatory	Statements	never	demonstrated	a	statistically	significant	relationship	with	
Force	Used.	
On	 the	other	hand,	H2	was	 supported	by	 this	 statistical	 analysis.	Balance	consistently	
exhibited	a	statistically	significant	negative	relationship	with	Force	Used.	This	was	true	
even	 when	 accounting	 for	 potentially	 confounding	 variables.	 Moreover,	 models	
including	Balance	consistently	performed	better,	in	terms	of	model	fit	to	the	data	on	US	
use	of	 force,	 than	models	 including	Hostile	Statements	or	Conciliatory	Statements.	 This	
supports	 the	 asserted	 importance	 of	 accounting	 for	 both	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements.	 Efforts	 were	 made,	 through	 robustness	 testing	 and	 engaging	 with	
alternative	explanations,	to	increase	our	confidence	in	these	findings.	
In	 light	 of	 these	 findings	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 further	 discussion.	 In	 the	 following	
Discussion	 and	 Research	 Agenda	 chapter	 I	 recap	 the	 theoretical	 considerations	 that	
motivated	my	statistical	analysis,	discussing	how	the	 findings	of	 this	analysis	apply	 to	
the	literature	and	theory	presented	in	the	first	half	of	this	thesis.	I	also	acknowledge	the	





8 Discussion and Conclusions 
This	 thesis	 has	 been	 an	 attempt	 to	 understand	 whether	 US	 presidential	 use	 of	
conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	 in	 dispute	 scenarios	 is	 related	 to	 the	 US’	 use	 of	
armed	 force	 against	 its	 adversaries.	 I	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 conciliatory	 statements	 of	
presidents	 and	 the	 balance	 that	 presidents	 strike	 between	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	
statements	when	addressing	an	adversary,	as	neither	has	received	systematic	scholarly	
attention	before	now.	Approaching	 the	conclusion	of	 this	 thesis,	 I	want	 to	 touch	upon	




of	 these	 findings	 for	 existing	 literature	 and	 theory,	 as	well	 as	 future	 research.	 I	 offer	
initial	thoughts	on	why	H1	is	unsupported	by	the	preceding	inferential	analysis	despite	
the	 fact	 that,	 as	 argued	 in	 the	 Theoretical	 Framework,	 the	 notion	 that	 conciliatory	




acknowledge	 some	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 this	 thesis.	 I	 explain	 why	 I	 was	 unable	 to	
collect	more	 data	 on	 the	 dispute	 behaviour	 of	 the	US’	 adversaries	 and	 the	 attempts	 I	
made	to	account	for	the	political	nature	of	the	foreign	policy	decision-making	process	in	
the	 US.	 I	 finish	 by,	 thirdly,	 offering	 brief	 concluding	 remarks	 that	 speak	 to	 the	
contributions	and	real	world	implications	of	this	work.	
8.1 Recapping Findings, Returning to the Literature and Turning to Future 
Research 
The	findings	of	my	empirical	analysis	were	reported	just	last	chapter,	so	I	do	not	want	to	
simply	 repeat	 these	here.	Rather,	 I	 attempt	 to	discern	 and	discuss	 those	 findings	 that	
have	 the	 largest	 implications	 for	 existing	 literature	 and	 theory,	 as	 well	 as	 future	
research.	I	discuss	the	findings	of	my	statistical	analysis	with	regard	to	hypotheses	one	
and	 two.	 I	 then	 move	 on	 to	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 relationships	 that	 the	 variables	




8.1.1 The Inconsequential Nature of Conciliatory Statements 




example,	 suggest	 that	 US	 presidents	 face	 electoral	 costs	 if	 they	 issue	 conciliatory	
statements	about	a	dispute	only	to	end	up	using	armed	force	during	the	course	of	that	
dispute.	I	argued	that	a	logical	corollary	of	these	arguments	is:	





of	 course,	 hard	 to	 know	 with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 confidence.	 I	 wish	 to	 discuss	 one	
possibility	here.	
8.1.1.1 The Nature of Audiences 
I	 talked	a	 lot	 in	 the	Theoretical	Framework	 about	 the	audiences	 for	a	political	 leader’s	
statements.	 I	 focused	 on	 domestic	 publics	 and	 how	 they	 act	 as	 one	 audience	 for	 the	
public	 statements	 made	 by	 political	 leaders.	 I	 also	 touched	 on	 Anne	 Sartori’s	 (2002,	
2005)	work,	which	argues	that	all	other	states	are,	in	theory,	an	audience	to	a	political	
leader’s	 statements.	 States	 uninvolved	 in	 a	 given	 dispute	 are	 an	 audience	 to	 the	








not	 account	 for	 other	 audiences,	 among	 whom	 there	 is	 a	 lot	 of	 variation,	 which	 US	
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presidents.	 These	 audiences	 potentially	 offer	 different	 incentives	 with	 regard	 to	
presidential	 use	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 than	 do	 the	 audiences	 that	 have	 been	 the	
focus	 of	 preceding	 literature,	 for	 example,	 the	 US’s	 domestic	 public.	 Three	 potential	
audiences	 that	 may	 have	 had	 specific	 salience	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 are	
members	 of	 the	 NATO	 alliance,	 members	 of	 the	 Non-Aligned	 Movement	 and	 the	
domestic	publics	of	communist	states.	
It	 is	 possible	 that	 US	 presidents’	 use	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 during	 disputes	 that	
occurred	 in	 the	Cold	War,	particularly	 those	 in	which	 the	US	confronted	a	 communist	
state,	were	utilised	to	appeal	to	allies	and	strengthen	alliance	bonds,	promote	an	image	
of	 the	US	 as	 benevolent	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	USSR	 among	 the	Non-Aligned	 states	 or	
foment	 dissent	 among	 the	 publics	 of	 communist	 states.	 Essentially,	 conciliatory	
statements	made	in	the	context	of	a	single	dyadic	MID	could	be	seen	as	part	of	the	US’	
larger	propaganda	effort	with	regard	to	the	Cold	War.32	If	this	is	the	case,	then	perhaps	











of	 force.	US	presidential	 decisions	 to	make	 conciliatory	or	hostile	 statements	 towards	
adversaries	might	 be	 driven	 by	 a	 broader	 strategy	 of	managing	 the	 Cold	War,	 rather	




of	 the	 US’	 propaganda	 campaign	 that	 appealed	 to	 the	 Cold	War	 audiences	 I	 mention	
above.	 However,	 while	 the	 US	 would	 seem	 to	 have	 incentives	 to	 present	 itself	 as	
militarily	 powerful,	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 likely	 that	 there	 would	 be	 much	 incentive	 to	
actively	present	itself	as	hostile,	as	defined	herein.	Promoting	a	hostile	image	of	the	US	
would	 likely	play	 into	adverserial	governments’	efforts	 to	paint	 the	US	as	an	agressor,	
for	example.	
In	 mentioning	 these	 issues	 I	 am	 not	 attempting	 to	 make	 an	 argument	 about	 which	
audiences	US	presidents	were	targeting	with	their	statements.	Nor	am	I	trying	to	make	
any	 claim	 about	 how	 audiences	 like	members	 of	 the	 NATO	 Alliance,	 the	 Non-Aligned	
states	 or	 domestic	 publics	 of	 communist	 countries	 reacted	 to	 US	 propaganda	 or	
contradictions	therein.	In	raising	these	issues	I	am	simply	trying	to	point	out	that	there	
are	 audiences	 to	 US	 presidential	 speech	 that	 may	 influence	 presidents’	 selections	 of	
statements	by	which	to	address	adversaries,	but	which	are	currently	under-theorised.	It	
is	 possible	 that	 the	 incentive	 structure	 for	 using	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements	
differs	 and	 that	 these	 differences	may	 have	 been	 particularly	 pronounced	 during	 the	
Cold	War.	This	is	one	potential	explanation	for	the	finding	that	conciliatory	statements	
are	not	reliably	related	to	the	US’	use	of	armed	force,	while	hostile	statements	are.	Or,	in	
other	 words,	 this	 is	 one	 potential	 explanation	 for	 why	 H1	was	 not	 supported	 by	my	
empirical	analysis.	Of	course,	comprehensively	explaining	why	conciliatory	statements	
do	 not	 have	 a	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	 US	 use	 of	 armed	 force,	 while	
hostile	statements	do,	requires	more	investigation	and	analysis	than	can	be	had	in	this	
concluding	chapter.	Explaining	this	difference	should	be	a	focus	of	future	research.	
8.1.2 The Balance of Statements: A Need to “Colour in” Presidential Speech 
In	the	foregoing	analysis	I	attempted	to	account	for	the	effect	that	both	the	conciliatory	
and	 hostile	 statements	 of	 US	 presidents	 might	 have	 on	 the	 odds	 that	 the	 US	 would	
employ	 armed	 force	 against	 an	 adversary	 by	 way	 of	 the	 Balance	 variable.	 In	 the	
Literature	Review	 I	explained	how	hostile	statements	had	been	the	focus	of	the	bulk	of	






must	 account	 for	 both	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 statements.	 My	 Descriptive	 Statistics	







H2	 was	 supported	 by	 my	 inferential	 statistical	 analysis.	 Balance	 was	 negatively	
associated	 with	 Force	 Used,	 and	 logistic	 regression	 models	 incorporating	 Balance	
performed	 better	 than	 those	 including	 Conciliatory	 Statements	 or	 Hostile	 Statements.	
That	is	to	say	that	models	including	Balance	best	fit	the	data	on	the	US’s	use	of	force	in	
those	 dyadic	 MIDs	 in	 which	 it	 was	 involved	 between	 1950-2010.	 However,	 as	 I	
acknowledged	in	section	7.6,	the	gains	made	when	incorporating	Balance	in	regression	
models	are	only	slight,	compared	to	models	including	Hostile	Statements.	This	raises	the	






case	 for	why	 conciliatory	 presidential	 statements	 and	 the	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	
hostile	presidential	statements	should	have	independent	effects	on	whether	the	US	used	
armed	 force	 against	 its	 adversaries.	 This	 theoretical	 case	 was	 implicit	 in	 a	 lot	 of	 the	
foregoing	 literature	 on	 domestic	 public	 reaction	 to	 political	 leaders’	 handling	 of	
international	 disputes.	 Thus,	 collecting	 and	 coding	 conciliatory	 statements	 is	 not	 just	











recently	 begun	 to	 be	 produced.	McManus	 (2014)	was	 the	 first	 to	 attempt	 to	 compile	
such	a	dictionary	of	hostile	 statements,	 even	 though	 the	study	of	 the	effects	of	hostile	
statements	has	a	far	greater	tradition,	as	outlined	in	the	Literature	Review.	The	fact	that	
the	 relationship	 between	 Balance	 and	 Force	 Used	 is	 stronger	 than	 the	 relationship	





our	 collection,	 coding	 and	 measurement	 of	 presidential	 statements.	 I	 discuss	
possibilities	in	this	regard	directly	below.	
8.1.2.1 Methodological Extensions 
To	begin,	a	corpus	representative	of	all	public	presidential	speech,	not	just	public	speech	
in	 the	context	of	militarised	 interstate	disputes,	 should	be	conducted.	Studies	 like	 this	




contexts	 in	 which	 presidents	 speak	 publicly.	 For	 example,	 while	 we	 can	 measure	
whether	a	president	used	more	hostile	statements	in	the	context	of	Dispute	A	than	in	the	
context	of	Dispute	B,	we	cannot	 tell	whether	presidential	speech	about	either	of	 these	
disputes	 contained	more	 hostile	 statements	 than	would	 be	 expected	 in	 any	 randomly	
selected	piece	of	public	presidential	 speech.	The	words	and	phrases	 that	make	up	my	
dictionary	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 and	 McManus’	 (2014)	 dictionary	 of	 hostile	
statements	no	doubt	appear	 in	public	presidential	 speech	 that	has	nothing	 to	do	with	
international	disputes	or	foreign	policy	more	broadly.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 whether	 presidential	 use	 of	 the	 terms	 that	 have	 been	
included	in	McManus’	(2014)	and	my	own	dictionaries	are	used	in	a	quantitatively	and	
qualitatively	different	manner	when	comparing	public	presidential	speech	in	the	context	
of	 disputes	 with	 public	 presidential	 speech	 more	 generally.	 Quantitatively,	 the	
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conciliatory	 dictionary	 entries,	 for	 example,	 that	 appear	 far	 more	 frequently	 in	 the	
context	of	disputes	 than	 they	do	presidential	 speech	as	 a	whole	 are	more	 likely	 to	be	
statements	presidents	consciously	use	 to	 try	and	express	conciliation	during	disputes.	
Entries	in	the	dictionary	of	conciliatory	statements	that	appear	in	dispute	speech	at	the	
same	 rate	 that	 they	 appear	 in	 all	 other	 public	 presidential	 speech	 may	 not	 be	 as	
indicative	 of	 a	 conciliatory	 expression,	 as	 they	 appear	 no	 more	 frequently	 in	 the	
contexts	 of	 disputes	 than	 they	 would	 in	 any	 other	 randomly	 selected	 body	 of	
presidential	speech.	Qualitatively,	analysing	presidential	speech	in	non-dispute	contexts	






could	 be	 identified	 using	 linguistics	 resources	 such	 as	 WordNet	 (Fellbaum,	 1998).	
WordNet	 has	 similar	 characteristics	 to	 a	 thesaurus,	 but	 is	more	 elaborate;	 it	 links	not	
only	words—strings	of	 letters—but	also	specific	 senses	of	words	(Fellbaum,	1998).	 In	
other	 words,	 WordNet	 (Fellbaum,	 1998)	 not	 only	 groups	 words	 together,	 but	 also	
groups	specific	meanings	of	words	based	on	meaning	similarity.	This	resource	could	be	
searched	using	words	included	in	my	dictionary	of	conciliatory	statements	or	McManus’	








obvious	 starting	 point.	 Many	 principles	 of	 this	 approach	 to	 linguistics	 are	 already	
implicit	 in	 studies	 such	 as	 my	 own	 and	 McManus’	 (2014).34	For	 example,	 corpus	
linguistics	 makes	 extensive	 use	 of	 computers	 for	 analysis,	 just	 as	 I	 used	 AntConc	





constructing	 my	 dictionary	 of	 conciliatory	 statements	 (see	 section	 4.4)	 and	 ensuring	
that	my	 coding	 process	was	 rigorous	 (see	 section	 4.5).	 Only	 through	 further	work	 to	
expand	our	understanding	of	which	 statements	presidents	use	 to	 express	 conciliation	
and	hostility,	and	to	refine	our	measurement	of	their	occurrence	in	presidential	speech,	
can	 we	 properly	 begin	 to	 understand	 the	 benefit,	 or	 lack	 there	 of,	 of	 measuring	 the	
balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	 hostile	 presidential	 statements,	 rather	 than	 hostile	
statements	alone.	
8.1.2.2 Broader Benefits of Analysing the Balance of Statements 
As	stated	above,	the	analytic	gains	of	measuring	the	balance	of	conciliatory	and	hostile	
presidential	statements,	as	opposed	to	hostile	statements	alone,	are	not	the	only	benefit	
of	 expanding	 our	 inquiry	 beyond	 hostile	 statements.	 Moving	 away	 from	 a	 focus	 on	
hostile	 statements	 to	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 multifaceted	 nature	 of	 presidential	 statements	
would	add	to,	and	challenge,	existing	literature	and	theory.	
The	first	benefit	is	simply	descriptive.	This	project	represents	a	first	attempt	at	trying	to	
compile	 the	 statements	 by	 which	 US	 presidents	 express	 conciliation	 to	 adversaries.	
Understanding	how	presidents	do	this	is,	for	those	involved	in	presidential	studies	or	US	
foreign	 policy,	 interesting	 in	 and	 of	 itself.	 Such	 information	 allows	 us	 to	 answer	
questions	 about	 which	 presidents	 were	 most	 conciliatory	 in	 their	 speech	 towards	
adversaries,	or	which	adversaries	of	the	US	were	spoken	of	in	a	particularly	conciliatory	
fashion,	for	example.	
Second,	 such	 an	 approach	 invites	 critical	 engagement	 with	 assumptions	 and	
conventions	in	existing	literature,	and,	as	such,	promotes	theory-building.	For	the	most	
part,	 the	public	 statements	of	US	presidents	have	been	 read	with	a	mind	 to	 collecting	
hostile	 statements;	 researchers	 deemed	 these	 to	 be	 most	 important	 with	 regard	 to	
political	 leaders’	 management	 of	 international	 disputes.	 Adopting	 a	 perspective	 that	
explicitly	recognises	 that	presidents	use	different	 types	of	statements	 to	 talk	about	an	
adversary	 within	 a	 single	 dispute,	 and	 strike	 a	 different	 balance	 between	 these	
statements	 across	 the	many	 disputes	 in	which	 each	 president	 is	 involved,	 suggests	 a	
reversed	process	in	which	the	public	speech	of	political	leaders	is	read	in	order	to	find	
those	 types	of	statements,	 rhetorical	 techniques,	etc,	 that	are	commonplace.	Statistical	
support	 for	 H2	 indicates	 that	 analytic	 gains	 can	 be	made	when	 analysing	 statements	
beyond	 those	 expressing	 hostility.	 However,	 of	 equal	 importance,	 explorations	 of	
presidential	speech	in	which	hostile	statements	are	not	the	sole	focus	allow	for	theory-
building	in	which	presidential	statements	are	not	treated	as	homogenous	or	exclusively	
hostile.	 Gaining	 a	 greater	 descriptive	 understanding	 of	 the	 complexity	 of	 presidential	
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statements	 is	 the	 first	 necessary	 step	 in	 developing	 more	 nuanced	 theorised	
connections	between	these	statements,	and	pertinent	subcategories	of	these	statements,	
and	the	US’	dispute	behaviour.	
Finally,	 acknowledging	 that	 there	 are	 multiple	 types	 of	 statements	 employed	 by	
presidents	during	disputes,	and	that	these	types	of	statements	are	balanced	differently	
in	 different	 disputes,	 is	 more	 in	 line	 with	 the	 political	 reality	 of	 how	 presidential	
statements	 are	 determined.	 The	 bargaining	 model	 of	 war	 literature	 cited	 in	 the	
Literature	 Review	 assumes	 a	 certain	 mode	 of	 decision-making.	 “Our	 theory	 is...about	
how	 they	 [people]	 behave	 given	 their	 goals.	 It	 is	 about	 the	 instrumental	 selection	 of	
actions	to	maximise	expected	utility	given	particular	aims”,	state	Bueno	de	Mesquita	and	
Lalman,	(1992,	p.	18).	In	other	words,	bargaining	model	of	war	literature	has	an	explicit	
theory	 of	 action.	 Yet,	 there	 is	 not	 a	 particularly	 strong	 recognition	 of	 the	 context	 in	
which	these	actions	take	place.	
Each	 president	 has	 limited,	 although	 increasing,	 time	 and	 opportunity	 to	 convey	 the	
messages	that	they	want	to	promote	publicly.	The	inclusion	of	one	topic,	or	one	type	of	
statement	 in	a	presidential	 speech,	 for	example,	 leaves	 less	 space	 for	another	 topic	or	
another	 type	 of	 statement	 to	 be	 included.	 The	 decision	 of	 what	 to	 include	 is	
fundamentally	 a	political	 decision,	 something	 that	 the	 abstracted	descriptions	 such	 as	
that	offered	by	Bueno	de	Mesquita	and	Lalman	(1992,	p.	18)	can	obscure.	“Balance”	 is	
both	 a	 noun	 and	 a	 verb.	 The	 decision	 to	 label	 my	 primary	 independent	 variable	 of	






those	 statements.	 The	 literature	 from	which	 this	 thesis	 proceeds	 is	 surprisingly	 bare	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 presidential	 administrations,	 and	 certain	
individuals	within	 them,	work	 to	 form	 the	 speeches	and	 talking	points	of	 a	president.	
Understanding	these	processes	would	allow	for	a	more	accurate	account	of	the	reality	of	
how	presidents	select	the	statements	that	they	make	about	dispute	adversaries.	
8.1.3 Adversary Political System, Relative Capabilities and Dispute Initiation 




use	 to	address	an	adversary,	as	well	as	 the	US’	use	of	 force	against	adversaries.	 I	 also	
included	variables	 that	helped	 to	 rule	out	 alternative	 explanations	 for	 the	 statistically	
significant	relationship	between	Balance	and	Force	Used	that	the	results	of	my	statistical	
analysis	 demonstrated.	 While	 I	 did	 not	 hypothesise	 relationships	 between	 these	
variables	and	the	dependent	variable,	Force	Used,	in	the	following	I	reiterate	the	findings	




Democracy	 was	 found	 to	 have	 an	 insignificant	 relationship	 with	 Force	 Used.	 This	
contrasts	one	of	the	most	well	established	findings	of	international	relations	(Haavard,	
et	al.,	2018):	 that	democracies	do	not	war	with	one	another.	More	 to	 the	point	of	 this	
thesis,	 it	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 corresponding	 research	 that	 finds	 that	 “When	 disputes	 do	
emerge,	democratic	dyads	 choose	more	peaceful	processes	of	dispute	 settlement	 than	
do	other	pairings	of	states”	(Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.,	1999,	p.	791).	This	is	interesting	
and	 calls	 for	 further	 investigation	 that	 cannot	 be	 adequately	 conducted	 within	 the	
confines	of	this	thesis.	However,	some	preliminary	thoughts	can	be	given.	
Of	 the	 268	 dyadic	 MIDs	 analysed	 in	 this	 study,	 only	 20	 involve	 the	 US	 confronting	
another	 democracy.	 This	 small	 sample	 size	 makes	 interpretation	 of	 Democracy’s	
statistical	 insignificance	 difficult.	 It	 also	 speaks	 to	 the	 need	 to	 conceptualise	 the	
connection	between	two	phenomena:	the	occurrence	of	disputes	between	democracies	
and	 the	use	of	 force	between	democracies.	As	Fearon	 (1994b)	has	pointed	out,	 states	
may	be	strategic	 in	selecting	the	disputes	that	they	enter	 into.	 If	democratic	states	are	
less	 inclined	 to	 enter	 into	 disputes	 with	 fellow	 democracies,	 then	 those	 disputes	 in	








use	 different	 datasets	 of	 international	 disputes	 (see	 Dixon,	 1994).	 Others	 focus	 on	
different	 dependent	 variables	 than	 that	 studied	 here.	 For	 example,	 Mousseau	 (1998)	
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found	 that	dyadic	MIDs	 involving	democratic	dyads	were	more	 likely	 to	be	 settled	by	
compromise	 than	 dyads	 of	 another	 nature.	 Raymond	 (1994)	 found	 that	 democratic	
dyads	were	more	 likely	 to	 submit	 their	 disputes	 to	 third-party	mediation	 than	 dyads	
involving	 zero	 or	 one	 democracies.	 However,	 while	 these	 findings	 speak	 to	 the	
relationship	 between	democratic	 dyads	 and	peaceful	 dispute	 settlement	 in	 one	 sense,	
they	 do	 not	 specifically	 speak	 to	 a	 democracy’s	 use	 of	 force.	 Having	 found	 that	
democratic	dyads	are	more	 likely	 to	resolve	 their	disputes	via	compromise,	Mousseau	
(1998,	p.	214)	 reminds	 the	 reader	 that	 compromise	 is	 “not	necessarily	peaceful”;	 it	 is	









8.1.3.2 Relative Capabilities 
My	 empirical	 testing	 showed	 that	 increases	 in	Relative	 Capabilities	were	 consistently	
associated	with	 increased	odds	of	 the	US	using	armed	 force.	The	US	was	around	50%	
more	 likely	 to	 use	 armed	 force	per	 one	 standard	deviation	 increase	 in	 its	 capabilities	




balance	 of	 power	 between	 states.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 ways	 of	 measuring	 this,	




fact	 that	 variables	 that	 measure	 major	 power	 status	 and	 relative	 capabilities	 likely	
measure	 the	 same	phenomenon,	 since	 “a	 large	part	of	what	 constitutes	being	a	major	





of	 nuclear	weapons.	My	 reasons	 are	 similar	 to	 those	 outlined	 by	 Sartori	 (2005).	 The	
possession	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 is	 somewhat	 captured	 by	Relative	 Capabilities,	 due	 to	
this	variable	measuring	military	expenditure,	for	example	(Singer,	Bremer	and	Stuckey,	
1972).	However,	those	states	that	had	capabilities	comparable	to	the	US	throughout	the	
time	 period	 observed	 (China	 and	 the	 USSR	 are	 two	 prime	 examples)	 are	 also	 those	
states	that	possessed	nuclear	weapons	for	the	majority	of	the	timespan.	Separating	out	
the	effects	of	general	capabilities	from	nuclear	capabilities	would	be	beneficial.	










As	 discussed	 in	 section	 5.1.2.1,	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 why	 I	 also	 analysed	 the	
statements	that	US	presidents	made	about	an	adversary	in	the	60	days	prior	to	a	dispute	
beginning.	In	disputes	such	as	the	ones	described	above,	there	is	no	time	period	that	is	





in	 the	 MID	 data.	 For	 example,	 the	 average	 duration	 of	 these	 disputes	 is	 106	 days,	
compared	 to	 the	 154-day	 average	 of	 all	 other	 dyadic	MIDs.	 This	 average	 drops	 to	 68	
days	when	 excluding	 one	dyadic	MID	 in	which	 the	US	breached	Pakistani	 territory	 to	
intermittently	conduct	drones	strikes	against	Taliban	and	Al-Qaeda	targets	therein	over	
the	course	of	1510	days.	
Moreover,	 these	 disputes	 seem	 to	 disproportionately	 represent	 minor	 or	 accidental	
disputes.	For	example,	at	least	seven	of	these	disputes	are	cases	in	which	the	US	Coast	
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Guard	 seized	 or	 fired	 upon	 boats	 (often	 commercial)	 of	 another	 state.	 I	 took	 steps	 to	
ensure	 that	 the	 inclusion	 of	 these	 cases	 did	 not	 influence	 the	 main	 findings	 of	 my	
inferential	 analysis.	 I	 used	 the	 variable	NYT	Hits	 to	 try	 to	 account	 for	 the	 salience	 of	
disputes	and	found	that	doing	so	did	not	alter	 the	 findings	of	my	statistical	modelling.	
Following	 McManus	 (2014)	 I	 also	 re-ran	 my	 statistical	 analysis	 excluding	 single-day	
disputes,	in	an	attempt	to	remove	minor	and	accidental	disputes.	Again	the	results	of	my	
analysis	 did	 not	 undergo	 any	 significant	 changes.	 However,	while	 these	 steps	 help	 to	
ensure	that	the	46	observations	I	 identify	above	are	not	having	an	undue	effect	on	the	
results	of	my	 inferential	analysis,	as	 they	apply	 to	my	hypotheses,	 they	do	not	help	 to	
properly	explain	the	effect	that	these	types	of	disputes	have	on	the	relationship	between	
the	US’	initiation	of	a	dispute	and	the	US’	use	of	force	in	a	dispute.	Qualitative	research	is	
needed	 to	 properly	 understand	 whether	 those	 disputes	 in	 which	 the	 US	 initiates	 a	
dispute	with	an	act	of	force	commonly	exhibit	different	characteristics	to	other	MIDs.	
8.1.4 Contemporary Circumstances and Future Research Possibilities 
As	indicated	in	the	introduction	to	this	thesis,	contemporary	events	such	as	the	election	
of	 Donald	 Trump	 have	 drawn	 attention	 to	 the	 role	 that	 political	 leaders’	 public	
statements	may	play	in	determining	the	course	of	international	affairs.	I	wish	to	briefly	
discuss	 one	 contemporary	 trend	 that	 challenges	 my	 research	 and	 provides	 fertile	
ground	for	future	scholarship.	While	this	trend	applies	to	many	political	 leaders,	 I	 talk	
largely	in	relation	to	Trump,	as	he	is	emblematic	of	this	trend.	
The	use	of	social	media	platforms	such	as	Twitter	by	political	leaders	raises	questions	of	









leaders	 in	 the	 context	 of	 international	 disputes	 are	 plentiful	 and,	 as	 I	 have	 argued	
throughout	 the	 above,	 it	 is	 worth	 understanding	 the	 relationship	 between	 such	
statements	 and	 the	 policies	 that	 states	 employ	 when	 engaging	 dispute	 adversaries.	
However,	contemporary	 trends	suggest	 that	a	 future	course	of	 fruitful	research	would	
be	to	analyse	the	role	of	statements	made	on	platforms	diffent	to	those	analysed	herein.	
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To	 do	 so	would,	 naturally,	 involve	 challenges,	 the	 first	 of	 which	may	well	 be	 around	
matters	 of	 authorship.	 There	 have	 been	 a	 number	 of	 reports	 demonstrating	 that	
Trump’s	 tweets	 are	 the	work	 of	 a	 team	 of	 individuals,	 not	 Trump	 alone	 (see	 Draper,	
2018;	Linkskey,	2018;	Robinson,	2016).	This	 raises	questions	of	whether	only	 tweets,	
and	social	media	postings	in	general,	that	Trump	himself	authors	should	be	included	in	
an	 analysis	 of	 presidential	 statements.	 The	 tweets	 that	 appear	 on	 the	




on	Twitter	 and	whether	 these	 words	 and	 phrases	 are	 significantly	 different	 than	 the	
words	 or	 phrases	 used	 in	 other	 contexts,	 such	 as	 public	 addresses	 and	 personal	
engagements	with	 the	 press.	 In	 essence,	 it	 cannot	 be	 assumed	 that	 the	 entries	 in	my	
dictionary	 of	 conciliatory	 statements,	 and	 those	 in	 Mcmanus’	 (2014)	 dictionary	 of	
hostile	 statements,	 can	 be	 used	 to	 search	 for	 concilatory	 or	 hostile	 statements	 in	
Trump’s	tweets.	The	funadmental	nature	of	social	media	platforms	such	as	Twitter,	e.g.	
the	 limiting	 of	 tweets	 to	 280	 characters,	 as	 well	 as	 potentially	 different	 social	
conventions	with	regard	to	communicating	via	tweet,	versus	communicating	in	person,	
mean	 that	 work	 would	 be	 required	 to	 understand	 descriptive	 differences	 between	
tweeting	and	speaking.	This	is	a	prerequisite	to	being	able	to	analytically	differentiate,	
for	example,	 the	relationship	between	social	media	statements	and	use	of	armed	force	
against	 adversaries	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 verbal	 statements	 and	 the	 use	 of	
armed	force.	Such	an	enquiry	would	be	a	valuable	extension	of	McManus’	(2017)	work	
exploring	 the	 relationship	 between	 hostile	 statements,	 dispute	 outcomes	 and	 the	
context	 in	 which	 hostile	 statements	 are	 made	 (e.g	 speeches	 to	 the	 nation	 versus	
interactions	with	the	press).	
8.2 Acknowledging Limitations 
Like	 all	 scholarship	 this	 thesis	 has	 a	 number	 of	 limitations.	 I	 would	 like	 to	 candidly	
discuss	 these.	 In	 the	 following	 I	 note	 what	 I	 consider	 to	 be	 the	 most	 significant	
shortcomings	of	this	thesis	and	explain	how	I	tried	to	rectify	them	or	why	I	could	not	do	
so.	
8.2.1 Opponent Behaviour 
The	bargaining	model	of	war,	by	definition,	recognises	that	to	explain	conflict	between	
states	 the	 decision-making	 processes	 of	 multiple	 parties	 need	 to	 be	 understood	 and	
accounted	 for	 (Powell,	 2002;	 Reiter,	 2003;	Wagner,	 2000).	Why,	 the	 question	 is,	 can	
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states	at	times	not	find	a	mutually	acceptable	state	of	affairs	(e.g.	division	of	territory)	
without	 resorting	 to	 armed	 force?	 The	 construction	 of	 the	 MID	 Dataset	 implicitly	
recognises	the	fact	that	the	dispute	behaviour	of	State	A	is,	at	least	in	part,	a	response	to	
the	behaviour	of	State	B.	Beginning	with	later	editions	of	the	MID	Dataset	(see	Ghosn	et	
al.,	 2004),	 event	 data	was	 collected	 that	 allowed	 researchers	 to	 chronologically	 order	
the	 actions	 of	 all	 participating	 states,	 and	 thus	 trace	 escalatory	 or	 de-escalatory	
processes	as	they	unfolded	back-and-forth	between	states.	
Despite	 this	 reality,	 this	 thesis	 has	 only	 accounted	 for	 the	behaviour	of	 one	 state	 in	 a	
disputing	dyad	–	the	US.	I	tested	to	see	whether	variation	in	US	presidential	statements	




theoretical	and	empirical	 literature	 that	makes	no	appeal	 to	 the	behaviour	of	a	state’s	
adversary.	For	example,	much	of	my	theoretical	discussion	was	dedicated	to	the	notion	
of	audience	costs.	The	central	contention	 in	 this	 literature	 is	 that	political	 leaders	 face	
costs	 for	 acting	 in	 a	manner	 contrary	 to	 the	 statements	 they	make	 about	 adversaries	
because	they	will	lose	electorate	support	in	dong	so	(see	Fearon,	1994,	Levy	et	al.,	2015;	
Smith,	 1998;	Tingley,	 2014;	Tomz,	 2007).	This	 literature	 theoretically	 and	 empirically	
examines	the	behaviour	of	a	state’s	domestic	public,	not	a	state’s	adversaries.	
I	 would	 frame	 this	 issue	 as	 one	 of	 variable	 omission.	 One	 assumption	 of	 logistic	
regression	 (and	 other	 forms	 of	 regression	 analysis)	 is	 that	 all	 relevant	 variables	 are	
included	 in	an	analysis	 (Menard,	2010).	Variables	 controlling	 for	 the	behaviour	of	 the	
US’	adversary	would	be	included	herein,	 ideally.	 In	particular,	variables	that	measured	
both	the	statements	that	adversarial	leaders	made	about	the	US	and	the	US’	adversaries’	
use	 of	 force	would	 be	 included,	 as	 it	 seems	 plausible	 that	 variation	 in	 either	 of	 these	
might	affect	 the	US	president’s	own	statements	about	the	adversary	and	the	odds	that	
the	US	would	employ	force	against	that	adversary.	
Variables	 measuring	 the	 statements	 of	 US	 adversaries	 and	 the	 use	 of	 force	 by	 US	
adversaries	were	not	 included	due	to	data	 inaccessibility.	Regarding	the	statements	of	
US	 adversaries,	 for	many	 states	 that	 the	 US	 experienced	 a	 dyadic	MID	with	 between	




political	 leaders.	The	Public	Papers	of	the	Presidents	 is	 a	 relatively	unique	 resource.	 In	
instances	 where	 adversarial	 leaders	 used	 languages	 other	 than,	 or	 in	 addition	 to,	
English,	access	would	be	doubly	difficult.	
Collecting	data	 on	 adversaries’	 use	 of	 armed	 force	was	 also	unrealistic.	 I	 explained	 in	












garnered	more	 attention	 in	 international	 relations	 scholarship	 and	military	 histories,	
especially	 within	 the	 Western	 academy.	 Relatedly,	 the	 second	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
resources	 I	 have	 access	 to	 as	 an	 English-speaking	 PhD	 candidate.	 Key	 resources	 I	
consulted	in	trying	to	determine	on	which	date	each	disputing	party	used	armed	force,	
such	as	the	New	York	Times,	likely	have	greater	access	to	information	on	the	US’	use	of	
force	 in	 their	 reporting	 than	 they	 do	 information	 on	 the	 use	 of	 force	 by	 adversarial	
nations.	 Due	 to	 their	 largely	 US-based	 readership	 they	 may	 also	 have	 incentives	 to	
report	more	on	the	actions	of	the	US,	rather	than	its	adversaries.	For	these	reasons	I	was	
unable	 to	 include	variables	accounting	 for	 the	 statements	of	 adversarial	 leaders	or	an	
adversary’s	 use	 of	 force	 in	 my	 analysis.	 I	 am	 not	 alone	 in	 this	 regard.	 For	 example,	
McManus	(2014)	was	unable	to	account	for	hostile	statements	made	by	US	adversaries	
in	her	analysis	of	hostile	presidential	statements.	
8.2.2 An Ignorance of Political Process? 
An	 objection	 to	 the	 finding	 that	 the	 balance	 of	 hostile	 and	 conciliatory	 presidential	
statements	 and	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 force	 are	 related	 could	 be	 that	 both	 US	 presidential	
statements	 about	 an	 adversary	 and	 the	 US’	 use	 of	 force	 against	 an	 adversary	 are	 the	
result	of	a	prior	policy	decision.	I	mentioned	above	that	a	lot	of	the	bargaining	model	of	
war	 literature	does	not	contain	an	analysis	of	 the	political	 institutions	 in	which	policy	
decisions	are	made.	The	literature	assumes	political	 leaders’	“instrumental	selection	of	
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actions	 to	 maximise	 expected	 utility	 given	 particular	 aims”	 (Bueno	 de	 Mesquita	 and	
Lalman,	 1992,	 p.	 18).	 However,	 it	 ignores	 the	 institutional	 context	 in	 which	 both	
preferences	and	the	expected	utility	of	certain	policies	are	formed.	
It	 is	 possible	 that	 US	 presidents	 and	 others	 in	 the	 policy-making	 process	 decide	 on	
whether	 the	 president	will	 use	 hostile	 or	 conciliatory	 statements	 about	 an	 adversary	
prior	 to	 the	 president	 talking	 about	 the	 adversary	 at	 all.	 Likewise,	 the	 decision	 over	





It	 is	not	possible	 to	directly	 account	 for	 the	 types	of	decisions	 I	mention	above	 in	my	
statistical	analysis.	The	private	nature	of	much	of	the	US’	foreign	policy	making	process	
prevents	 the	 collection	 (certainly	 in	 any	 systematic	 way	 for	 the	 268	 dyadic	 MIDs	
analysed)	of	the	information	that	would	be	required	to	make	a	determination	on	these	
matters.	I	suggest,	however,	that	my	control	variables	and	those	variables	I	included	to	
account	 for	 alternative	 explanations	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	 Balance	 and	 Force	
Used,	assist	in	mitigating	these	problems.	
The	 control	 variables,	 Democracy	 and	 Relative	 Capabilities,	 account	 for	 exactly	 those	
factors	that	existing	literature	leads	us	to	believe	will	influence	policy-makers’	decisions	
over	 whether	 to	 use	 force	 against	 an	 adversary	 or	 not,	 as	 discussed	 in	 section	 5.1.3.	
Assuming	 that	 policy-makers’	 decisions	 over	whether	 to	 use	 force	 are	 not	 completely	
random	 but,	 rather,	 strategic	 and,	 therefore,	 driven	 by	 an	 analysis	 of	 an	 adversary’s	
political	 system	 or	 relative	 strength,	 then	 by	 including	 Democracy	 and	 Relative	
Capabilities	 in	 my	 analysis	 the	 foreign	 policy	 decision-making	 process	 is	 indirectly	
accounted	for.	
Similarly,	 US	 Side	 A	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 account	 for	 the	 process	 of	 policy-making.	 In	
discussing	 US	 Side	 A	 in	 section	 7.12.2	 I	 mentioned	 that	 a	 number	 of	 colleagues	 had	
suggested	 to	me	 that	 a	 state	 having	 initiated	 a	 dispute	might	 be	 positively	 correlated	
with	 it	using	 force	during	 that	dispute.	Their	belief	was	not	 that	 the	act	of	 initiating	a	




8.2.3 Coercive Practices Other Than the Use of Force 
It	needs	to	be	made	clear	that	the	use	of	armed	force	does	not	account	for	the	entire	set	
of	coercive	practices	that	a	state,	and	the	US	in	particular,	has	at	its	disposal	in	dealing	
with	 adversaries.	 There	 are	 clearly,	 for	 example,	 economic	 practices	 that	 constitute	
attempted	 coercion.	 As	 a	 recent	 example,	much	 has	 been	made	 of	 the	 current	 “trade	
war”	 between	 China	 and	 the	 US	 (see	 Pham,	 2018;	 Klein,	 2018).	 These	 alternative	
coercive	practices	 are	disproportionately	 available	 to	 powerful	 states,	 such	 as	 the	US,	
that	 have	 more	 economic	 and	 diplomatic	 clout	 than	 the	 “average”	 state.	 This,	 again,	
highlights,	that	the	findings	herein	cannot	be	generalised	to	states	beyond	the	US.		
The	above	does	not	discredit	my	choice	of	armed	force	as	a	dependent	variable,	it	simply	
suggests	 that	 future	 research	 on	 the	 public	 statements	 of	 political	 leaders	 should	
attempt	 to	understand	 the	 relationship	between	 these	public	 statements	 and	 coercive	
policies	 other	 than	 the	 use	 of	 armed	 force.	 In	 this	 instance,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 PhD	
research	 in	 which	 I	 had	 already	 undertaken	 extensive	 data	 collection	 concerning	 the	
independent	variable,	Conciliatory	Statements	(see	chapter	4),	it	was	not	feasible	to	also	
assemble	data	on	numerous	dependent	variables	(i.e.	different	coercive	practices)	and	
test	 the	 relationships	 between	 these	 dependent	 variables	 and	 public	 presidential	
statements.	Among	 the	many	coercive	practices	states	employ,	 the	use	of	armed	 force	
against	 an	adversary	demarcates	 a	 clear	 “red	 line”,	 exceeding	other	 levels	of	hostility.	
Understanding	the	relationship	between	public	US	presidential	statements	and	the	use	
of	 armed	 force	 by	 the	 US	 represents	 a	 starting	 point	 from	 which	 to	 explore	 the	
relationship	between	public	statements	and	other	forms	of	coercion.	
8.3 Contributions and Final Concluding Remarks 







of	 war	 scholars.	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 theoretical	 arguments	 used	 to	 ground	
preceding	investigations	into	hostile	statements	of	state	leaders	were	equally	applicable	
to	conciliatory	statements.	Following	the	work	of	Levy	et	al.	(2015),	Tingley	(2014)	and	
Tomz	 (2007)	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 there	 were	 no	 theoretical	 reasons	 to	 believe	 that	
audience	 costs	 applied	 only	 in	 cases	 where	 state	 leaders	 acted	 inconsistently	 with	
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appearance	by	a	US	president.	Due	 to	 lacking	data	on	when	 the	US	 first	used	 force	 in	
disputes	 prior	 to	 1993,	 it	 also	meant	 consulting	 secondary	 resources	 to	 establish	 the	
exact	 date	 that	 the	 US	 first	 used	 force	 in	 50	 dyadic	 MIDs.	 Furthermore,	 in	 order	 to	
ensure	 that	 the	 statements	 included	 in	 my	 dictionary	 were	 reliably	 conciliatory,	 I	
undertook	a	number	of	steps,	including	an	inter-coder	reliability	process,	to	ensure	that	
dictionary	entries	were	not	the	result	of	personal	bias	or	interpretation.	
Finally,	 I	 conducted	 the	 first	 large-n	 study	 in	 which	 the	 balance	 of	 conciliatory	 and	
hostile	statements	made	by	US	presidents	was	statistically	tested	for	a	relationship	with	
the	US’	use	of	force.	I	found	that	where	the	balance	of	statements	was	more	favourable	






president.	 As	 I	 write	 this	 conclusion	 Trump	 is	 about	 to	 meet	 with	 Kim	 Jong-un.	 I	
mentioned	in	my	introductory	chapter	that	Trump	had	publicly	expressed	a	willingness	
to	attend	such	a	meeting	more	than	a	year	ago	(Diamond	and	Cohen,	2017).	Did	Trump’s	
statements	 expressing	 his	willingness	 to	meet	 have	 an	 independent	 effect	 on	 the	 fact	
that	 the	meeting	now	 seems	destined	 to	happen?	 I	 am	not	 sure.	What	 I	 am	 confident	
about	 is	 that	while	 the	 public	 statements	made	 by	 political	 leaders	 are	 not	 always	 as	
news-worthy	 as	 many	 of	 the	 events	 that	 international	 relations	 and	 political	 science	
scholars	 study,	 such	 as	 military	 coups,	 economic	 booms	 and	 busts,	 peacekeeping	
operations,	 electoral	defeats	and	victories,	 they	 represent	a	 commonplace	phenomena	
in	international	politics.	The	fact	that	they	are	an	everyday	occurrence,	unlike	the	events	
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10.2 A2 – Instructions for Intercoder Reliability Process 
Context	
For	my	thesis	I	have	established	a	“dictionary”	of	conciliatory	words	or	phrases	used	by	
US	Presidents	while	in	disputes	with	other	countries.	I	selected	these	words	or	phrases	
from	a	random	sample	of	all	presidential	speeches	made	while	in	dispute	scenarios	
between	1950	and	2010.	
As	the	occurrence	of	these	words	or	phrases	in	the	speeches	of	US	Presidents	will	be	
used	to	calculate	how	conciliatory	their	speech	towards	adversaries	is,	it	is	important	
that	we	can	be	confident	the	words	or	phrases	included	in	my	dictionary	are	
conciliatory.	Inter-coder	reliability	is	an	important	part	of	ensuring	this.	
Task	
Conciliatory	words/phrases	are	defined	as…	
any	verbal	statement	made	by	a	state’s	political	leader	that	directly	refers	to	the	
dispute	in	question	and,	a)	expresses	a	willingness,	preference	or	commitment	to	
interact	with	the	other	party	to	the	dispute	in	a	non-coercive	manner,	and/or,	b)	
expresses	a	willingness,	preference	or	commitment	to	not	interact	with	the	other	
party	to	the	dispute	in	a	coercive	manner.	
Hostile	words/phrases	are	defined	in	Roseanne	McManus’	(2014)	work	as;	
1. Negative	characterisations,	denouncements	or	complaints	about	the	status	
quo	or	another	state’s	behavior.	
2. Concrete	demands	or	concrete	refusals	regarding	the	adversary.	
3. Explicit	threats	towards	the	adversary.	
	
I	have	randomly	selected	10%	of	all	the	words/phrases	I	have	included	in	my	dictionary.	
This	amounts	to	40	words/phrases.	I	have	done	the	same	with	McManus’	dictionary,	
randomly	selecting	26	of	the	264	hostile	words	or	phrases.	I	proceeded	to	find	every	
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instance	of	these	words	or	phrases	in	the	same	body	of	text	that	I	used	in	initially	
establishing	my	dictionary.	I	have	“pulled	them	out”	of	the	text	by	using	the	AntConc	text	
analysis	software.	The	software	also	provides	150	characters	either	side	of	the	word	or	
phrase	to	be	coded	(highlighted	in	red)	to,	hopefully,	give	you	some	context	to	what	is	
being	said.	
What	I	would	greatly	apprciate	you	doing	is	reading	through	the	various	instances	of	
words	or	phrases	and	making	a	decision	on	whether	you	think	the	word	or	phrase	in	
question	is,	in	that	instance,	conciliatory,	hostile	or	neither.	Please	use	one	of	the	pens	
provided	to	write	“C”,	“H”	or	“N”	above	the	word	or	phrase	in	question	(highlighted	in	
red)	to	indicate	your	answer.	
As	far	as	possible,	please	code	the	statements	as	they	stand,	rather	than	trying	to	
interpret	a	deeper	meaning	to	the	Presidents’	words.	My	research	aims	to	answer	
whether	public	statements	influence	policy,	not	whether	what	is	said	is	an	accurate	
presentation	of	intentions.	It	is	entirely	consistent	that	a	President	may	say	“we	want	
peace”	when	really	they	want	to	go	to	war.	The	question	I	attempt	to	answer	is	whether	
armed	force	is	less	likely	after	the	President	having	said	that	they	want	peace.	
Similarly,	additional	words	are	provided	either	side	of	the	word/phrase	in	question.	
This	is	important	in	providing	context	and,	of	course	a	word	or	phrase	cannot	be	
completely	removed	from	its	context.	However,	please	remember	that	it	is	only	the	
word/phrase	in	question	that	you	are	trying	to	code.		For	example,	if	you	think	that	the	
instance	of	a	word	or	phrase	you	are	coding	is	conciliatory,	yet	words	or	phrases	
immediately	preceding	or	afterwards	are	hostile,	please	do	no	think	of	the	latter	words	
as	“making”	the	conciliatory	word/phrase	less	conciliatory.	It	is	possible	for	conciliatory	
and	hostile	words/phrases	to	be	used	in	the	same	sentence.	
Throughout	the	course	of	our	coding	we	will	stop	at	intervals	and	come	together	to	
discuss	the	process	and	any	particularly	difficult	decisions.	These	breaks	will	occur	
every	20	minutes	or	so	to	begin	with,	as	you	familiarise	yourself	with	the	process.	Once	
you	feel	familiar	enough	with	the	task	we	will	meet	every	hour	or	so,	if	necessary.	It	is	
fine	to	change	any	instance	of	your	coding	in	light	of	meeting	to	discuss	progress.	
However,	this	is	never	required.	Your	coding	decisions	should	be	a	representation	of	
your	views	on	the	word	or	statements	to	be	coded,	guided	by	the	instructions	herein.	
Usage	
Following	our	completion	of	the	above	task	I	will	enter	both	of	our	coding	decisions	into	
NVivo	11.	I	will	then	run	a	coding	comparison	query.	NVivo	will	produce	a	Kappa	
coefficient,	an	accepted	means	of	establishing	the	degree	of	agreement	between	coders.	
Your	decisions	will	help	me	determine	whether	I	have	set	my	coding	process	up	
properly.	High	agreement	between	us	will	indicate	that	the	phenomenon	of	interest	
(conciliatory	statements)	can	be	identified	and	collected	systematically	using	my	
definition	and	coding	process.	Low	agreement	would	indicate	that	there	is	more	random	
error	involved	in	my	coding	process.	
	
